Spoilers and perils in post-settlement Sudan

Moving Beyond the North-South Paradigm

Summary

Fifteen years after the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power by force, the
Sudan is at the crossroads: although the twenty-one year old conflict in the
South has been nominally brought to an end, unremitting extreme violence in
Sudan’s western region of Darfur and lingering tensions in the central and
eastern parts of the country cast a shadow over the misnamed Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Nairobi on January, 9, 2005. Since the CPA
provides a basis for resolving Sudan’s conflicts and for fostering democratic
transformation, external actors should unreservedly support its implementation
in the face of various potential spoilers. Eventually, however, building a
peaceful and united Sudan will require broadening the scope and support base
of the agreement, and moving beyond the North-South paradigm.

By Emeric Rogier, The CRU Policy Brief*

A Historic Achievement

The signing of the comprehensive peace agreement
following thirty months of rolling
negotiations in Naivasha and other Kenyan towns
represents a historic achievement in several
respects.

First, it brings an end to Africa’s oldest war – a war
triggered by Khartoum’s unilateral abrogation of
the Addis Ababa agreement in 1983, but rooted in
a small Arab elite’s domination of the Sudan
straight away from its independence in 1956.
Secondly, the agreement provides for a fair
settlement of the conflict by addressing legitimate
grievances of the Southern Sudanese, and by
stipulating in particular a referendum of selfdetermination
for the South at the end of the six
year interim period.

Thirdly, the agreement foresees tangible democratic
changes in the field of governance that may
help to gradually abolish the dictatorial regime that
dominated the country for the past fifteen years.
Political changes at the centre combined with steps
toward effective decentralization may further create
a more conducive context for addressing conflicts
and grievances in Sudan’s other peripheral and
marginalized regions.

Notwithstanding the historic character of the CPA,
the perils and difficulties ahead are commensurate
with the size of the country. Even though the peace
agreement may provide a starting point for restructuring
the Sudan, it is actually perceived not so
much as a driver of change but rather as a bilateral
deal between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and
the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) on sharing power and wealth. It may
therefore face resistance in every region of the
Sudan, including the South, and may even be
undermined by elements party to it.

A Potential Spoiler at Each Corner

In the South, the post-settlement setting raises
serious challenges of governance for the former
rebellion. Whereas the SPLM/A has been granted
massive powers over the Southern administration,
the movement will have to maintain its unity,
transform itself into a political party, and learn the
basics of democratic governance. Despite its
popular support, the SPLM/A does not represent
the South in its entirety, since it is dominated by
the Dinkas. Hence, its forthcoming supremacy is
likely to generate fears and frustrations from other
groups, such as the Nuers and Equatorians.
The interim security arrangements are a case in
point: the Dinka-dominated SPLA will subsist
alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), but
the Nuer-dominated South Sudan Defence Forces
(SSDF) – a conglomerate of separatist Southern
militias affiliated with the Government of Sudan –
are called to disband and to integrate either of the
two recognized armies within a period of twelve
months. It is unlikely that all SSDF members
will abide by such provisions; some of them, potentially
encouraged from Khartoum, might play a
spoiling role, even more so if reconciliation efforts
among Southerners fail to make tangible progress.

SPLM/A’s brothers-in-arms in Abyei, the Nuba
Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, the Three
Areas bordering the South, should have less
reasons to complain since their case was actually
addressed in parallel with the IGAD talks1.
However, the Protocol on Abyei, while granting the
area a special status under the institution of the
Presidency, contains a number of loopholes and
shortcomings that may well obstruct its implementation.
Moreover, the Protocol on Southern
Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile states seems
unlikely to satisfy groups like the Nuba people who
claim the right to govern themselves on their
historic land but were refused, contrary to Abyei
residents, a referendum to choose between North
and South.

Frustration over the IGAD process and its outcome
has also grown in north-eastern Sudan. Since the
1990s, the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free
Lions have combatted alongside the SPLM/A
under the opposition umbrella organization, the
National Democratic Alliance (NDA), to protest,
like others, against government neglect. At present,
the two groups lack a clear reason to feel grateful to
their former allies: the SPLA committed itself to
withdraw from eastern Sudan within a year, while
NDA leaders negotiated in Cairo the conditions of
their return to Khartoum but failed to defend Beja
interests before the government. Riots in Port
Sudan in late January and the recently announced
merger of the two groups into a new party, called
the Eastern Front, attest to rising tensions in the
region.

Finally, there remains Darfur, which, contrary to all
other areas cited above, is not included in the
ceasefire zone and continues burning. If Naivasha
is a historic achievement, then Darfur is a tragic
example of what should not be done in conflict
management, in particular relying exclusively on
regional organizations that are usually held
hostage by their own members and lack the
necessary peacekeeping capacity.

In short, the so-called ‘comprehensive peace agreement’
provides for welcomed changes in the South
and possibly in Khartoum, but seems inadequate in
settling the conflicts in the Three Areas and overlooks
the eastern and western fronts. Moreover, the
ruling party’s domination is consolidated over all
northern states for the four years to come. As a
result, unresolved conflicts in the North are likely
to persist and, in the worst scenario, might link
with each other, from Western Darfur to the Red
Sea via Kordofan. Various indications suggest that
a ‘coalition of the marginalized’ is being set up,
possibly facilitated by Eritrea and by the fact that
one million Darfurians migrated over time to
Eastern Sudan. These groups might also be acting
with the blessing of the NIF’s former eminence grise
Hassan al-Turabi, whose invisible hand the GoS
thinks to see all over the country since his
dismissal in 1999. In any event, the possible
emergence of an arc of conflicts throughout
Sudan’s central belt raises critical security
questions and poses a serious threat to the
sustainability of the Naivasha agreement. But it
may not even be the biggest one.

The Threat From Within

At first sight, it thus seems that the CPA is mainly
threatened by groups not party to it. Yet, it is not
that simple. While deploring its restricted format,
opposition parties from the North largely support
the peace process in which they see an opportunity
for regime change and simultaneously for their
own political comeback. And while continuing the
armed struggle, certain rebel groups nevertheless
welcome the signing of the peace agreement in the
hope that the appointment of SPLM/A’s chairman,
John Garang, as First Vice-President will help their
cause. Eventually, the support for the peace agreement
by a given party less depends on this party’s
signatory status than on its perceived interests.

From this perspective, the biggest threat to the
peace agreement may well be posed by the GoS
itself. The NIF seized power by force in 1989 with
the aim of preventing the imminent conclusion of
a peace deal with the SPLM/A and imposing instead
its Arabo-Islamic agenda throughout the Sudan.
Fifteen years later, the Islamist project has ended
up in failure and President Al-Bashir has resolved
to make peace with John Garang. However, the
National Congress Party (as the NIF has renamed
itself) made this U-turn in the aftermath of 9/11 for
self-preservation purposes only. As its response to
the insurrection in Darfur shows, the ruling elite
remains largely attached to Arab supremacy and
the benefits of exclusive governance. It is questionable therefore whether it will actually play the game
of power sharing and let the Southern Sudanese
appropriate oil reserves by referendum.

This situation creates a serious dilemma for outsiders:
building peace and safeguarding Sudan’s
unity require the end of NCP supremacy; but the
ruling faction is likely to resist any such move and,
as Darfur illustrates, does not hesitate to resort to
genocidal violence to hold its grip on power. Hence,
the peace implementation process has a high
potential of relapse.

How Best to Promote Unity?

By signing the Machakos Protocol, the parties have
subscribed to the unity of Sudan as the ultimate
goal of the peace process. Since most Southerners – with the notable exception of their leader,
John Garang, a genuine unionist – want to break
ties with the Northern ‘Jallaba’, the challenge is
considerable and the Machakos Protocol may
eventually prove a procedure for divorce rather
than a roadmap towards unity. Moreover, the
international/ donor community is on the whole
committed to giving Sudan’s unity a chance, but as
divided as the Sudanese parties on the modalities
for doing so: ‘pro-Sudan’ donors emphasize an
even-handed and bridge-building approach
between North and South, whereas ‘pro-South’
stress the need to make unity attractive for the
Southern Sudanese. In fact, as this policy brief
argues, prioritizing unity entails moving beyond
the North-South paradigm. Guidelines are
suggested below for fostering change in the South,
the other marginalized areas, and the centre.

– If the international community actually wants to
advance the unity of Sudan and encourage
Southerners to vote accordingly in 2011, it will
first have to ensure implementation of the agreement
(through providing safeguards and enforcement
mechanisms like a robust UN force) and
help the South to catch up for its development
differential (including making extra efforts for
enhancing Southerners’ representation at the
central level). In doing so, donors should insist on
the requirements for democratic governance in
the South and press for genuine reconciliation
efforts between Southern groups.

– While hoping and working for unity, donors and
interested governments should bear in mind that
unity is not the most likely outcome; they should
therefore plan in time for ensuring respect for the
voters’ will and for possible separation.
The peace process and a vote for unity are further
unlikely to materialize if the North is conflictridden
and/or if no significant changes occur in the
centre.

– Conflicts in Darfur and Eastern Sudan should be
addressed by bringing pressure to bear on the
strongest party. Since the SPLM/A has historically
claimed to fight for a ‘New Sudan’ and risks
loosing the Naivasha dividends otherwise, its
leadership should be encouraged to play a constructive
role.

– The possibility of (re)creating (western, eastern,
central) regions after the Southern model in the
northern half of Sudan should be examined as a
way to accommodate outstanding grievances
while preserving the Naivasha framework.

– Development aid should be allocated between the
Sudan’s five main regions according to their
relative level of development.

In order to foster changes at the central level, the
international community should further induce the
signatory parties into holding on to their promise
of opening the political space to non-signatories
and should insist on accountability for war crimes.
While the national income will significantly rise in
peace-time, the donor community should also try
to spare Sudan from the well-known oil curse and
promote greater equity and transparency.

– Broad participation in public affairs should be
promoted through supporting an inclusive
constitutional review process, facilitating free and
fair elections, and providing targeted political
party assistance to the new political forces that are
coming or aspiring to come to power peacefully.
Political progress should be tangible, yet gradual
in order to ensure a peaceful regime change of
the kind witnessed in Milosevic’s Serbia.

– Accountability for war crimes should be sought
through supporting the establishment of a Truth
Commission to deal with the Southern conflict
and ICC prosecution of abuses committed in
Darfur. The US administration should recognize
that a one-way ticket to The Hague is eventually a
better option for neutralizing spoilers than a
travel ban.

– Donors should promote improved economic
management through ensuring transparency of
oil exploitation, advocating budget allocations
to social services, and effecting fiscal decentralization.
This multi-faceted approach will require a genuine
multilateral strategy similar to the one that enabled
the negotiation process to finally succeed.

Dr. Emeric Rogier is Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael Conflict Research Unit.

* Published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, the Netherlands. www.clingendael.nl.