President Mbeki: Innocent as the wolf of Joseph’s blood! (2-3)
Obstacles in the Way of Sudan National Dialogue
By Elwathig Kameir
As I concluded in the previous article, “The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) appears helpless, in the face of the Sudanese government, due to the Council’s lack of requisite powers and necessary mechanisms to implement its decisions “(Sudantribune, 17 October 2015). The objective of this article is to shed light on the real and concrete obstacles to both the process of negotiations, with the armed movements, and the inclusive national dialogue. I contend that these hurdles are the creation of our own political forces, elites, and governments, of which President Mbeki is innocent as the wolf of Joseph’s blood! These obstacles include
I. The Addis Ababa Preparatory Meeting
1. As illustrated, in the above mentioned paper, “AUPSC: Toothless” the preparatory meeting (which is not a “conference”, as some mistakenly persist in labeling it) is not an initiative of the opposition, but one of the steps adopted by the AUPSC at its meeting No. 456,of September 2014, and reaffirmed by the recent Communique 539. It is important to realize that the idea of the preparatory meeting had already been put forward by the Chairman of the AUHIP and accepted by both parties to the negotiations, as embodied in the (Draft Framework Agreement, April 30, 2014), and referred to by the mediation as “The Agreed Text”, or the “Colored Document “, between the government and the SPLM – North.
2. It came as no surprise that the government refused to participate in such a meeting. Indeed, the President himself, had in a televised speech (December 23 2014), slammed the meeting and strongly rejected the idea of participation in any gathering held outside the country. Following this explicit directive, I was almost certain, and wrote in my article “Putting All the Eggs in the Basket of Communique 456”, Al-Rayaam, 19 March 2015, before the scheduled date of the meeting on 29-30 March: “I don’t think that President Mbeki will be able to bring the NCP to the table of the proposed all-parties stakeholders’ meeting in Addis without securing al-Bashir’s consent”. Again, al-Bashir, after nine months, this time, in front of the Sudanese community in Beijing, against the backdrop of Communique 539, which stressed the imperative to hold the proposed Addis Ababa preparatory meeting, declared in a stringent tone; “I will not allow any dialogue abroad, I am chairman of the dialogue, and nobody else can come to preside over the dialogue and be president over me, whether they are from the African Union, or anywhere else” (Alshrooq TV Channel, 4 September 2015).
3. Therefore, it is clear that the President wants to be at the center of any possible political settlement. It is a clear message, to the opposition and international community, that no deal can be concocted behind his back. Upon hearing this news, the “7 +7″ mechanism, of national dialogue, rushed to reject the resolutions of Communique 539, describing it as unfortunate, labeling it an impediment to the whole process. In my opinion, this is the main reason behind the reluctance of the government to participate in the proposed meeting. Indeed, nobody, in the party or government, dares challenge the President’s decisions. al-Bashir’s position, in my opinion, can be attributed to a strategic consideration of the ruling regime in approaching both negotiations, with the armed movements, and the national dialogue process. This will be explained later, when examining the obstacles to these two tracks.
4. The Government cited several motives for its failure to attend the meeting, which was called for by the AUHIP, in Addis Ababa, in late March 2015, including its disapproval of participation in any meeting, which brings together the armed movements and all civil opposition factions, in any venue outside Sudan. Other arguments, not always subject to public disclosure include:
? The government does not want to be engaged in a meeting outside the country with civilian political forces. Meanwhile, it also holds the view that negotiations with the armed movements should be the government’s prerogative, as the constitutionally ruling entity, in dealing with armed movements waging war against the state.
? The government was suspicious of the diplomatic and media offensive to be triggered by the participation of a cohort of political forces, regional and international organizations, and civil society, with the attendant potential for “booby-trapping” of the meeting’s agenda. Ironically, the civilian and armed opposition, and civil society organizations, spared no effort to inflate the impact of their participation, and amplifying the meeting’s expected outcomes, and the international community’s support for their positions, thus making the government even more skeptical and apprehensive of participation in such a meeting. In the words of a prominent leader in the NCP, Gotbi al-Mahdi, “the reason for reluctance to attend the meeting is the government’s fear of falling into the trap of the hidden objectives of this conference,” (Aljareeda, September 3, 2015).
? Procedural reasons, along the lines of: no invitation was extended to the 7+ 7 mechanism of national dialogue, nondisclosure of the participants’ identities? especially the representatives of civil society organizations, the call for the meeting came too late, and at a time when the government had already decided to go ahead with the scheduled general elections, regardless of the outcry of the opposition political forces, and pleas of the international community. Furthermore, many of the participants in the national dialogue were themselves candidates in these elections, thus the impossibility of abandoning their electoral campaigns.
? No doubt, the alliance between Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi with the SRF, has affected the ruling regime’s calculations, since participation in the meeting would portray the government’s at least tacit acknowledgment of the “Paris Declaration”, or “Sudan Call”, an impression that it has always avoided conveying. Perhaps, this explains why the Chairman of the AUHIP opted to separate, into two documents, the signing of the Agreement on “National Dialogue and Constitutional Process”, Addis Ababa, September 4, 2014. The first one, between the AUHIP and Ahmed Saad Omar (DUP) and Ghazi Salah al-Din, on the one hand, as representatives of the 7 +7 mechanism, from the government and the opposition, respectively, and the second one with Imam al-Sadiq Mahdi and Malik Agar, representing the forces of the “Paris Declaration”, on the other hand. The NCP, as the ruling party, was only a witness. Imam al-Sadiq has been subjected to arbitrary arrest and unbecoming treatment by the government, though he was a staunch supporter of dialogue with the ruling regime, a position that had earned him hostility of many political forces, and put him in confrontation even with the leaders of his own party. The abrupt defection of -Imam Sadiq from the “Leap’s” boat was a strong personal blow to the President, who, according to reliable sources, was seething with anger at Imam Sadiq.
? To reiterate my views, as included in the article entitled “Communique 456”, the scene of -Imam Sadiq joining hands with the “rebels” around the same table, and exchanging smiles with his new allies, is intolerable for the President, unless of course -Imam Sadiqcomes back into the fold of the dialogue, and returns to Khartoum (Sudantribune, 17 March 2015) In the President’s eyes, -Imam Sadiq has kidnapped his own national dialogue initiative of January 2014, and is calling to remove him from the leadership of the national dialogue mechanism in favor of a “national” figure, namely; a judge (Sudanile, 12 September 2015). Nevertheless, the ruling party will continue in its efforts to convince Imam Sadiq to return and participate in the national dialogue.
? In addition, there are some political parties, in the opposition , especially the Popular Congress Party (PCP), and some Baathists and Nasirists, who stand against the idea of any meeting outside Sudan, under the pretext of the possibility of foreign intervention in national issues and the abduction of dialogue by third parties. While, there are other factions of the opposition, under the banner of the National Consensus Forces (NCF) who have definitively, and in stern language, closed the door to participation in the preparatory meeting: “while appreciating the efforts exerted by the African Union, and the AUHIP, the meeting (of the NCF leadership) stressed that the NCF’s, already endorsed, political position is to take the road of the popular uprising, leading to the overthrow of the regime. Thus, engagement in any dialogue is contingent on the regime’s response to the conditions declared by the NCF, in September 2014 (NCF, 1September 2014). On the part of the armed movements, this is exactly the position of Abdel-Wahid Nur, the leader of a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). Though the Addis preparatory meeting was presupposed to bring together all political forces, and/or stakeholders, to discuss procedural issues related to the convening of the national dialogue in Khartoum, there is no doubt that the differences, between the opposition forces, , stand in the way of holding such a meeting. Thus, compromising the “inclusive” nature of the meeting, which has been strongly called for by the opposition forces, while providing the government with strong justification for marketing its own arguments against the meeting. In other words, the fragmentation of the opposition has served, if inadvertently, the purpose of the government par excellence.
? Perhaps, for a proper understanding, it is important to recognize that the proposed measures by the APSC, as stated in the Communique, are purposely sequenced in a way so that they start with separate although synchronized negotiations on cessation of hostilities, immediately leading to a comprehensive security arrangements agreement, both in Darfur and the Two Areas. This step is reckoned to pave the way for the proposed Addis preparatory stakeholders’ meeting. Thus, by the time the meeting is convened, a measure of mutual confidence building will have been achieved between the contending parties, and a cease-fire agreement concluded. This step would eventually complete (theoretically of course) the preparation process for holding the national constitutional dialogue in Khartoum. To dispel any doubt on this point, paragraph (iv) of the Communique urges the government to “provide the necessary guarantees for the armed movements to participate freely in the National Dialogue, once comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements have been concluded.”
? The German government (supported by the Europeans and Americans) invited all parties to the conflict to Berlin between 25-26 February 2015, in order to bridge the gap in opinion between the Sudanese opposition groups on the possible ways for resolving the crisis in the country, and finding a way to soften the terms of the “Sudan Call” Declaration. In addition, it was an invitation to open the door for engagement between the NCP, and civil and armed factions of the opposition. Since Germany is the closest Western country to the ruling regime, and a supporter, the ruling party, as stated by some of its leaders, accepted to participate in a preparatory meeting, in Addis Ababa. This, despite the fact that the Germans’ initiative altered the sequence of the steps outlined above, and prompted the convening of the Addis Ababa meeting before reaching an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, leading to a comprehensive cease-fire.
? It is pertinent to note, that the Americans retracted their support, even if it had been behind the scenes, from the German intervention, after the revival of the role of the US Special Envoy, and at a time when Sudan has found a measure of attention from the US administration, and Obama himself. But, perhaps, it contributed to the killing of the German initiative, which was no longer of interest to the US, possibly with the help of some hands in the Secretariat of the AUHIP, and eventually paving the road to the AUPSC resolution 539. The US justification is that Germany is not a member of the Troika, and has never been involved in facilitating negotiations and they did not look favorably at Germany’s sudden leap to the front, becoming the most active actor in the process.
? Despite Thabo Mbeki’s deep embarrassment, after the government boycotted the meeting he had called for, the ruling regime remains grateful to the South African government, notably following the foiled attempt to arrest the President during the AU Summit there last June. In addition, to the cordial meeting between al-Bashir and Zuma, on the sidelines of their recent visit to China, which will make it difficult for the President to categorically reject the preparatory meeting. Moreover, the African Union remains a strong supporter of the government, and I do not foresee that new tensions in regional relations will erupt, regardless of the government’s harsh criticism of the AUPSC for holding hearings attended by the civil and military opposition leaders, in Addis Ababa on 23 August 2015.
? There were conflicting statements by some of the ruling party leaders about the preparatory meeting and the possibility of its convocation. However, I believe that the government, against the backdrop of the above factors, in addition to the strength of the regime’s relationship with Germany, would accept participation in the Addis Ababa preparatory meeting, provided that it is organized along the lines of the Berlin initiative.
? What is the Berlin Accord? After extensive debate about participation in the forthcoming preparatory meeting, representatives of the parties to the conflict reached an agreement, in Addis Ababa, with the Chairman of the AUHIP on the agenda of the meeting and the identification of the participants. During the deliberations of the meeting, the opposition insisted on the participation of the NCF, women, youth, and civil society organizations. The response of the government is that this kind of participation would turn the meeting into a huge political demonstration, especially since; a) the meeting is purely of a procedural nature, related to the agenda and roadmap of the dialogue, b) it is almost impossible to agree on civil society representation, and c) some parties in the NCF alliance are against the meeting in principle. The AUHIP did not accept the logic of convening an inflated gathering, thus agreeing to restrict the participants to include: the 7 +7 national dialogue mechanism, representing the government and the opposition (those engaged in the dialogue), Malik Agar and Imam Sadiq, as delegates of the opposition and the armed movements, following a written and signed authorization by all parties to the Berlin meeting.
? In fact, the text of Article III.14 of the AUPSC Communique 56, did not clearly specify the participants in the preparatory meeting, but called for, using generalized language. a meeting that brings together the “Sudanese parties”, at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, to discuss the relevant procedural issues, in order to pave the way for the National Dialogue”. Also, the Council reiterated, in Communique 539, its call for an urgent meeting, preceding the national dialogue process, involving all the parties concerned,” without defining them. Thus, it is clear that the AUPSC has left the burden of identifying the participants to the Sudanese parties themselves, facilitated by the AUHIP, and this is what has been agreed upon during deliberations in Berlin.
II. Obstacle to National Dialogue and Negotiations
1. I firmly believe that the major obstacle in reaching an agreement with the Government is divergence between the two parties to the talks, as regards both the scope and the expected outcome, or the “end-game” of the negotiations. Therefore, the national dialogue will be an exercise in futility and its findings will not lead to a national consensus on how to move the country forward in the direction of a better future, unless all Sudanese political parties and strong engaged societal forces agree on the “scope of change” required in the institutional and political structure(s) of the Sudanese state after more than a quarter century of one-party rule. It is obvious that the NCP, on the one hand, and the rest of the political forces, on the other are not reading from the same page regarding the results and expected outcomes of the national dialogue. While, the ruling NCP admits prevalent disorders in the structures, institutions, and policies of the state, however, the party’s perspectives of change are defined by the “reform” document, on which the President’s initiative for dialogue “the leap” was premised, on 27 January 2014.
2. Therefore, the forces of both the civil and armed opposition, are invited, unconditionally, to participate in the national dialogue, called for by the “leap” initiative, under the specified framework of the reform document, and in the context of a natural constitutional evolution, with the government’s pledge to respect and implement the outcomes of the upcoming national dialogue. Meanwhile, the opposition forces aim at “dismantling” the regime through the national dialogue process or alternately opting for a popular uprising, for which armed protection might be in order. The ‘dismantling” option, in the view of these forces, means instituting full-fledged transitional arrangements, modelled on the earlier transitions occurring after popular uprisings and revolutions, to be managed by the military and civilian political opposition, and informed by the principles of the opposition program-documents, leading to the organization of free and fair elections.
3. Equally, with regards to armed conflict, the major obstacle for reaching an agreement with the Government is divergence of positions, of the two parties to the talks, on both the scope and the expected outcome, or the “end-game” of the negotiations. A difference that has always stalled the negotiations. While the SPLM-N calls for the inclusion of national constitutional issues in the agenda, the Government insists on restricting negotiations to the Two Areas. However, as in the case of the national dialogue, the upcoming rounds of negotiations will never succeed in reaching, an agreement without a common understanding between the parties on the nature and extent of the expected outcomes of the negotiations. Every party has its own perceptions and expectations of the negotiations’ outcomes, and the nature and scope of change. It is also necessary for the parties to agree on the final destination that the talks would lead to, at the end of the day, so that each party approaches the dialogue with an open mind, and confidence in the expected results. This is what the NCP should comprehend.
4. Thus, it is obvious that the positions of the government, the opposition (both civil and armed), are not only far apart, but seem more like a zero sum equation. I also repeatedly called for public opinion leaders, and all those concerned, to engage in an in-depth debate, as to whether a full-fledged transition, in the absence of the necessary conditions, is a politically realistic option, especially against the backdrop of the current balance of power?
III. The Conducive Environment Obstacle
1. The AUPSC, in Communique 456, encourages the Government to expedite its efforts towards implementing the agreed confidence-building measures, including: the release of all political detainees and prisoners; ensure political freedoms and a guarantee of full freedom of expression and publication, and providing the necessary guarantees for the armed groups freely to participate in the National Dialogue. Ironically, these measures are already provided for in the country’s constitution, they were also approved by the NCP itself, during the deliberations of the General Assembly of all participants in the dialogue, and included in the Roadmap of the (7 +7) national dialogue mechanism, chaired by President al-Bashir himself.
2. Overcoming this impediment, due to its very nature, however, remains in the hands of the government, which alone monopolizes state power and institutions, while controlling the decision-making process and the necessary implementation tools. The government is, thus, obligated to announce a series of decisions and actions aimed at reassuring opponents and adversaries, and Sudanese people at large, while sending a positive message to the international community. Of course, all laws that contravene the spirit and principles of the 2005 Transitional Constitution, and particularly with the provision of the Bill of Rights and Freedoms, and how to align them with the Constitution, will be subject to discussion and deliberation at the table of the prospective national dialogue.
3. In fact, as noted in the previous article, while the Communique 456 encourages the Government to initiate the implementation of the confidence-building steps, it does not consider these measures preconditions for the national dialogue, as is misconstrued by many quarters. However, the matter was succinctly clarified by the Chair of the AUHIP himself, in a written letter addressed to all signatories of the Addis Ababa Roadmap, on 4 December 2014, underlining that “the 12 September, 2014 Communique of the AU-PSC did not say or require that the “confidence-building” measures it mentioned in paragraph 15 are or should be prerequisites for the holding of the National Dialogue”. (Sudantribune.com, 17 October 2015) However, despite this understanding, the government is, morally and politically, obliged to honor its commitment to its own people, and the African Union, “our mother organization”, as the leaders of the regime are keen to state repeatedly.
4. In what seems like a response, albeit partial, to the appeal of the AUPSC to the government for creating a conducive environment and building confidence before the national dialogue, the President issued a decree declaring cease-fire, for two months, in areas of armed conflict. In return, the armed movements announced their willingness to sign a 6-months cease-fire agreement (SRF Press Statement, 15 September 2015). However, I continue to feel both skeptical and apprehensive as to the possibility of reaching an agreement, since it is most likely the government that will not accept the armed movements’ proposition, which aims, according to the statement, at protecting civilians, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance without hindrance, to be followed by creating a favorable climate for peace and the national dialogue process. The issue of the provision of humanitarian assistance has remained controversial, since the beginning of the negotiations with the armed movements, especially with the SPLM-North in 2011. The government strongly argues that any cease-fire agreement before first agreeing on the Negotiations Committees, on security and political arrangements, and in accordance with the time limit specified, only provides the armed movements with a “warrior’s break” in order to prepare for a longer war.
Conclusion
This contribution has attempted to review the real obstacles on the road to achieving peace and democratic transformation, in Sudan. These obstacles are primarily the responsibility of the ruling regime in the country, the political forces, whether opposition or pro-government, and their differences in the midst of the struggle for power. They are not manufactured by the AUHIP, or its chairman, President Thabo Mbeki. However, in addition to these impediments, there is also a strategic disagreement that remains unresolved, especially between the government and the armed movements, mainly the SPLM-North. This discord is worth contemplating, for, in my opinion, it is destined to sabotage both the negotiations and national dialogue.