Can Nivasha peace Deal call off The Next coup?
By Salah Al Bander
Overview
Sudan’s military elite has been adamant about preserving their privileges, status, force structures and strategic plans. This legacy has persisted through regime changes (civilian, transitional, military), and radical transformations of Sudan’s internal and external strategic challenges. Yet, the institutionalisation process of politics in the post-colonial Sudan is not examined closely in the light of the cycle of civilian-military musical chairs. In reality, the boundaries and institutional capacity of the socio-political forces were defined by the dominant role of the military establishment. Yet, this issue has gone largely unnoticed by analysts and policymakers, and entirely missed by many efforts to address the challenges of a post-conflict Sudan. However, some scholars who dealt with the issue in a broader context realised that African political life, which was impacted by unrest, disorder, and conflict due to the absence and weaknesses of institutions, exert on the polity a choice based on supremacy rather than reason. On the other hand, Middle Eastern experience showed that quasi-civilian governments have an affinity to depend on the military establishment in order to maintain their hold in power. The Sudanese reality is not far away from these two conducive observations.
The general objective of this paper is to contribute to the better understanding of modalities of the safe passage to a democratic post-conflict Sudan. In particular, it aims to identify the determinants of the current military hegemony on the Sudanese polity, explore ways for further research towards ending the military’s political domination, and analyse a number of options for a better and balanced role of the military establishment in the Sudanese politics. It also explores the primary link between the rising hegemony of the military establishment on the polity within the trajectories of national security, reconstruction of civil society and sustainable development. Finally, it argues that for any credible alternatives advocating sustainable peace, sustainable democracy and social justice the tripartite dependence and the right balance between these 3 elements should be considered seriously.
The Writing on the Wall
The Sudanese state has failed to represent the interests of all groups within its boundaries; hence its legitimacy became questionable. At the same time, power struggle is a crucial element in Sudan’s crisis. Considerable attention has been paid to the multi-dimension elements of these crises. It is my contention in this contribution that equal attention should be paid to the military establishment – not only in its own right, as a major stakeholder or as a stakeseeker of power, but also because it demands study if we are to assess the prospects for survival of a democratic post-conflict Sudan. Let us pay attention to the following wake-up call:
General Joseph Lagu, who signed in 1972 the Addis Ababa Peace Accord with Khartoum, told Reuters News Agency on Monday 16th of August 2004, on the week the military establishment is celebrating its Golden Jubilee. This is a clear message from the peace partner to General Jaffar Nimeri, and an army officer who defected in 1962 in order to defeat the oppression of the Centre Establishment. In fact he was his Vice President and the rebel commander who ended the First Civil War that crippled the Sudan between 1955 and 1972. Then General Lagu added:
Interestingly, General John Grang who defected from the army in 1983 and formed the SPLA will change his position so soon from an “outlaw” to seeing himself as the First Vice President of General Omar al-Bashir. The deal is brokered by no one but the Kenyan General Lazarus Sumbeiywo. For the second time in the Sudan history the Generals are setting the scene and the boundaries of peace settlement that in the end will protect their interest.
It is some times obvious, as I have elsewhere argued, that the most probable foreseeable future for any institution was unlikely to differ significantly from its present or its immediate past. On this basis, the Sudanese military establishment is unlikely to change fundamentally 5 or even 10 years ahead from today. For nearly 50 years the al-Giada Ala’ma (Central Command) of the military establishment operated a miniature government of its own. It is controlling at present a critical mass of professional personnel and a powerful web of economic and political connections more than any group in the society and across the board of the polity. It created an elaborate institutional structure both for its own rule and for effective links to civilian supporters. The shift in its original mission of state defence to an internal security (coercive apparatus) and then to one that becomes the ultimate locus of state power is remarkable.
The Legacy
Historically, the seeds of military intervention in politics were sown, to a great extent, as early as the closing decades of the 19th centaury during the rise of the amateur generals of the Mahadia era (1884-1898). Since then the chief mission of the army is internal security and, to a lesser degree, defending its territorial integrity from any external threats. The more ambitious and more advanced colonial regime began to develop a professional army in the country. The invading Anglo-Egyptian authority established in 1905 the Military School based solely on the African ethnic affiliations and exclusion of Sudanese from Arabic decent in fear of their close association with the defeated regime of the Mahadia.
By 1917 the Eastern and Western Arab Corps were established. By the 1920s a group of national officers were actively involved in secret organisation in order to influence the political order of the day. In the Aftermath of the 1924 uprising defeat and expulsion of Egyptian army from the Sudan an independent Sudanese army was established. The Sudan Defence Force was declared functional on regional bases. The military college was re-organised by 1935 in order to cope with the new demands for professional officers at the dusk of the 2nd World War.
When the military college was established the majority of the affiliate’s officers were of African origin; 30 years later the Arabised northerners dominated the army, while the majority of the soldiers are from the African groups. The final characteristics of the military establishment emerged and consolidated by the Sudanisation process. For the first time the close association between the Jallaba business class and the military establishment was obvious. The alliance was gradually forged since the mid-1950s between this business institution and military establishment to create a structure of political order. The ultimate political domination of the military rested upon a highly interconnected political system with the Jallaba institution, a solid support of the paramilitary force Gouat aldifa alshabi (Popular Defence Forces), and a web of friendly forces of more than 60 tribal militia networks in the theatres of the resources battlefields by the mid-1980s.
The military establishment and some sections of political elite have long connected the prestige of the Sudanese state with the supremacy and status of its military. Since the mid 1960s the state security dogma focused more and more on the internal front rather than the traditional threat of aggression by foreign armed forces. By mid 1970s the armed forces moved permanently to be an instrument of internal security enforcement. This has provided further a rationale for expanding the role of the military establishment in politics. Military intelligence targeted politicians, political parties, universities, trade unions, businesses or any “suspicious” individual or group. In consequence the emerged national security doctrine attributed political problems to the perseverance of serious defects within the civilian socio-political and economic systems. Under this cover, the establishment continued for decades to prepare planning scenarios for internal conflict and continued utilising military intelligence for domestic purposes.
Since independence the country has had 7 regimes, 4 of them were controlled by the military: the first was under General Abboud (1958-64), the second one under General Nimeri (1969-1985), a 12-month transitional regime was under General Swar al-Dahab, and the present regime is under the leadership of General al-Bashir (1989- ). To-date the military establishment has controlled the country for 35 years out of the 48 years since 1956.
The national security pretext was an integral part for the military establishment to transform its role further. The only way for the military establishment to ensure ultimate dominance in the face of the threat of Southern insurgency was to use a total war approach and take control of virtually every aspect of the Sudan’s social fabric and economy. The crude validation for this argument was that the civil war, the longest standing war on any continent, requires fighting fire with fire and defeating almotmarideen (rebels) is all that matters. Violation of group rights is perceived as an intrinsic and inevitable part of the ongoing military operations, and repression is regarded as an endemic part of the transition for the advancement to secure the Dawlla al-Rashida (the Guided State) and implement the grand Islamic Civilisation Project. Indeed, in this case Islamised national security doctrine since the early 1980s was imposed at the expense of political freedom.
An Evolving Dominance
The frequent claim by the military to rule has been motivated by a perceived need to save the Sudan from weak, incompetent, corrupt, and undisciplined civilian leadership. However, the military governments that took power were marked by an escalation of civil war, and fear of social chaos as well as by harsh repression of civil and group rights. No doubt, the role of the military establishment in the process of economic development can only be judged against the political, and socioeconomic realities of the present Sudan.
Unlike other countries the military intervention in the Sudanese political as well as economic life in the post-colonial period is not claimed to be a continuation of the army’s participation in the national movement for independence. Interestingly, the military establishment rise to power is related to the momentous changes in size and organisation of the army within the context of an internal duty: the civil wars. Moreover, the historical development of the army was spurred on by developments outside the Horn of Africa as well as by national imperatives embedded within the region.
The size of the army witnessed a rapid increase in the post-colonial period. In 1956, at the independence, there were 5 thousand recruits, increased 10 times by the mid 1970s. By the dawn of the 21st century the army had increased by 50 fold to reach a 250 thousand. Many strategic factors and threats perception were advocated to justify this phenomenal increase: civil wars, domestic opposition and foreign invasion. This resulted in an ever increasing militarisation of the society and state, complicating any efforts to establish civilian control over the military and making demobilisation an essential component in achieving lasting peace and sustainable democracy.
The military high command and the ministry of defense exercised since the mid-1950s total control over the allocation of the military budget, funding priorities, as well as procurement, and supplies matters that in democracies are routinely overseen by civilian control. On parallel track, military share of the government expenditure changed considerably over the same period. In the mid 1950s the resources allocated to the military were around 8% of government expenditure. The share grew gradually and reached around 25% by 1990s, and currently is reaching around 70%. Compared to other African countries, the military share is exceptionally high (Kenya 9%, Rwanda 12%, Zaire 5%).
The relationship between the military institutions and civilian governments since the early 1970s is undergoing a major shift. For 3 decades the military establishment incrementally managed to develop a complementary set of mechanisms under the cover of “protecting the national security of the nation”. In addition to its traditional arsenal, its tools range from a web of welfare services, advanced research academies, dedicated educational schools, mass media facilities, advanced medical establishments, agricultural projects, commercial dealings companies, housing, construction, and transport. Moreover, it has the most sophisticated industrial complex for civilian and military supplies, one of the largest banks of the country (control more than 40% of foreign currency dealings), insurance and financial investment portfolios.
During the present regime the military establishment is further consolidated its institutional autonomy, its position within the state apparatus (civilian services, administrative posts, community groups ?etc), and expanding its militias (friendly forces) in the countryside. Moreover, what it distinguishes the military establishment during the present rule of General al-Bashir from those that came before him is the intension of the establishment to remain in power indefinitely and to restructure the Sudan in its own order.
Responding to Winds of Change
The military establishment perceived that the present regime is best equipped intellectually and physically to face the challenges to the country on both the security and economic fronts. It implies that these threats were enduring in nature necessitating a permanent need for support like what has been facilitated by General al-Bashir’s regime. It claims, for more than 15 years, to have a blueprint for a “new society” in which their Mashrooa alHadari al-lslami (Islamic Civilisation project) would allow them to control the state more effectively than civilian rule. Within that “modified” concept of the military establishment’s discourse, the achievement of development helps to eradicate the causes of instability. Security and development are complementary and closely linked to each other. This is further justified by stress the role of the military since the mid 1960s as a tool for development.
Moreover, its campaigns forwarded the notion that security is necessary for any kind of economic activity and for the achievement of development goals. The ultimate goal of security is to create a secure and suitable environment conducive for the realisation of development plans. In the words of the military establishment researchers the development process aims to increase the nation’s economic, social and political abilities to meet the requirements of stability and prosperity.
Sudanese military establishment is not isolated from the rest of the polity. Historical experience showed that it is part and parcel of the overall map of ideological competition, manoeuvring, factionalism, inefficiency, socio-religious cleavages, economic collapse, and political rivalry of the civilian component of the Sudanese society. Yet, the prime motivations behind the military intervention are mainly organisational, pretending to protect the state sovereignty at the time of its defending the corporate interest of the military-Jallaba institutional partnership. A focus on this link will reveal the specific logic and internal dynamics to this special civil-military hybrid of state crafting.
For the last few years, the Sudanese public opinion has reached gradually a conclusion that the military establishment cannot achieve better results than the civilian rule. The issues start with the realisation that no military rule can protect them from poverty, hunger and disease. Post-1989 the pace of changes was swift. The military, despite repeated claims, did not succeed in ending the civil wars in the South, East fronts and armed conflicts in Darfur. Whether it might have succeeded in protecting the national security of the Sudan by utilising a different approach is at least not feasible. Indeed, what constitutes a threat to national security has changed in the eyes of the public over the years to include such issues like poverty, resource scarcity, disease, hunger, migration ?etc. It challenges the purely militaristic conceptualisation of security promoted by the military establishment. The crystal fact remains that mobilising more than a quarter of a million army and popular defence forces and more than 10 billion dollars did not achieve victory.
No doubt, the high instability of all post-independence regimes in the Sudan exposes the fragility of the state. Civilian regimes emerged after a collapse of a military regime due to the withdrawal of its civilian base of power. For those civilian supporters, the military regime was not a viable choice to achieve their political ends. On the other hand, the military establishment intervenes when their financial and political resources are sharply reduced. For pluralist democracy to take root in the Sudan, both military and civilian institution must be re-structured and take on new roles.
The Challenges for Democratisation
Sudan has often been recalled as a case for despair. It is a country of great expectations and potential, but also one of missed opportunities and unfulfilled hopes. Since the early 1980s the military establishment is consolidating its position faster than any other organised group in the society. It is moving from being a major player in the fields of resources acquisition, management and distribution to a powerful stakeholder in the overall processes of economic growth and political development. It is not yet clear whether the Ingaz regime, the shared transitional period (Ingaz + SPLM), or the subsequent civilian Government with a powerful military-economic linkages and a large armed forces (GOS, SPLA, informal militia), will have the will and capability to establish the fundamental changes essential to mitigate the conditions of the poor and the chronic instability of the Sudanese polity.
In practice, the definitions and determination of which the enemy is, the mission of the armed forces, and of the legitimacy of the actions that can be executed by armed units were the work of “organic generals” of the military establishment. This very elaborate strategies and tactics involve neither the participation of the civilian governments (1964-1969; 1986-1989) nor, indeed, the pillars of civil society.
The Sudanese experience, also, showed that rising dominance of the military establishment in the political scene is less to do with the measurable exertion of influence and more to do with the organised context through which that influence was either expressed or suppressed. For example, the consistent political manoeuvrings of the Transitional Military Council (April 1985-April 1986) post-General Jaffar Nimeri regime in order to shape the ground for a favourable civilian rule on the terms of the military establishment of the day. Another example is the Higher Command ultimatum to the civilian government on February 1989, which marked turning points in the way that the military establishment perceived its role and mission. That event was the most difficult period in civil-military encounters in the history of the country. The military establishment believed that the civilian government of Prime Minister Saddiq al-Mahadi acted in ways that endangered national security. Both events taken together underlined the crucial mechanisms played by the High Command in shaping the theatre of Sudanese politics and permitted its “organic” generals to maintain considerable control over the pace, and nature of the transition to civilian rule (1986-1989) resulting in its ultimate collapse. This is the exact situation that the Sudan is going to face after the final peace agreement by the end of 2004.
Indeed, the failure of General Nimeri’s regime in 1985 has strengthened certain factions within the military and weakened others; at the same time the collapse of the civilian rule in 1989 shifted the balance among competing military factions. The prompt execution by firing squad after a summary court martial of the 28 officers in April 1990 is a case for consideration. The military establishment influences and manipulations are only as effective as the prevailing institutions of the day allow them to be. Indeed, this is, again, the risk that we are facing at present.
The above-mentioned examples reflected the covert and overt interventions of the military institution directly during an onset and a collapse (outset) of a civilian rule. In both cases the military command exercised a veto power over the direction, what priorities the civilian rule should deal with, and who should participate in it. At the same time, the situation in the opposition front is not less complicated. The integration of the al-Giada al-Shareia (Legitimate Command), the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) structure and the other military opposition militias on the leadership and the transitional programme of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) will further complicate the political scene by expanding the political participation of the armed forces and paved the way for spirals of violent competition.
Both rival camps agreed that the armed forces have a legitimate right to intervene as an actor in shaping the political system. This very complex model of interaction between the military establishment and the civilian authorities, on both sides of the conflict (government, opposition), pose substantial risks to a post-conflict Sudan. One major dilemma is how to set a clear objective to the transition: is it the demilitarisation of politics or depoliticisation of the military? What kind, how much, when and with what limitations the interventions (either covertly or overtly) are acceptable? However, it seems that the political elite of the Sudan (government and opposition) left completely the internal security final decisions and the civil war issues without any challenge in the hands of the military establishment. The cost has been the civilian loss of control over the armed forces (army and militias) and the strong autonomy of the latter for the predictable future.
Theoretical Framework
Development experts have moaned over Sudan’s inability to take advantage of its enormous size, fertile land, abundant resources, and reasonably skilled work force to place itself on the path to modernisation. To a large degree that path is blocked by the context of the civil war (1955-1972; 1983- to-date, killed 2 million, 2½ million injured, 4 million internally displaced, and exiled 2 million), factionalism and civilian/military misrule.
In the last 3 decades the interdependence between economic development and the military acquisition of resources has been the focus of limited public debate and none scholarship. The overall approach restricted the issues to the way that the state viewed its potential, perceived or actual threats to its national security. Yet, these concerns neglected or masked the proper understanding of the rising hegemony of the military establishment on all aspects of military-civilian relationship; and particularly the complex web of military-economic linkages. Indeed, some of these observations emphasised the adverse economic effects of military expenditure on development. However, the demand for a crucial restructuring of the military establishment as an integral mechanism for equitable distribution of power and resources is missing. In particular, this is an essential cornerstone for any efforts to rationalise the proper passage to a sustainable peace, sustainable democratic option, and proper allocation of resources, demobilisation and balanced military-civilian relations.
Many voices have also advocated the need for reforms and even radical changes in civilian institutions. The military establishment conducts are often responses to the civilian institutions with which it interacts. Indeed, weak institutions (party structures, parliament, judiciary … etc) invited military intervention in Sudanese politics just less than 3 years after independence. Strengthening those institutions is an essential pre-requisite towards creating a favourable context in which democratic control of the military establishment becomes a feasible option.
Nearly 4 decades of military progressive domination of the political sphere provides a window to understanding the possibilities for addressing the interdependence of national security doctrine and civil society role on accomplishing sustainable development. Little, however, is known about the military establishment precise thinking and evolving strategies. Understanding past legacies and the challenges they present is crucial in developing strategies aimed at transforming the current uneven balance in Sudanese military-civil relations. This paper tries to add few core questions, and initiate interests in filling this gap.
Given the uniqueness of the Sudanese case, a theoretically informed case study approach can provide some answers to a very complex setting. In my more detailed further study I will adopt a historical-structural perspective, considering specific events of the more than 35 years military establishment enjoying the spoils of power, and having supreme and unrestrained access to state resources. This dominance constitutes opportunities and threats for transforming the interdependence of a national security doctrine and proactive civil society role in achieving sustainable development in the Sudan.
Indeed, the advocated theoretical frame is not perfect, but it is more likely to lead to answers to a set of strategic questions and explanations for the tripartite dependence of sustainable peace, sustainable democracy and social justice in the Africa’s largest country. Yet, despite the fact that the Sudanese case has its particulars, it can provide some lessons regarding the possibilities for re-defining reforms and reconstructing political and social institutions in other war-torn communities.
Strategic Questions
A stable post-conflict Sudan must meet a set of requisites, the achievements of which challenge the prevailing situation. At the heart of this is the critical role of the state as a regulator of diverse interests within the society. Under military hegemony the army substitutes its will for that of the majority, as expressed through the electoral process. Perhaps more than any other political actor the military establishment stands to loses a crucial edge once it gives-up its hold on the state, transfer power to elected civilians, and subordinates itself to the terms of constitutional regime and democratic process. Moreover, it might indirectly partially explain the reasons behind the candid fear of military establishment from reaching any sustainable settlement of the ongoing civil war.
Undoubtedly, the passage to a post-conflict Sudan will necessary be influenced by many external factors, such as the state of economy, both nationally and internationally, the nature of the existing pre-military socio-political structures, and the force of the subjugation of civil society throughout the military rule. Moreover, a post-conflict Sudan will open a possibility of new regional policies and development strategies. Any co-operation and interaction between neighbouring countries will impact on the collective defence conceptions in the region.
The principal strategic question is what can be done to promote effective civilian control, in a structural and historical context, conducive to autonomous and highly politicised military establishment? Any interest in dealing with the issues of post-conflict Sudan and transition to sustainable democratic option will bring to the fore even more normative questions regarding the role of the armed forces.
The second set of questions is perhaps the most obvious. What type of mechanisms of power within the establishment, and by extension, the Sudanese state most vulnerable considering the limited capacity to monopolise and deploy violence and maintain it institutionally? Is the management of the ongoing civil war too important to the integrity of the country to extend that it necessitating to be left to the generals? Or is it too vital to the country not to be left to the generals? Is the post-conflict Sudan bound by national security priorities developed by the existing military establishment? How an alternative national security concepts and practices are evolved, developed, become, and remain, structured within a sustainable democratic order of governance?
Thirdly, to what extent will the rising domination of the military establishment be a powerful hurdle limiting the possibilities to subject itself to civilian control? What concrete steps are necessary to create a political climate where military subordination to civilian rule will be perceived as acceptable and feasible? Is it feasible to preserve the core and vital interests of the military establishment (institutional autonomy, assets, access to and control of resources, militias networks, organisational hierarchy ?etc) in order to guarantee positive transition to democracy? What potential for conflict between the establishment factions (hardliners us softliners; military-as-government vs military-as-institution)? How to explore the nature of factions within the military establishment? What kinds of ties bind officers to one particular faction and their relative importance? To what extend will this be useful in any decision to reform the military in post-conflict Sudan and in the process of democratisation itself? How to produce a blue-print that is agreeable to reduce the military establishment’s political power and at the same time contains potential for conflict with civilian authorities?
On the other hand, will the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) formula help the transformation from a case of ultimate military dominance, through military participation in governance, to one of some level of military involvement? Undoubtedly, all these questions will form the most challenging hurdle yet facing the redefinition of socio-political institutions of the future Sudan and beyond.
In the Sudan, the prospects for peace and democratisation are closely associated to the future of the country’s military establishment. Indeed, the resolution of the armed conflict and a peace settlement with the SPLM and the NDA, against which much of the armed forces mission had been targeted, improved chances of regional co-operation, and greater emphases on sustainable development pose a new set of challenges about the role of the army.
Simple Hypotheses
In the Sudan where political contenders too often brandished the K-47 automatic rifle and not the pen or the ballot box, I hope that in a post-conflict Sudan the mere absence of coercion is itself noteworthy. Moreover, I believe that in the experience of other countries the civilian control is a gradually incremental and lengthy process that takes serious efforts, resources and time to complete; it is bound to lag well behind democratisation itself. Furthermore, military establishment attitudes toward civilian rule cannot be better understood without disaggregating the officer corps, taking seriously the candid debate among competing factions (ideological, religious, ethnic, regional… etc) over the army’s role, and the military-economic linkages in the post-conflict Sudan.
Thus far, for the sake of informed answers I assume that the military establishment will try to maintain, consolidate acquired position or resist, with varying level of success, the winds of change in a post-conflict Sudan. Indeed, political power cannot by default transform preferences into a feasible course of action; it must negotiate its will through governing institutions.
The precise answers to the strategic questions raised earlier have yet to be compiled. Nevertheless, based on their tentative boundaries and the historical analysis of the Sudanese experience the following set of 6 hypotheses will be guiding indicators that require further examination. These will be tested alongside the military establishment responses to the issues of routes to democracy, shifts in development strategies, accountability, institutional reforms, mission of the army, and access to resources. These hypotheses are:
– One
The higher the prestige (legitimacy, credibility, reputation) of the elected civilian government and the lower prestige of the military establishment, the more likely the success of the civilian tactics (procedures towards change) to limit sphere of influence and subordinate the military establishment.
– Two
The stronger Civilian governmental actors (norms, structures, rules of procedures … etc) and supremacy the less likely for the military establishment to succeed in making influence to preserve autonomy and privileges, the more effective for civilian policymakers to contain military manoeuvres around it and advances.
– Three
The more role of the military establishment in non-military development-related areas, the more insertion of the army in domestic structures, the more difficult to subordinate the military establishment, the less stable the post-conflict regime.
– Four
The military establishment will vigorously defend their survival as an autonomous institution. Other related privileges will be defended to the degree that is critical to survival or maintenance of core interests.
– Five
The higher levels of political instability and economic crisis, the more “decisive” the military establishment will perceive its interest as vulnerable, the more likelihood that the leadership will tolerate risky means (passive or active) of confrontation.
– Six
The more shared the interest across the various sectors of the army (resources, equipment, and management), is less likely to be reduced by civilian authorities, the more likely the success of the military establishment in defence of this interest.
The Way Forward
In July 2002, the Ingaz regime under the command of General al-Bashir (now Field Marshal) in Khartoum signed with the SPLA General Grang Machakos Protocol in Nairobi. Fourteen months latter on September 25th 2003, the two warring parties, influenced by their military concerns and background, signed an agreement in Nivasha on the security arrangement. Then on January 7, 2004, the Ingaz regime and the SPLM signed an Agreement on Wealth Sharing, and by May 27th signed an Agreement on Power Sharing. The deal is going to be finally concluded by the end of 2004.
In the prevailing international, regional, and national context, there are few if any viable alternatives to the pluralistic democratic option. Nevertheless, it is very disappointing to witness the absence of any impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war on the Sudanese situation. However, the failure of the military establishment to monopolise violence and defeat the SPLM, the rejection of authoritarian regimes, and increasingly vigilant monitoring and international sanctioning of group rights abuses will add more to a favourable transitional environment to a post-conflict Sudan. Here, I hope that this brain storming session guided by this paper would lead to better focusing on the policy implications that will be considered by regional and international partners for the post-conflict Sudan. Indeed, governments friendly to Sudanese people, international NGOs, and regional institutions have a critical role (technical assistance. monetary support, and political pressure), though secondary, in restructuring the Sudanese reality. In particular, those partners seeking to help Sudan’s transition to democracy through empowering democratic institutions of the civic society, institutionalisation of effective system of civilian control of the military establishment, and assist in expanding opportunities for mass political participation.
Sudan’s historical experience underscores the interface between the forces of socio-economic interests and political setting (shaped by civil war, economic crises … etc), on the one hand, and the questions of means and agency (dictatorial military or civilian regime) involved in the process of change, on the other, as essential to the realities of the post-conflict period. It is the central paradox of peace in Sudan: any agreement will oblige the Ingaz Islamic regime to share not only wealth, but power. Any such sharing will inevitably put the regime at serious challenge, given its past dependence upon tyranny, a brutally efficient set of overlapping military and security services in order to protect their monopoly of national wealth and political power. At the heart of this challenge are the interests of powerful Military-Economic axes.
Indeed, powerful financial and commercial interests backed by the might of the Islamic banking network played a significant role in funding, providing personnel, and facilitating the operation of June 1989 military take-over by the National Islamic Front. Unfortunately, this is the less talked about issue even after 15 years of the event, and it has not received adequate attention in discussions about the route to the 1989 coup d’etat. Economic factors were a central cause in the war since 1983 (oil, water, land, and livestock ?etc). More than 60 Militias were set-up by powerful Military-Commercial interests in cattle raiding, mechanised farming, wood, gum, gems, sugar, salt, gold, drugs, arms, ivory trade, and many other resources in the Southern and Western Sudan. This is, again, the most avoided issue and less talked about in Sudanese politics. General Lagu was right in pointing to the fact that there will be no peace in the Sudan if the military is not disengaged from politics. However, I will add to his demand that there will be no peace in the Sudan if the military establishment is not disengaged from the sphere of the economy and resources extraction.
Sudan has been suffering under a long process of crisis. From being described as the “breadbasket” it is referred to nowadays as one of the hottest conflict spots, famine, chronic instability, genocide, and ranked among Africa’s top ungovernable state. Most experts expect the stressful socio-economic and political upheavals to persist for many years, perhaps even a generation. For however much the occasion of stopping the civil war and such signing peace ceremony must be cause for celebration, the realities consequent upon this purely symbolic gesture are all that matter in the end. The most crucial issue here is that for the international community to support a reconstruction and rehabilitation programme and pave the way for a sustainable peace in the Sudan that the military-economic linkages must be under scrutiny. Complete transparency about the covert and overt connection, direct or indirect, should be a precondition for any support.
In the post-conflict era, diverse new threats to long-term political and socio-economic stability will emerge. Sudan enters post-conflict period with unusual advantages of the military establishment over all other loci of power in the society. Each of these advantages may operate as a constraint in certain respects, especially if we look at who receives the benefits of the peace agreement. Indeed, the socio-economic and political burden of the military establishment is not likely to decrease by 2005, the time scheduled for the conclusion of a peace deal between the Ingaz and the SPLM, or 2012 the year fixed for the return to civilian rule. Nor is a high priority on the needs of the poor Sudanese likely where the probability of military intervention is high. Yet, any proactive outcome of answers to the aforesaid set of hypotheses in relation to the more precise strategic questions, posed earlier by this paper, may open the door for civilian’s triumph over the military establishment each and every time an issue is in dispute. Greater civil society involvement is crucial in Sudan’s efforts to resolve the bloody conflict that have plagued it for nearly 50 years.
While it is now increasingly clear that the privileged military establishment constitutes a threat to a sustainable democratic transition, the process by which it destabilises the democratic regime, governance structures, and civil reconstruction remains obscure. The problem is frequently defined by asking whether the civilian rule can live with ever expanding military establishment and where officers retain effective power. Can the post-conflict state survive the military intervention? Indeed, the peace agreement will bring with it an alternative concept of national security, a review of military doctrine, and a new foreign policy. Can the modalities that will be adopted during the transitional period begin to solve or sort out some – only some – of the challenges that lie in wait for Sudan after the Nivasha peace round of talks? The questions remain open.
No doubt, on of the most frustrating and difficult challenges faced by the civil society has been coping with military coups. Critics have asked: Could politicians have anticipated and pre-empted the coups?” The essence of the challenge for all of us, however, is not how to deal with the next coup d’etat blotters, but rather how to persuade the authoritarian Ingaz regime and its senior partner the SPLM to yield progressively their power during the transitional period in such a way that the successor is least likely to be a military regime and most likely to be decently democratic. The only remedy to the increased risk of a bending military take-over is renewed faith in capacity of the civil society and an intensely optimistic belief that together with the international solidarity we can overcome the challenges of tomorrow. Yet, international community interested in supporting democratic change can do little during the transitional period to reduce the hegemony of the military elite. Nevertheless, proactive supports to the civic groups that will, in the long-term, create a positive context for a balanced relationship between the military, government, and the civil society as a whole is badly needed. At the same time, given the gloomy forecast that the military establishment will accept any reduction for its privileges, status and power, political forces are in great need for more vigilance and unity. The focal point of this paper is for raising the core question again, and we have a responsibility to see that Sudan’s pressing needs are understood. It strives to have something to say in order to support the struggle for a sustainable democratic transformation in our country. That is the desired significance of this contribution.
This paper was presented to the Horn of Africa Conference III: “Transforming Horn of Africa: Culture of Peace vs War Culture”, 27-29 August 2004, Lund, Sweden.
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Salah Al Bander is the Director of Sudan Civic Foundation.
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