SRF’s rejection of Mbeki roadmap is inevitable
By Eric Reeves
Some are critical of the decision by the Sudanese rebel coalition known as the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) to reject a new “roadmap” from the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki, who tabled his proposal in Addis this past week. Described as reflecting a “maximalist” negotiating view, the SRF rejection has in fact very considerable context and understandable motivation.
First, it is an open secret that the two main elements of the SRF—the Darfuri rebel groups led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, Minni Minawi, and Jibril Ibrahim on the one hand, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North (SPLA/M-N) of South Kordofan and Blue Nile on the other—are a coalition in name only. The Darfuri rebel groups are fractious, irresponsible, and in the case of Minawi, burdened with a long history of brutality and inconsistency. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is led by Jibril Ibrahim, brother of former JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, but with no real training or background justifying his leadership of the movement. For its part, the SPLA/M-N doesn’t know how to mend the rift or bow out of the SRF without seeming to be contributing to opposition splintering, a chronic Sudanese problem in opposing the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime, either militarily or politically.
Second, at this point Mbeki is deeply distrusted by all non-regime parties in opposition. Over the past eight years of relentless failure, Mbeki has supported the regime in far too many instances and is no longer considered an impartial mediator, especially by Darfuris. Moreover, on the present occasion, it was perversely foolish of him to sign his own “roadmap,” especially after the regime had signed it. This just compounds his credibility problem with the rebels groups, who knew that it was his roadmap. Why did he need to sign it himself except to ingratiate himself with the Khartoum regime?
Mbeki simply cannot any longer carry the title of “mediator” with any credibility. We should recall that “AUHIP” refers to the AU High-Level Implementation Panel,” i.e., “implementation” of Mbeki’s disastrous 2009 “Roadmap for Darfur,” which ultimately failed so badly that the absurd “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur” (July 2011) became inevitable. Mbeki has betrayed Darfur, and the vast majority of non-Arab Dafuris deeply distrust and resent him. Moreover, it has been over four years since the African Union, which Mbeki represents, proposed a credible plan for humanitarian relief in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (February 2012). The SPLA/M-N signed immediately; the Khartoum regime has continued to balk at every stage, giving the appearance of readiness, but always changing the conditions. Why on earth would the SPLA/M-N trust either the AU, Mbeki, or for that matter an international community that has done nothing to recognize the still-growing urgency of the need for large-scale cross-border/cross-line humanitarian access?
Mbeki is rightly perceived as a tool of Khartoum (for extraordinary revelations of Khartoum’s perceptions of Mbeki, see Appendix A). He should long ago have been replaced. But the AU has proved time and again that it does not take critical issues in Sudan seriously, and has repeatedly failed to confront Khartoum, even over instances of serial war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Mbeki evidently loves being in a high-profile role that has now extended over eight years, for which he has been handsomely remunerated in various ways (he began “research” for his Darfur “roadmap” in 2008). As it happens, we can learn much, very quickly, about Mbeki’s tenure from the leaked minutes of a September 10, 2014 meeting in Khartoum of the most senior regime officials. In the words of Ibrahim Ghandour, then Deputy Secretary General of the NIF/NCP and currently Khartoum’s Foreign Minister:
“But whatever we do to thank Mbeki will not be sufficient to reward him fully for the things he did for our sake and our behalf.”
Thirdly, we should remember that this regime has never abided by any agreement made with a Sudanese party—not one, not ever. The Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 2006), the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (2006), the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011, Qatar), and the various protocols of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), not one of which was fully complied with, most conspicuously the Abyei Protocol, but also the protocols on border delineation, power-sharing and wealth-sharing, as well as the “popular consultations” for South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Even the much-touted January 2002 Nuba Mountains ceasefire was immediately violated when Khartoum’s military directed two brigades, a very substantial force, to re-deploy from the Nuba to what was then Western Upper Nile, where fighting in the oil regions was still ferocious. This directly violated the terms of the cease-fire. On this issue, I closely questioned Brigadier-General J.E. Wilhelmsen of Norway, leader of the Joint Monitoring Commission, when I was in Kauda in January 2003. His response was to turn away contemptuously, saying only, “That was before my time here.” This entirely predictable violation was never discussed prominently, certainly not be those who championed the cease-fire.
With this history of non-compliance in mind, and leaving aside the problems created by the poorly led Darfur rebel groups, the SPLA/M-N clearly needs stand-alone agreements on a cease-fire and humanitarian access before it will accept any Mbeki- or AU-sponsored “roadmap.” Neither they nor anyone else seriously believes that the regime’s “National Dialogue” is anything but a charade. Mbeki, predictably, made a terrible mistake in bundling any discussion of the “National Dialogue” with the issues that matter most to the SPLA/M-N. But that he did so was his predictable concession to Khartoum, and doomed “negotiations” from the beginning (Khartoum’s negotiator, Ibrahim Mahmoud, had no authority to go beyond Mbeki’s roadmap, which the regime had undoubtedly seen before the meeting this past week in Addis).
This analysis from Sudan Democracy First Group and is surely right:
Abdelmonim El Jak, Chief Executive of the Sudanese Democracy First Group, explained the content of the roadmap agreement proposed by the AU mediator.
“The roadmap is based on two main components. The first one concerns a cessation of hostilities, a comprehensive ceasefire, and political negotiations on the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan) and Darfur, while the second component is related to the National Dialogue process, in particular to the stances of the ruling National Congress Party.” (all bold added)
El Jak stated that it was envisaged that as soon as the warring parties have signed the roadmap, the attention would immediately turn to developing an accord on the cessation of hostilities in Darfur and the Two Areas, followed by an agreement on a comprehensive ceasefire, and an agreement on political solutions for Darfur.
[Such may indeed have been “theoretically” envisioned by Mbeki and Khartoum, but good faith negotiations by Khartoum are impossible to imagine, especially as violence in South Kordofan again escalates, including aerial bombardment of civilians—ER]
“Immediately after these accords, the opposition was supposed to reach an agreement with members of the 7 +7 Dialogue Mechanism in Addis Ababa about arrangements for the opposition groups to attend the National Dialogue in Khartoum,” he said. (Radio Dabanga, March 22, 2016)
Without a stand-alone agreement on a cease-fire in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and a firm guarantee of humanitarian access, the SPLA/M-N saw that any agreement that bundled these issues with a politically manipulated “National Dialogue” would be held hostage to Khartoum’s infinitely expansible “stages, in this case the “7 + 7 Dialogue Mechanism.” In short, Khartoum could always use failure of this agreement as justification for abrogating any cease-fire or humanitarian access agreement.
Here also we must remember what the regime itself has repeatedly said about the “National Dialogue” when speaking with (erroneously) presumed total confidentiality: that it is a political ploy, simply an expedient means of giving the appearance of democratic reform (see Appendix B). The military generals who matter, especially First Vice President Bakri Hassan Saleh and President al-Bashir himself, have nothing but contempt for any real “National Dialogue,” a phrase now so expansive that it has lost all meaning. In an especially revealing remark, al-Bashir declares in a meeting of July 1, 2014 that,
“The National Dialogue is also intended to provide political cover for the present Constitution and the Decisive Summer Campaign [against rebel groups in Sudan].” http://sudanreeves.org/2015/02/18/fluent-idiomatic-rendering-of-received-english-summary-translation-of-minutes-from-july-1-2014-meeting-in-khartoum-18-february-2015/
The SPLA/M-N knows all this: they are intelligently led and know the stakes if “mediators” attempt compel them to accept bad agreement. On the political front, Yasir Arman has got it largely right:
SPLM-N Secretary General Yasir Arman Sunday accused the government of seeking to create two forums for the pre-dialogue process, one outside Sudan with the rebel groups and the second with the political forces inside the country. He further said all the opposition forces participating in the Strategic Consultations Meeting rejected the government proposals and have demanded that the National Dialogue Preparatory Meeting be held in Addis Ababa with the participation of all the opposition forces.
Of course Khartoum won’t agree to this, surrendering in part their absolute control of the “National Dialogue” inside Sudan. Moreover, the regime feels no pressure to open the process in a truly meaningful way. They are running the “National Dialogue,” and they are not about to surrender any control over, most certainly not moving discussions to Addis.
Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for the past seventeen years. He is author of Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 – 2012