A No-Fly Zone for Darfur
By MICHAEL SOUSSAN, The Wall Street Journal
After being powerless to prevent mass murder in Srebrenica and genocide in Rwanda, the United Nations appears ineffective at quelling the Sudanese government’s aggression against civilians of Darfur. Earlier this month, the U.N. reported more aerial bombings against civilians. In addition, forced relocation of villagers and continued violence by the government-sponsored Janjaweed militias hinder humanitarian workers from helping the 1.2 million refugees now “guarded” in concentration camps by some of the same militiamen who made them flee.
Just as the U.N. cannot afford “another Rwanda,” the U.S. can hardly afford “another Somalia.” Yet somewhere in between these scenarios, a way must be found to turn the tide in Darfur. A no-fly zone, of the kind that protected millions of civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan at a relatively modest cost in blood and treasure, could make the difference in Darfur, creating safer conditions for the humanitarian workers, and giving the international community more leverage in dealing with the Sudanese government.
Last month, the U.S. Congress described the atrocities of Darfur as genocide. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has advocated military intervention if U.N. threats of sanctions fail. But neither the U.S. nor the U.K. has troops to spare at the moment. And France, Germany and Russia are unlikely to take the initiative — though France did send some troops to monitor the situation in neighboring Chad, which now hosts over 150,000 Sudanese refugees.
The Security Council’s tepid threat of economic sanctions against Khartoum has failed to produce results. Even if economic sanctions are imposed, they are unlikely to resolve the crisis. In Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, sanctions worked mostly to boost smuggling and enrich crooked government officials. Sudan is not only poorer than these two countries, it also has far more porous borders.
Did sanctions save the Albanians of Kosovo in 1998? Or the Kurds of Iraq in 1991? No. In both instances, willing members of the international community had to act militarily, without the consent of the U.N. Security Council, to create secure conditions on the ground. Only then were humanitarian workers effective.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, it wasn’t even necessary to put troops on the ground. A no-fly zone was enough to dissuade Saddam Hussein from unleashing his tanks and helicopters against the Kurds. In Sudan, a no-fly zone would bring an end to aerial bombings against civilians. And the situation on the ground would change dramatically if the sound of helicopters sent the Janjaweed, rather than civilians, running for their lives.
A no-fly zone could be run from neighboring Chad, with technical assistance from the U.S. and an international airplane fleet. A U.N. mandate would be preferable, but it is unclear how it would matter to civilians in Darfur. And as the diplomatic clock ticks in Turtle Bay, many more civilians could die before the Security Council acts.
The choice, in Darfur, is not between multilateralism and unilateralism. It is between empty words and effective action in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe; between learning from the U.N.’s failures in Srebrenica and Rwanda, and plowing ahead with a policy that keeps the fate of defenseless refugees in the hands of those who forced them to flee in the first place.
What is the U.N. good for? With every crisis, the answer can only come from those who need the organization’s help. So far, the people of Darfur have lost their homes and livelihoods; they live in constant fear of attack. The priority must be to protect them (and those who would help them) from further harm. A no-fly zone is the fastest, cheapest and most effective step in that direction.
Mr. Soussan, a former U.N. humanitarian worker, is editor of African Geopolitics Quarterly.