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Editorial Board :

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SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION - CAIRO

SHRO-Cairo is a voluntary non-governmental organization concerned with human rights and is active within the area of Africa and the Middle East.

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Editorial

The 25th Issue of the Sudanese Human Rights Quarterly

The persistent collective murders and other genocide crimes by the Government of Sudan and her Janjaweed highwaymen against the innocent people of Darfur will not help to bring peace to the region. Our most recent report on the period ending in September 2007 reads: “May 22 and the succeeding days, the villages of South Darfur were bombarded by aerial attacks, as well as land operations by the government and the Janjaweed militias... Tens of civilians were murdered and thousands forced to cross the border to Central Africa.”

With these reckless attacks that inhibit the march of the Nation towards prosperity and political stability, the time is now for a principled implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the dear hope for national accomplishment. The escalated conflicts between the Central Government on the one hand, and the Government of South Sudan (as well as the people of Darfur and many groups in the other regions) on the other, testify to the urgent need to ensure the largest participation possible of all Sudanese parties and civil society groups in the national decision making of peace, democratic rule, and development in the country – instead of the failing bilateral partnership of the ruling parties.

Quarterly 25 is a crown of 15 years of voicing the Sudanese grievances, the concerns for human rights, and the striving for democratic rule.

Back in December 1992, when SHRO-Cairo was just initiated by a small group of activists, in exile, it was a dream to publish a human rights’ journal - one fully dedicated to our country’s concerns for the just and permanent peace, electoral democratic rule, and a sustainable system of social and economic development based on the equitable access to the civil and political rights, as enshrined in international norms, as well as the full enjoyment of economic, cultural, and social rights.

The first Sudanese Human Rights Quarterly was thus a great celebration when it came to light including several reports on the gross human

rights violations committed by the Government of Sudan against the People of Sudan, of which the murder of popular activist Dr. 'Ali Fadl was strongly condemned in the national and international arenas. The Quarterly documented many other violations with a special focus on the activists' views on various issues of the human rights situation in Sudan.

The 24 other issues of the Quarterly covered a vast area of human rights, peace, and democracy concerns in varying degrees. Our reports ranged between cases of individuals subjected to tortures by the notorious State Security Department, the NIF special guards, or the regular police forces up to massive massacres of army officers and regulars in April 1990 (the holy month of Ramadan); the bombardments of innocent citizens in the South; the police brutalities in Eastern Sudan and the Northern Provinces; and the ongoing genocide of Darfur populations.

The Quarterly provided a systematic up-dated documentation of these violations that should help to track the role played by the ruling party's politicians or executives in these heinous crimes over 15 years of unchecked tyrannical rule.

In this issue, we read a short report about CEDAW training workshop, an activity performed by the SHRO-Cairo women activists among Sudanese refugees in Cairo. The workshop revealed that the awareness of women about CEDAW is indeed negligible, which warrants additional efforts to increase the women's awareness of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by CEDAW as a significant part of the international human rights norms. Along with this need, the SHRO Groups Inside decided to exert more efforts to provide women with the knowledge necessary to implement CEDAW in both society and state levels of action, as much as they can.

In this Quarterly, we included summaries of 3 (three) critical papers aimed to stimulate discussion amongst a few villages in rural Sudan by emphasizing the impact of international norms on the economic, cultural, and social life. A SHRO workshop was held for this specific purpose for 35 participants whose opinions indicated the need to expand such training in the other rural areas of the Homeland.

A significant document earlier prepared on Charter for the Sudanese Women in the early 1990s is included in this Issue. At this point, the Or-

ganization reiterates a lifetime commitment to collaborate closely with civil society groups by collective planning in the national scope to boost the concern for women's rights, as stipulated by international human rights norms, independently from all governmental or partisan influences or forms.

The human rights activities by all democratic NGOs will surely proceed with consistency and integrity, only if all political parties and government departments pledge to respect the independent status of these NGOs, indiscriminately in legal and practical terms, especially those of them concerned with the women's groups and trade unions and the grass-roots initiatives of rural Sudan.

Mahgoub El-Tigani
Editor-in-Chief

The Situation of Human Rights

(May 1-September 30, 2007):

Mohamed Hassan Daoud
SHRO-CAIRO SECRETARIAT

Between May 1st and the ending September of 2007, the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms was never abated. Many violations were committed against the right to free press, peaceful assembly, and organization. Many citizens were arbitrarily arrested, while many suffered long months in unlawful detention without charge. Acts of violence continued unabated, including extra-judicial killings in the regions of Darfur and Southern Kordofan. The ultra-violence of police forces by firearms to suppress popular demonstrations resulted in scores of murdered people and injured victims.

Reported in the same period were many suspensions and/or confiscation of papers, in addition to interrogation of chief editors and journalists by the security organs and the Press and Publications' Attorney.

Up to the end of September there wasn't any change in the case of the citizens politically dismissed from public service or the state privatized enterprises, despite decisions by the National Council adopted by the Presidency to reinstate the purged employees whose ages might qualify them to take up jobs, in addition to medical insurance for retiring ages. A parliamentary report estimated the strength of the purged employees as 4,000 persons, whereas those dismissed from the privatized institutions of the state were 95,000 estimated individuals, or even more, in the period between June 1989 and August 2006. The real figure, however, might be much bigger than these estimates, according to other sources.

The security situation deteriorated in Darfur leading to the influx of tens of thousands of the displaced population. Attacks continued on international relief employees and the African Union force which witnessed by the end of September the worst operation against its troops. In the first half of June, 9 convoys carrying food from the UN Food Program were severely attacked by armed people in Darfur. The Program announced it would not be able to reach about 170,000 persons in June because of this situation.

On September 20, an armed group shot eight employees working with

the World Vision relief agency. Three persons were seriously injured; Mohamed Hamid al-Mahdi and ‘Abd al-Rahman Eissa were shot in the head. The UN said that the attacks on relief workers increased by 150% in June this year compared by June last year.

By the end of September the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees announced it was forced by meager sources to reduce its operations in West Darfur. The commissariat said there was 7.1 million dollars deficit in the required budget for Darfur in the year 2007. The failures in the security situation and the influx of displaced people swell the camps around al-Ginaina and Zalingi beyond their maximum capacity.

On September 30, ten of the AU soldiers were killed and eight soldiers injured by the worst attack launched on an AU basis at Haskanita in South Darfur, which had been plagued with fierce fighting between government troops and the rebels.

The relationship between the two Naivasha peace partners worsened to an extent that threatened the stability of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with possibilities of “a renewed war,” as relayed by the President of South Sudan Government.

The Government of Sudan refused to deliver the Sudanese State Minister Ahmed Haroun and the government-backed leader of the Janjaweed militias ‘Ali Koshai to the International Criminal Court. Moreover, the dispute between the government and the United Nations concerning the international peace-keeping troops in Darfur has not yet been resolved, which delayed the deployment of the troops in Darfur.

Violating the Freedom of Press and Expression

May the 11th, the Press and Publications Attorney (PPA) in Khartoum North summoned Kamal Hassan Bakheit, the editor-in-chief of Al-Ray Al-‘Am journal, accused together with his economic reporter by the State Security Department for publication of news “negatively affecting the Sudanese-Egyptian relations.” Pledging to appear before the Attorney’s Office as might be required Bakheit was released by a personal bond.

May the 17th, Al-Sudani paper was suspended for unspecified period of time by the PPA who decided further to suspend the paper until it might be discharged from a law suit by the Minister of Health versus the paper whose editor-in-chief had been arrested with journalist Osman Merghani, another writer who asked the Minister of Justice to resign his

position for failures in the due process of justice.

May the 19th, the journalists organized a demonstration in protest of the authoritative suspension of papers. The journalists called on the resignation of the Minister of Justice since he had been abusing certain provisions in the law about “polluted foods,” in addition to assaulting the public by suspending the papers and committing other breaches of peace.

May the 24th, the Press and Publications Council decided to suspend journalist ‘Abd al-Baqqi al-Zafir from writing to Akhbar Al-Yom journal because he had criticized the Council’s decision to disallow the papers from imparting news about the military in Darfur.

On June 6, the deputy editor of Al-Ayyam, Kamal al-Sadiq, and the retired brigadier ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Khalid, Chairperson of the National Alliance Party, were summoned before the Khartoum North Court in relation to a writing by the latter criticizing the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics. These criticisms were considered defaming to the Armed Forces.

By mid June, the security authorities arrested four journalists who had been covering events in Kajbar.

On July 3, the authorities prevented journalists from traveling from Khartoum to Juba on a UN aircraft. Only UN employees were licensed to use the UN flights, insisted the authorities. A spokesperson of the UN Expedition in Kharotum said she had asked the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain this abrupt prevention which took place despite the fact that the UN flights used to allow non-UN employees, particularly government officials from the Government of South Sudan in addition to members of the Cease Fire Joint Military Command. The spokesperson asserted the UN would assist the journalists among others to be able to perform their duties and to witness all events directly.

On July 24, Mahgoub ‘Irwa, editor-in-chief of Al-Sudani newspaper, came before the Khartoum North Criminal Court in response to a law suit by the Egyptian Embassy vis-à-vis Al-Sudani reporting of visa corruption.

August 8, the Civil Aviation Department at the Khartoum Airport stopped the travel of a number of journalists and media personnel who were about to take flight with the UN Special Envoy Ean Elison for a scheduled tour in Darfur. The Director of the Department said that a directive had been earlier issued suspending flight of all non-UN staff in

the UN flights.

On August 21, the authorities suspended 17,000 copies of Ray Al-Sha'b paper claiming that it breached an agreement not to publish details of sabotage the authorities managed to end.

August 28, the authorities suspended without charge 15,000 copies of Al-Midan before they were distributed. It was assumed,

however, the confiscated paper included information about new arrests at Kajbar.

Violating Public Rights and Freedoms

Early in May, the authorities of the Red Sea State refused to permit the Port's Workers' Union to march with a Memorandum to the Governor about their labor demands.

In the midst of June the University of Khartoum Workers' Union went in strike for 3 days protesting the forced retirement of 47 professors. The union claimed that the retirements violated the principles of independence of universities and that the University was in dire need for the service of the retirees. The University Council had already rejected the ending of a professor's tenure by age if the professor would still be able to work. The Council considered the decision politically biased since it had selected for retirement members of the Professors' Union.

On May 21, the authorities of the Kassala State refused to allow the East Front to demonstrate in protest of the slates finalized for appointment in constitutional posts. The authorities justified the rejection saying the requested demonstration was planned during meetings of the Joint Committee on Security Arrangements.

On May 21, officers of the Sudanese Liberal Party were harassed and intimidated by the authorities upon their visit to the Nuba Mountains and South Kordofan. Muhanad Zamil, member of the party's media and information office, was harassed by a group dressed in military uniform. Zamil was beaten up and almost kidnapped. That night, the residence of Nor Tawir was also shot by firearms.

In June the 'Ulama Al-Sudan Group issued a fatwa [religious decree] prohibiting the engagement of girls in media commercials. The group called upon the authorities to end decisively "this shameless chaos and exploitation of women." Equally, the 'Ulama depicted a show of men's dress as "a disgrace of manhood against the Sudanese values for which

an investigation must be immediately done.” On June 7, the authorities of the Red Sea State stopped the Beni ‘Amir Consultation Council from commemorating the anniversary of the late Sheikh Musa Hussain Dirar, the former deputy governor, at the Peace Hall of the State.

About the 18th of June, the authorities refused to permit the People’s Congress Party to convene its June 21st scheduled state conference.

June 21, the Khartoum security authorities curtailed the Minbar Abna Darfur [Forum for the Children of Darfur] from completing a workshop on “unifying visions on Darfur.” The police prevented the audience from entering the meeting hall which was attended by the European Union financiers of the workshop.

June 24, the authorities curtailed Khalid ‘Abd-Allah Jadeen, Chairperson of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) at the Khartoum Legislative Council, from traveling to Cairo for medical reasons by order of the Minister of the Interior. In protest, the SPLM group boycotted meetings of the Council.

September 12, Assistant to the President Chairperson of the East Front Musa Mohamed Musa was forced to postpone a visit to Port Sudan in protest of a prevention imposed by the Red Sea Government upon his reception at the Daim al-‘Arab area.

Arbitrary Arrests and Trials

In the closing week of May the authorities arrested in Zalingi both Yasin Sa’d and al-Sayed Anees of the Jazarona Organization on their return from al-Hamidiya Camp. The two persons were arrested from inside a UN vehicle.

June 13, the authorities of Dongola in the Northern State arrested 4 (four) journalists who had been covering peaceful protesting of people against construction of the Kajbar Dam. The journalists were Al-Fatih ‘Abd-Allah (Al-Sudani Journal), Qadaffi ‘Abd al-Mutalib (Al-Ayyam), Abu al-Qasim Farahna (Alwan), and Abu ‘Obaida Awad (Ray Al-Sha’b). Also arrested were lawyers ‘Alamaddin ‘Abd al-Qayoum, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Qayoum, and ‘Imad Merghani Seed Ahmed. The arrests included many citizens in Wadi Halfa, Dongola, as well as several towns of the National Capital Khartoum. The authorities arrested subsequently a number of the speakers, including Dr. Mohamed Jalal Hashim, in a forum held at the Abna Sakoat wal-Mahas Club in the Diyoum Sharq area of Khartoum.

On July 15, the security authorities arrested politicians and military personnel in Khartoum accused of engaging themselves in a conspiracy to sabotage the National Capital. The accused persons included Mubarak al-Fadil, ‘Abd al-Galil al-Basha, ‘Abd al-Rahman Shamla Khalifa, Yagoub Yahiya, engineer Hassan Mohamed Haj Musa, Salahaddin Hamad al-Sayed, Ahmed Suliman al-Dood, Siddig Khalid ‘Abd al-Nabi, Tawir Osman Tawir, and Kabashi Khatir Mohamed Ahmed. The military personnel included army Lieutenant-General Mohamed ‘Ali Hamid, Police Lieutenant-General Salah al-Nour Mattar, Brigadier Ibrahim ‘Abd-Allah Abu Goroun, Brigadier al-Tayeb Ahmed Khalid, Brigadier Khalifa Ahmed Mohamed, Brigadier Taj al-Sir Mahmoud, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Ata al-Manan Seed Ahmed, Lieutenant-Colonel Usama Mohamed Sakran, Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed Hassan Nasr, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Ali Khalifa Mohamed, Major Mustafa Ibn ‘Oaf Mohamed, Police Captain Salah Hassan al-Fahal, First Lieutenant Waheeb Ahmed al-Amin Diyab, First Lieutenant ‘Abd al-Rahman Shimayla Khalil, Lieutenant Walid ‘Awad Hassan, and Lieutenant Hatim Adam Suliman.

Within a few days, the number of the arrestees increased to 40 persons. It was repeatedly reported that many of them had been tortured. On July 30, the authorities arrested the Deputy Chairperson of the Democratic Unionist Party ‘Ali Mahmoud Hassanain for the same charge.

On July 20, the authorities arrested ‘Osman Ibrahim ‘Osman, Deputy Chairperson of the Committee Against the Kajbar Dam, from his residence in the village of Fareeq at the Wadi Halfa Locality. The eight men that arrested him climbed over the walls of his house at 2:30 am according to his wife ‘Aza Khairi. The latter informed further that her husband was not allowed to take with him his diabetic and high blood pressure medicine.

July 30, the Khartoum security forces arrested, the Deputy Chairperson of the Workers’ Federation Ahmed ‘Aydarous. The arrest might be related to a conflict between the Transportation Workers’ Union and a league of business owners in Khartoum.

August 1, the Public Order Court of Khartoum flogged and fined a student at the Nilain University dressed in female dress condemned by section 152 “gross indecency” of the criminal law.

In the beginning of August, the security authorities arrested Dr. Siddig Norain of the Geography Department at the University of Western Kordofan from his residence in Khartoum, accused of cooperating with

the Darfur rebels.

August 13, 14 students were injured in attacks on the campus of Juba University at al-Kadaro District in Khartoum North. The police arrested 40 students including three officers of the Students' Union: Karbino Dot, foreign relations secretary; al-Ghali Ibrahim Suliman, social affairs secretary; and Maryano Rihan, member of the Union. The Union accused the administration of calling on the police to disperse a peaceful demonstration inside the campus. Two days later, the Deans' Council of the University decided to suspend the Students' Union and its 40-members council for two years.

On August 23, the authorities arrested in Nyala, South Darfur, 30 persons of the Beni Hilba group without charge.

August 26, the security force of Port Sudan arrested Shaiba Dirar, Chairperson of the Beja Congress. Dirar was released without charge after 3 days of arrest.

August 28, the authorities released the detainees of the Kajbar events (June 2006): Journalist Mujahid 'Abd-Allah, 'Imad Merghani, 'Alamaddin 'Abd al-Ghani, 'Abd-Allah 'Abd al-Gyoum, 'Osman Ibrahim, and 'Osman 'Osman Shammatt. Dr. Mohamed Jalal Hashim was not released, however.

September 9, the Omdurman Criminal Court discharged 5 of the Minawi group in the Sudan Liberation Movement following six months of detention after the occurrence of the al-Muhandiseen events that resulted in 12 killings (last year).

On September 14, the Dongola security department released 8 detainees related to the Kajbar events in which 4 citizens were killed (by the police). The released persons, al-Khateeb Mohamed Salim, Rami Hassan Faraj, 'Abd al-Raziq 'Ali 'Abd al-'Aziz, Maysara Izaddin, Naif Mohamed Hamid, Nazmi Mohamed Hamid, Farouq Nouri, and Daoud Suliman had earlier entered into an open strike to protest detention without charges for more than three months.

By mid September, the security authorities arrested in South Darfur the Chief Nazir of the Turjum people Mohamed Yagoub, his assistant 'Abas al-Doma, the mayor of Abu Jazo area, and mayor 'Abd al-Rahman Mastour.

September 20, the authorities arrested 14 members of the Sudan Liber-

ation Movement in Khartoum after injuring 6 (six) demonstrators. The latter had been peacefully demonstrating in support of their leader ‘Abd al-Wahid Mohamed Nor – the rebels’ leader rejecting peace talks with the government in October unless a climate conducive to peace would be fully guaranteed before the deployment of the UN peace keeping force in Darfur.

In September, Suliman Jamous, coordinator of humanitarian services in Darfur, was released from house detention at the UN building in Kadugli by government orders. The release came about in response to a year’s international campaign.

Violence and Extra-Judicial Killing

The opening days of May witnessed the killings of two displaced persons and the injury of four near Kilma Camp by the government-Janjaweed troops. Fourteen other persons disappeared. The murdered persons were al-Haj Mohamed and Dogol ‘Ali. The injured ones were Salih Musa, Adam Adam, Wad Morro, and Daoud.

May 22 and the succeeding days, the villages of South Darfur were bombarded by aerial attacks as well as land operations by the government and Janjaweed militias. The villages were Dofag, Dar as-Salam, Kilgo, Jawahir Sonait, Khur Shamam, Kaily, Um Rakoba, Tartar, Sinaita, Tayba, Barkok, Daim Bushara, Saysaban, and Um Barido. Tens of civilians were murdered and thousands forced to cross the border to Central Africa.

On May 22, supporters of the League of Darfur Children were assaulted in al-Fashir by the Janjaweed firearms. The victims included Hamid ‘Abd al-Karim Idris (shot in the head) and Mubarak ‘Abd-Allah Mango (shot in the legs).

June 13, a police force supported by State Security officers used tear gas and firearms to disperse a peaceful demonstration in the Fareeq village. Four citizens were immediately killed: Shaikhaddin Haj Ahmed, Mohamed Fageer Dyab, al-Sadiq Saleem, and al-Mu’iz Mohamed ‘Abd al-Rahman. The injured persons were Sid Ahmed ‘Osman Nouri, Khairi ‘Osman Isma’il, Hamid Hamad Hamid, Mohamed Mustafa, Faraj ‘Abd al-Halim Faraj, Mursi Seed Ahmed, al-Fadil Mohamed Faqiri, ‘Abd al-Raziq yagoub, and ‘Osman Ibrahim.

Early in July, the government-Janjaweed troops attacked Kilma with both heavy and light arms, killing Ahmed ‘Abd al-Baqqi, a displaced citi-

zen, and injuring Essa Ibrahim Adam, Qamaraddin Isma'il, 'Adil Ahmed, Adam 'Abd al-Rahman, 'Ali Mohamed Yahya, Yousif Ishaq, 'Abd al-Mon'im Mohamed, and 'Abd al-Rahman Mohamed Ishaq; some of these victims were gravely hurt.

By mid July, 36 persons were either killed or hurt in a feud between the al-Turgum and the Abbala Rizayqat peoples. Towards end of the month, more than 60 persons were killed or injured in another feud at the al-Balabil al-Thalatha area in the al-Salam Locality west of Nyala. The beginning of August, 82 citizens were killed and 20 others injured by attacks the Abbala Rayzaqat launched on the mourning house of the al-Turgum at the Thani Dalaiba area of the al-Salam. The aggressors used 12 Land Cruiser cars in the attack.

Also in July, tribal feuds erupted between the Lou Neur and the Morli in Jongli State: 56 persons were killed and 18 citizens injured.

August 8, an armed conflict between the Minawi-led Sudan Liberation Army and the al-Ma'aliya people (the al-'Aqariba) in the 'Adila Locality of South Darfur led to the killing and/or injury of 18 persons.

On August 29, an attack by the rebels on the town of Wad Benda in North Kordofan led to the killings of 46 emergency police officers and a civilian besides the injuring of 11 citizens, including a police officer.

By mid September, 10 persons were killed and others injured while taking their meal in the holy month of Ramadan by a Janjaweed attack on the Um Shigairah village east of the Shi'airiya town in South Darfur. Two other citizens were later killed in another attack on the funerals of the murdered persons.

On September 26 and the two subsequent days, violence continued unabated in the three states of Darfur leaving behind more than 40 persons dead, including 4 police officers, in addition to scores of the injured persons. Three cars of the Euro Feshin relief agency, which suspended activities in the region in protest of repeated attacks on its work, were forcibly dispossessed

September 29, 17 persons were killed and 9 persons injured due to armed conflict between the al-Misairiya and the al-Nuba Ab Jook in the al-Sunut area south-east Lagawa in the State of Southern Kordofan.

About the end of September, 47 persons were killed in armed conflicts between elements of the Justice and Equality Movement and militias of the al-Ziyadiya people nearby al-Hijlij village of North Darfur.

The Relationship between Peace Partners

The SPLM continued to accuse its peace partner of inhibiting implementation of the Peace Agreement since partner had been slowing down the necessary steps to expedite the transition to democratic rule, the oil revenue, the border mapping, and the re-deployment of the armed forces. The SPLM asked specifically to withdraw the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from the oil region in the Upper Nile and Unity States. The responsibility of protecting oil producing areas, claimed SPLM, was conferred upon the Joint Military Forces, not the SAF. Also, the SPLM claimed it had already redeployed its troops south of the 1956 border in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions. The SAF determination to stay inside these borders was considered violation of the CPA.

September, in particular, saw the escalation of tensions between the two partners. On September 7, government troops put under siege tens of the soldiers of the South Sudan Government at al-Mujlad town in the State of South Kordofan. Amongst the arrestees were Lieutenant-General Ayon Aler, Chairperson of the Committee on Organizing the People's Army, Brigadier Alwal Ajok, Brigadier Yadavid Majok, Brigadier Feroij Waig, Brigadier Hassan Hamid, and Brigadier 'Abd al-Rahman Musa. The problem was settled via international mediation after 3 days of the arrest.

On September 10, inspecting and confiscating documents, the police force sacked the SPLM Khartoum offices in the Khartoum North Locality, al-Diyoun, and al-Mogran. Despite an implicit apology by official of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), the Minister of the Interior refused strongly to apologize for the SPLM: "There nothing to warrant police apology," affirmed the Minister.

In the same day, the First Vice President of Sudan President of the Government of South Sudan expressed his fears of "a renewed war" due to the inaction of the NCP with respect to the implementation of the Abyei Protocol, the mapping of the North-South borders, and the SAF withdrawal from the oil fields in the Upper Nile and Unity States.

By mid September the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) prevented a battalion led by a SAF captain from progressing southwards into the north part of the Upper Nile State.

On September 23, the First Vice President accused the SAF of making an effort to destroy the CPA to make war and to prevent the Southerners from exercising the right of self-determination.

Charter for the Sudanese Women

Zeinab Osman al-Hussain

This Charter was first prepared by the author in the early 1990s in Cairo. It was discussed by several political parties and human rights groups in exile - Editor.

Principles and Guidelines

The advancement of women is not gender-specific; men must share affirmatively the women's progression which applies the international agreements, charters, and declarations on the cause of women's rights.

The women's international rights and freedoms are consonant with the holy teachings and the religious values that require the women's equality with men. The ascertainment of this equality does not negate a woman's motherhood or her special sentiments or obligations towards the family and the children. It is an affirmation at the same time of the full responsibility of men in equal terms with the women's responsibility for the proper socialization of generations.

The women's freedom to establish women's associations is a fundamental right to promote the women's status. These associations must be equally empowered to support the women's rights with the other women's bureaus in the ruling or opposition parties, as well as trades unions.

The women's legislative role concerning constitutional and legal rights is a major prerequisite of the democratic political domain. The women have the right to represent their own masses, whether in the domestic life or in schools. The Sudanese women are entitled to play leadership roles in the political, economic, diplomatic, judicial, and social spheres inside Sudan or in the external world.

The promotion of the status of rural women is a national duty of the State in the first place. All women's organizations should pledge to achieve this goal by their independent groups.

The liberalization of Sudanese society from the harmful concepts and customs that handicap the women's movement and the women's recognized freedoms, including political and cultural rights is a national mission.

The setting of plans and programs to liberate the Sudanese people from the obstacles of human rights is a general obligation for which women's organizations must play the leadership role.

Program of Action

All democratic forces and national personalities are invited to sign this Charter for the Sudanese Women; pledge to achieve the women's advancement; and defend the women's rights and public freedoms to enhance the socioeconomic, political, and cultural life of the existing and the future generations of Sudan.

Official commitment to the International Convention

The Government of Sudan must sign and rectify the International Convention on the Eradication of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The laws of Sudan must be cleared from all forms of discrimination against the women's rights and legitimate freedoms.

CEDAW National Implementation

A National Committee on Women's Rights should be established to supervise over implementation of CEDAW by law.

The State guarantees the women's rights and freedoms in accordance with international obligations, with due respect to the rights and the freedoms guaranteed by religious teachings and generous beliefs.

The National Committee on Women's Rights must be composed of elected representatives of the women's independent organizations, women's bureaus of political parties, and women unionists. The Committee must include an administrative consultant to be appointed by the Public Service Department and a judge woman to be appointed by the Judiciary to act as a legal adviser of the Committee.

The State allocates an annual budget for the Committee activities in the national level. A special act stipulates the Committee jurisdiction and activities. The Committee is entitled to collect appropriate revenue from gifts, private sector donations, and the regional and international funds.

The Constitution of Sudan should include provisions for the Committee.

The Committee must represent Sudan before the UN human rights bodies, especially those supervising over CEDAW or following up its implementation by the Member States.

Popular Implementation

The State supports the activities of Sudanese women as represented by the National Committee on Women's Rights, as well as activities aiming at the promotion of the women's status by the independent organizations of women and the women's bureaus in political parties and trade unions.

The State acts as a media and cultural care-taker of the women's rights in accordance with CEDAW. The State is equally required to allocate a special budget to advance the status of rural women in full cooperation with the National Committee's plans and programs and those appropriately enforceable by government units.

Workshop on CEDAW

Muna Awad Khugali

The SHRO activists organized two educational workshops on CEDAW held in Cairo on the 4th and the 5th of August 2007. Twenty-two (22) women with different ethnic and educational backgrounds from Sudan and Egypt attended the workshops. The female participant's age varied between 21 and 55 years of age. Some were married; others were either single or divorced. The educational backgrounds varied between primary and secondary schools.

Residents in Cairo, the participant women included members of the Women Group of the Sudan Liberation Movement and Women of the Nuba Mountains political parties who formed the majority of participants. The women were very enthusiastic about the International convention on the Eradication of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The participants were keen to discuss each article and to give their opinions freely.

The first workshop was held in Madinat Nasr (Nasr City) in Cairo from 12:30 noon to 7.00 pm on the 4th of August. The Second Workshop was delivered on the 5th of August in the office of the Nuba Mountains' group from 3 to 8.00 pm.

Both workshops started with introducing the participant names and the aim of the workshop. A copy of the Convention with cases and comments from various countries were distributed to every participant in both workshops.

The participants told about their knowledge on CEDAW. Most of the women, although members of political organizations, did not know about the Convention, while a few heard about it. Only one or two of the participant group knew some elementary information about the international document.

Following half an-hour of brief reading of the Convention to prepare the women for a detailed discussion on its provisions, the participants discussed the main idea behind the document, the date it was issued, the causes behind its issuance, the groups that campaigned for it, and the way different states signed it. The UN terminologies, such as "reservations,

signing, ratification, Member States, etc.,” were explained and discussed.

The workshops enlightened the participant group about the background of different movements by women in the world to realize their rights, and why CEDAW was considered important for all women of the world. All articles were discussed in the first day with further discussion in the following day. The participants had lots to say, and they posed so many questions about the Convention.

The women made comments that helped the Workshops to run smoothly with good participation. In general, the Egyptian participants showed less knowledge about CEDAW than the Sudanese women did.

In the second workshop a flip chart was used, and three little groups were formed. The women discussed in sub-groups the Convention’s articles, and then met as a complete group for further questions and comments. Every participant in each sub-group had a chance to brief the whole group about their concerns and comments.

Findings and Conclusions

All women agreed that CEDAW is an important instrument to respect the women’s rights.

The participant women showed concerns about the public law and the customary law, especially in the South and the Nuba Mountains.

Some of the concerns addressed the unlimited authority of the Sultans in the societies under consideration.

The women noted that some articles of CEDAW are embedded in both Sudanese and Egyptian laws; but claimed these laws are affecting women of the cities, not the other women.

Because many women do not know their legal rights, whether in the local or in the international levels, women should be adequately enlightened about these rights.

Men control everything, especially in the villages due to the women’s lack of awareness. To assist the women, continuous efforts must concentrate on women’s education, awareness campaigns, and development.

The women expressed their views openly: Governments should sign CEDAW, which does not contradict any recognizable rights by religion or customs. CEDAW protects the women’s rights and helps half the society to advance.

The women claimed that education is very important and the articles on the right of education and work should be adopted without any reservations. They demanded other sessions for teaching CEDAW. Men should be equally taught about CEDAW. The SPLA women claimed they have large female membership in Egypt, in general, and Cairo, in particular, that needs to be educated. Also, the women from the other organizations wanted to acquire more education about CEDAW. The personal matters law and the Convention need longer time to discuss.

Views on polygamy and age of marriage were expressed. Some women explained they are not against polygamy and they do not want it prohibited because polygamy solves many problems in the different societies, especially the rural ones.

Egyptian participants were not aware of the rights that Sudanese women enjoyed during the previous periods, or even now. For example, the Egyptian women did not know that the first female judge was appointed during the 1960s in Sudan, while an Egyptian woman judge was appointed only a few years ago.

The Sudanese women from the south felt they were far behind and they needed more teaching about the existing women's rights Sudan Laws, especially those prevailing in the transitional stage before the upcoming national elections.

Some women did not want to be filmed or photos taken for them. We respected their desire and did not film them.

Recommendations

1. Human rights should be taught in schools; the media radio and television and the Press should focus closely on them.

2. All political parties must firmly realize the women's rights and the women's freedom of expression.

3. Women need to be empowered by providing them with the information needed. Organizations, such as SHRO, should help women to know their rights.

4. Lots of efforts about Human Rights and CEDAW are urgently needed. The women with less education are the majority of Sudanese women, yet their knowledge about rights is very small. The education of these rights, however, should also include men, because both men and women are victims of ignorance.

5. Workshops should be organized for all women so that a woman will not be excluded from training if she is not well educated, or if she lives out of city.

CEDAW should be taught to all women inside the country and abroad. Women must know what rights are there for them in the international law and the other legislations to be able to defend their rights with confidence.

To adopt laws with conviction is a matter that needs knowledge above all. The elite women have to bear the effort of enlightening the others; but they do not have the right to talk on their behalf without consulting with them or explaining what they intend to do. The information should be delivered to the grass roots directly.

Democratic Rights:

Journalist al-Sir Mekki

The Principles of Democracy

Democracy is founded on five principles:

1) The Constitution, which dictates the ruling regime of the State and its authority. It is the high reference of the national entity that judges over the laws and the institutions established by it. The Authority is made in different forms that safeguard the rights and distribute jurisdictions against monopoly by censorial mechanisms. The presence or absence of the constitutional document, however, doesn't necessarily imply that the ruling regime is a democratic system. In England, for example, a constitution is not available; and yet the country is democratically ruled. There are a large number of Arab and African states with written constitutions; however, they are far away from living in political democracy.

2) The freedom of opinion and expression, which includes the rights of individuals and groups to express their opinions freely by guaranteed legal freedoms. These freedoms embrace the freedom of the Press and scientific research and the right to diversity (as in the right of minorities to maintain their own identifications and to express them freely). Without the freedoms that guarantee the right to free expression in public affairs and the right to oppose the Authority, it is not possible to speak about a democratic system of rule.

3) The recognition of the principle of political pluralism, the direct material expression of the freedom to establish associations, as well as the other civil and political rights, to convert politics into a public affair and to make of political activities a public right. The difference is indeed huge between a formal political pluralism that generates scores of parties, as occurred to the Tawali [successive rule of] parties in Sudan lately, and a real political pluralism of which the Authority honors this right.

4) The realization of the principle of the representative local and national system (parliamentarian or legislative). Public freedoms, civil and political rights, and political pluralism are practically meaningless unless the fundamental right of civil society to construct the political life is fully realized as the main condition for democratic rule. This is a real condi-

tion by which the constitutional legislative authority installs the modern national state; and

5) The affirmation of the principle of the democratic succession of authority, which translates the right to assume the administration of public office by elections.

Democracy is an undivided system of rule. It is a comprehensive system that is either adopted with its whole extent or abandoned all together. Every attempt to destroy any part of the system will lead to the destruction of the other parts.

We are invited to assimilate the values of the Era which we already accepted its' economic and social premises.

We have designed institutions of material and symbolic reproductions on the basis of the Era's rules. We have reproduced in contentment of the Era's global domains the knowledge offered in sciences and technology. Why should we hesitate when it comes to politics? We inherited the Western State, i.e., the colonial government of the homeland, which became the epitome of our independent state. We retained only the crust of the Western state (the central government versus the native and partisan administrations) in the post-independence governance.

The state that accepted privatization and the market economy and succumbed to the rules of globalization must attend at some point of development to the need to surrender to the Will of democratic progression in an integrated manner. The present political regime claims it is adherent of the teachings of Islam that require an exception for its Civilization Project. The question is: does Islam really stand negatively against democratic rule?

First, we do not find a particular legislation for politicians and the political issue in the texts of Islam (the Qur'an and the Sunna) that is equal or comparable to all of the other affairs related to the interests of the Islamic group. This means that the political issue has been left to the authority of Ijtihad [scholarly work] and the thinking of the mind. No one, therefore, should decide on political matters with any final word because such fatwa will not be founded on the Shari'a to back it up as an enforceable authority.

Secondly, the only Qur'anic teachings which we find under this title emphasize justice in governance and the obligation to work with Shura [collective consultation] in the administration of civil affairs. Islam

stresses the right of people to participate in the administration of the group and to break the monopoly of authority.

Thirdly, the modern democratic system might not be the best regime to guarantee rights and secure justice. But it is assuredly the most competent system of all systems prevailing today to curb the transgression of a governor against the rights of the group, to maintain its political rights, to enable it to participate in the administration of public affairs, and to supervise over its leadership.

The democratic system is the one that best guarantees the people's enjoyment of the right to select their own representatives, as well as the right to exercise a vote of confidence, or to isolate their representatives if they betray them. The regime which provides for the equality of people and rights so that an Arab would not be preferred to a non-Arab or a male to a female, is the kind of regime that well expresses the spirit of Shura in Islam. Hence, whoever uses Islam as a front, and then act aggressively against democracy, are the ones who stand directly against the Principle of Shura - the fundamental Islamic conception of the political issue. There is no excuse for the dictators who act against democracy.

Contemporary Democracy is a Method, not Faith

Today, democracy is more humble than many believe in it or expect of it. Democracy is not faith; it is less than economic or social systems that enjoy a stable ideological implication. Democracy is a method to make public decisions by those committed to it. It is a necessary methodology to maintain the peaceful co-existence of the members and groups of a society.

Democracy is a methodology that is based on principles and institutions to allow the political groups to manage their differences of opinion and/or interests in a peaceful way. Thus, society would be able to control the sources of violence and then face out the causes of mischief and civil wars. Contemporary democracy maintains this situation by regulating the democratic practice by a constitution guaranteeing the terms agreed upon by the effective forces through which the political group establishes sufficient consensus in society.

"The people's rule by people in the interest of people" - an ideal portrayal of democracy that hasn't yet materialized, nor is it expected to occur in the near future - is the ultimate goal of democracy. The latter starts up when society is able to control the sources of violence to tackle peace-

fully its conflicting interests. Democracy is an expression of the working groups' consensus on the minimum guarantee of effective political participation for all citizens, indiscriminately.

By this practice, democracy will move on to a higher level of advancement since more stability might be reflected in the public, as a sign of the mature civilization of society. In the present time, the democratic system of rule draws heavily from the principles of which effective institutions are established to prevent the dictators or the ruling elites from authoritative governance. As such, the democratic system guarantees the minimum standards of a people's rule by people – the real meaning of democracy.

There are countries characterized by ethnic diversity; so it is necessary to maintain social and political forms to keep up the identity of each group in co-existence with the others. Some models co-existed successfully with different ethnic groups, while preserving their own identifications within the total recognition of the whole country, as in Britain, Switzerland, and Belgium.

In Britain, for example, a Scotch is proud of his [ethnic or national] identification; he is equally proud of his British citizenship. So is the case of a Welch, or an Irish, or the others: every ethnic group maintains its own ethnic and cultural identity within a greater allegiance to the nation state to which it belongs freely. In these societies, the constitutions stipulated full rights for all citizens and conferred upon them equal duties.

Agricultural Rights

Professor Farouq Mohamed Ibrahim

Strategic Framework of the Permanent Agriculture

The minimum goals of achieving self-sufficiency in the basic food commodities and the alleviation of poverty have often constituted an obstacle to all governments of Sudan since the Independence time, notwithstanding the great potentialities for a promising well-known large agricultural development if we ignore the recurring default in the accomplishment of the widely announced goal that Sudan “is the basket of the Arab world food,” which became a source of sarcasm for many people.

The absence of positively influential strategies and programs from the economic inputs of both modern and traditional systems of agriculture (within a continuity of dogmatic production relations in disharmony with the aspirations of the beneficiaries of the vast sector of the poor farmers) led to deterioration of the agricultural systems on the one hand, as well as the painful and most frustrating non-growth of the principal and the competencies of the beneficiaries themselves. This absence questions, as well, the validity of the development concepts adopted since our national independence and the philosophy and applicability of these concepts.

The urgent call to evaluate agricultural development in Sudan has been frequently repeated to salvage the agriculture of the land via a correct framework of the foundations of permanent agriculture – one that should satisfy the demand and the increasing aspirations of the population, as well as achievements of international economics and trade (IGAT, the economic and regional groupings, currency instability, and inflation, etc., in addition to the challenges and promises of the 21st century.

Our workshop convened its meetings as a contribution to meet the aforementioned needs, especially the need to straighten out the agricultural discourse in a way that would guarantee its advancement to attain economic progression on a permanent basis towards the achievement of maximum welfare and justice for all Sudanese.

The Workshop aims to achieve multiple aims: First, it aims to discuss

objectively and professionally the promising abilities, horizons, and obstacles of agricultural development with a view to deduce the possible lessons and experiences.

The discussions would stimulate a dialogue on the potentialities and the obstacles to bring about consensus on a framework for an alternative strategy to agricultural development, as well as the setting of workable agenda of action in the future. The Workshop aims to encourage the establishment of net-works for all individuals concerned with agricultural development in Sudan, as might be agreed upon by the participants in the Workshop.

The functioning of these net-works would provide forms to facilitate the efforts of groups, multi-purpose development inputs, continuous dialogue and documentation, and exchange of information and expertise between the concerned parties.

It is hoped that the final conclusions of this Workshop would be implemented within the alternative strategic framework and the agenda thereof in the service of the national policy-makers of Sudan and the regional and international agencies entrusted with funding and technical assistance. At the same time, this alternative strategy might help the social, cultural, unionist, and political organizations to envision clearly the policies that serve the interests of their groups in harmony with the [Sudanese] high national interests.

General Directives of a Strategic Framework

1. The consensus that man is the basis of development, and that the economic and political freedoms are fundamental elements to prepare all individuals of society to participate in development and economic activities.

2. The Sudanese economy should be built on social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, principal, and income such that the different remote areas, the traditional sector, the poor strata, and the war-affected areas would receive top priority from State, as well as appropriate share of the investments and oriented programs to create opportunities for an integral development in between all regions of the country.

3. The gradual and programmed orientation towards application of a free economy based on competition to avoid repercussions on the powerless strata in society, and to tie up the movement for economic reforms with the movement for economic and social stability.

4. The ideal utilization of all natural resources with due respect to the need to protect the Environment from deterioration by the best ways of utilization.

5. The sufficient supply of food for all strata of the population.

6. The provision for a large access to information and technology and the reinforcement of permanent human resources programs in the various locations of agricultural production.

7. The achievement of import abilities based on relative high productivity to integrate in a calculable way the economy of Sudan with the Arab and African regional economies, as well as the global system, to reduce the risks of foreign dependency and its recurring variables.

8. The expenditure of State oil revenues on the infrastructure and the basic services with provision for the needs of agricultural development and the agro-industrial projects.

The Directives of Alternative Policies

1. The Comprehensive Policies

1.1 The setting-up of competitive comprehensive policies that comply with the general directives of the strategic framework.

2.2 The establishment of a purposeful far-sighted national plan in the medium and the long terms that targets the public and the private economic sectors to come up with a detailed annual plan for the Public Sector. Agreement should be granted that this indicative planning must be founded from the bottom-up, i.e., from the level of the village followed by the locality up to the center.

3. The accomplishment of successive high development rates accompanied by concentration on the achievement of high growth rates in the rural and agricultural sectors by allocating a proportion of the Gross National Product for this end, as a true constituent of the flourishing and advancement of the national economy.

4. The comprehensive revision of the financial and monetary policies and the other relevant rules to cope with the economic and social variables. This revision should create the appropriate climates for investment, the attainment of high productivity, and the just and fair distribution of revenue and principal.

5. The comprehensive revision of the financial and banking sector by

strengthening the infrastructure via horizontal expansion; the perfection of banking developmental processes to increase savings; and the creation of a horizon for Insurance to satisfy multi-purpose demands through the independence of the Central Bank and the other specialized banks.

6. The application of all modern methods to make use of the long-term funding made available by foreign sources with a commitment to activate the financial and monetary markets to strengthen the medium and subsidiary organs.

Agricultural Policies and Institutional Choices

1. Unifying the visions about institutional change on the basic production level of the agricultural system, and the creation of efficient entities to express the wishes of beneficiaries to participate in the administration of the attainable resources. The latter should serve the former's goals and help to determine the magnitude of the optimum policies and future strategies.

2. Guaranteeing the freedom of assembly in effective cooperatives to the small producers of irrigated farms as users of water from the branching channels with a view to form a federation in the Project's level. The proposed Federation should have the right to establish companies or a limited corporation to administer the production inputs and to organize the self-services, financial operations, production plans, post-harvest, and manufacturing processes.

3. Allowing the small farmers in the rain-fed agriculture to form committees on the development of villages to help them to take decisions on development and production planning. The proposed committees should have the right to group together as unions or cooperatives or companies to oversee and to organize the production inputs in good understanding with the functional financial and marketing systems.

4. Applying political decentralization with economic decentralization in the implementation of programs and projects in the regional and local levels up to the village level. This decentralization should ascertain the close integration of economic activities in the entire regions of the country in order to achieve the most efficient coordination for the best performance.

5. Enforcing a comprehensive administrative reform to make true the full coordination between the central, regional, and local levels, including the villages, by the codification and distribution of jurisdictions with transparency and accountability.

Persistent Crises in Our National Development

Economist Mohamed Ali al-Mahasi

Acute Problems

Economists agree that the concept of economic development entails 4 (four) important considerations:

The distribution of the national product between consumption commodities and the formation and rate of capital growth; 2) the method of distributing the national income among classes of society; 3) the levels of labor and the size of unemployment; and 4) the social, cultural, and health services.

The economic and social methods refer to: 1) the expansion in the investment of natural and human resources; 2) the expansion in agriculture and the strategic and lucrative industries; 3) the utilization of resources in a fulfilling way with modern inputs and techniques; and 4) the development of social relations.

The goals of economic planning must be based on the development of the national economy and capital formation, and the provision for the health, cultural, and social services as rights of citizens rather than government charities. The goals require the organization and supervision over foreign trade and the enforcement of necessary laws for agriculture and land acquisitions to preserve the soil.

These issues demand serious participation in the industrial projects, based on proper regulations and the recognition of the rights of businesses in production. The recommended procedures include labor legislation for the minimum wage and the right of workers to defend their human rights. The capitalist states ask for all sorts of elementary materials with disregard to the needs of national industries. In the light of the global disputes of the Era, nonetheless, economic conflicts are reflected in discussions by research centers about the national strategies.

The 1989's Coup and the Aftermath

The June 30th military coup came about as a consequence of the political crisis that seized the Homeland with the failure of the ruling regime

to end civil war despite the long way it took to achieve this end. The situation worsened as the masses asked for a real advancement in the economic and social life. A chief factor for the coup was due to the fact that the agreement between the opposition and the SPLM adopted the settlement of a balanced solution that never applied to the National Islamic Front (NIF - the newly name of the Muslim Brotherhood after their previous Front of the Islamic Charter).

The coup arrested arbitrarily all opponents from both major and small parties. The NIF chief was also placed in "mock detention." All forms of tortures were practiced, including murders, all over the country to intimidate citizens. It was said some NIF supporters rejected these practices as anti-Islamic; but the ruling regime was notoriously known for them to "intimidate the enemies of the Lord." The regime, however, was never able to identify clearly such enemies.

The relationship of the ruling regime with the Gulf States, the United States of America, and European States deteriorated after the Second Gulf War in Iraq 1990. As a result of the wrongful stands of the Salvation Government, an economic siege began against Sudan accompanied by diplomatic isolation which stopped the flow of Western and Arab aid. The regime's hostilities were expanded to the neighboring African States of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea; then to Egypt via the assassination attempt on the life of President Hosni Mubarak. The SPLM war against the Sudanese Government was further supported by external powers as an extension of these hostilities.

The Economic Salvation Program

Perhaps the most remarkable note about the military coup pertained to the ultra-violent authoritative adoptions of the regime in the fields of national economy beginning with the imposition of complex procedures to change the Sudanese currency (in the amount of 5000 pounds) in May 1991 followed by the Sudan Bank's unjustifiable decision to deduct 20% of each transaction.

Other unjustifiable actions included the dramatic secretive way to change the currency, which was vested in a few circles and never was adequately or deeply studied to make the right precautions. The currency deposits were thus shaken in banks because many citizens preferred to keep their monies in their own hands.

The new authorities amended the official value of the national curren-

cy from 4.5 pounds to 15 pounds [to a dollar]. The exchange value was then placed at 30 pounds to a dollar. In the investment markets the value was 80 pounds. The prices of sugar and petrol immediately increased followed by unprecedented skyrocketing rises in the prices of all commodities.

Another declaration was announced about an Economic Liberalization Program to remove the skeletal distortions in agriculture and the infrastructure. The industrial sector, however, and the performance of the major businesses of the State deteriorated with unrealistic profit margins, lack of production inputs, and deficit in the foreign accounts.

Dr. 'Abd al-Wahab [the minister of national economy and finance] enforced these correctives: First - 1) unification the prevalent currency value; 2) allowance to commercial banks to dispose of foreign currencies freely by the removal of all prior restrictions; 3) cancellation of import licenses, except for protocol commodities, and the cancellation of exportation permits.

Secondly: imposing a unified fee on the exports, starting with 15 pounds per dollar; 2) imposing a temporary tariff to absorb the impact of profits, as well as helping the poor strata, by increasing the minimum wage and supporting the poor family with 500 pounds per family; and b-cancel the ministry's support to a losing institution.

Thirdly – procedure of the monetary policy: 1) release of the frozen funds; 2) maintaining the bank of Sudan's policy of monetary financing and reserves; 3) allow the banks to convert the fees on profits to deposits. Fourthly - in the area of pricing: removal of all restrictions. Fifthly - in investments and production: remove all restrictions.

These were the general indicators of the Salvation experience throughout 13 years and half of a year. Let us now take a look at the Comprehensive National Strategy that Dr. 'Abd al-Wahab ignored for good since he had already recognized the complete failures of the 1992-2001's Economic Program.

The Strategy in question and the results attainable by it constitute, in our opinion, the right measure to assess what the Salvation made in actual fact.

The Comprehensive National Strategy, 1992-2002

This strategy may be summarized in the following principles: first, it

is based on a moral ethical principle; secondly, it pursues justice and equality in the interest of the deprived people, the powerless, and the needy populations; thirdly, it adopts self-help programs; fourthly, it is a strategy for economic reform, liberalization of the economy, and reinforcing free market economics by complete removal of the measures or procedures that destroy the market modalities or suffocate their initiatives.

The procedures for the national economy include:

A) the cancellation of all restrictions on the foreign currency exchange and the freeing of prices to reflect in the economic and social costs, the supply and demand balance; and the abrogation of monopolies, privileges, and government subventions.

B) Encouragement of individual pursuits and property, and the subjection of the private ownership to its functioning prerequisites. The Shari'a conditions in the era of succession embraced the enlargement of cooperative properties and the setting-up of a least government as a most efficient system in 26 States and thousands of governorates.

The Strategy defined its objectives as follows: 1) A national program for the investment priorities with respect to increasing the rates of the agricultural sector and granting a priority to the vertical growth with a top priority status to the public utilities and economic services, and the use of loans and grants to release the balance of payments;

2) Making a 20-fold increase in the national income;

3) Combating inflation and directing the Insurance to the productive sectors to end the financing of non-productive operations - for example, the real estate projects or foreign currency markets, etc. - and the abstain from and the ending of the deficit financing of the non-strategic public sector units; and

4) Encouraging savings to accomplish 10-fold increase over the present level; controlling government expenditure; reinstating of the internal and external balance; and combating unemployment.

There are abrupt risks of capital that subject banks to the crises of destructive competition, money laundering, and the weakening of national sovereignty in the area of monetary and financial policies. The experience of Egypt (for example) indicated the in-competency of the private sector to manage the wheel of national economy in light of the absence

of general investment.

Privatization led to the growth of many monopolies: the privilege of producing a specific commodity for a certain period of time is monopoly; the merging of some companies and banks is monopoly - thus, a major aim of privatization is virtually foiled. The private sector was not able to boost the local savings due to the rises in prices, except for few cases, while the digits of unemployment continued to increase.

The responsibility of the government is to guarantee efficiency of the market mechanisms with due respect to the proper planning of investment. The market economy must be placed under continual and organized intervention from the part of the State, which should guarantee the best climate of investment by systematic legislative and administrative reforms.

The national organizational competencies of the State should be strengthened by effective censorial bodies to prevent monopolies; increase the economic growth 3-folds over population growth; produce orderly growth in the national capital and its efficient use; increase the rates of employment; reform the organizational and institutional skeletons; and define the necessary policies and tools for development.