Implications of al-Bashir’s regime dismantling

By Alhadi A. Khalifa

The enactment of the law of dismantling the regime of Omar Albashir on 28 November 2019 represents a turning point in the march of the Sudanese revolution given its implications to the future of Sudan. The law provides for the dissolution of the National Congress Party (NCP) of the deposed dictator and for the removal of the same from the list of forces that will take part in the formation of the political landscape. It also bans the regime and NCP figures from engaging in any political activities in Sudan and further confiscates the party’s property and assets in favour of the Sudanese government. In sum, the law aims at obliterating the traces of the so-called “empowerment” policy the regime had systematically carried out for thirty years to run the country with an iron fist.

The Sudanese have welcomed this law with jubilation, believing that their revolution has become more secure and is on the threshold of success, pending the eradication of the so-called “deep state” if this law is strictly applied. The passing of the law has also provided an answer to sceptics who questioned the slow headway of the civilian-led transitional government and described it as so fragile and helpless that it could cave into the aggressive counter-revolutionary forces at any time. That is why the Sudanese Professionals Association described the law as “an important step on the path to building a democratic civilian state.”

However, the most important feature in this law is its unanimous endorsement without objection from the military, which means that, from now on, the transitional government can count on the military component to achieve the objectives of the revolution. The suspicion that the military was halfhearted toward the revolution no longer holds. The military became aware that the revolution is irreversible, backed by the people’s determination to take to the streets at any time they see their revolution go off track. Based on this determination, both the military and civilians gradually converged in their attitudes toward change envisioned by the revolution. The consequence is this unanimous landmark legislation. According to Sudan Tribune of 5 December 2019, Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, in his recent visit to Washington, confirmed that the military component of the Sovereign Council welcomed the law and denied any allegations that this component had been opposed to the dissolution of the NCP of the ousted regime, stressing that it was working closely with the civilian component to achieve the tasks of the transitional government and the goals of the Sudanese revolution: freedom, peace and justice.

The enactment of the law has an equally important implication for peace being one of the three pillars of the revolution. The Revolutionary Front will rest assured that change is no sham, now that the transitional government has real power to advance toward creating the new Sudan. The legal ban of the NCP as the arch-enemy of the Revolutionary Front forces against whom they had carried arms for the past thirty years should urge them to get involved in a serious, unconditional dialogue to bring about peace and stability to the country. Additionally, the demilitarization of society as a result of the dissolution of the NCP and its brutal armed militia will certainly contribute to the creation of lasting peace.

To the NCP, the situation will no longer remain the same despite their proclaimed intent to resist the legislation. The revolution, representative of the will of the majority, cannot tolerate the presence of the same party it has laboured and offered hundreds of victims to remove from power. The NCP will not support the revolution’s vision of change, to say the least, and therefore if allowed, it will do whatever it can to undermine the effort of the transitional government to set the groundwork for revolutionizing the society, given the pervasiveness of its elements in all government institutions. The concurrent dissolution of the NCP, dismantling of its political structures and power relations, and confiscation of its assets, all rest on an intent to head off this threat.

So, instead of escaping forward and attempting to pull the country back into another dilemma, the NCP is better advised to succumb to the new reality and start to think of how to overcome its unpopularity, either by apologizing to the Sudanese people or by declaring its members’ availability to stand trial for the mess they have done to the country. Their arrogance and muscle-flexing that proved futile when the revolution was rising cannot work after the revolution has triumphed. The NCP will be the first loser in any act of violence it starts against this new law.

The author holds a PhD in Political Science and presently works as a translator in diplomatic corps. He can be reached at [email protected]