

# THE SUDANESE HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

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## Editorial Board :

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### ***SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION - CAIRO***

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**Editorial**  
**Democracy is a Precondition**  
**For Home Security**

Our country is passing a critical crisis: the economy is wasted by huge spending on a large-scale security of the ruling regime at expense of the real tenets of the Nation's stability and the basic rights of people to work, production, and enjoyment of the good life. Civil striving is unabated, resisting bravely the repressive governance of Sudan and struggling to enforce the just and lasting peace all over the land, whereas in the meantime, an increasingly non-constitutional tyranny continues to waste the Nation's resources and armed forces. Still, a loose government refuses to arrive to agreement with the forces of Sudanese opposition; armed movements and broad civil society.

In this tragic situation, the people of Darfur lingered behind, unattended; suffering the injustices of genocide and extinction; in addition to people of the North, who resisted the government's plans to abandon their ancestral land for the sake of dams; people of the South who have been frustrated by inevitable failures of the National Islamic Front's NCP/Sudan People's Liberation Movement's (SPLM) government of national unity to make success of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); people of the East who have been angered by the government's reluctance to conduct judicial investigation on the Port-Sudan massacres and other crimes of authority; and people of Central Sudan who suffered catastrophes of the Nile floods and failures of the administrative system to reform the Gezira agricultural scheme, which poor farmers and seasonal workers have been struggling against all odds to maintain the na-

tional economy for long decades.

In the international arena, the Homeland received several penalties aimed to force the government to comply with international law, instead of acting elusively to escape State obligations; to abide-by all resolutions on the stability, security, and development of Darfur; and to surrender the individuals who committed crimes against humanity in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Notwithstanding the destructiveness of this situation, which came about in the first place as a direct result of the government's policies and practices, there are increasing hopes in the possibilities of ending the crises to reform the ongoing conditions, to bring the country up to a prosperous and healthy life in all local, national, and international spheres. There is hope in the Sudanese rising popular movement, which democratic intellectuals and human rights activists inside the country, as well as those in Diaspora, have been strongly voicing the grievances of people based on clear visions on their public needs and aspirations.

A group of intellectuals, children of the region of Darfur in North America (the United States and Canada), met in an important democratic conference, graciously arranged by the United States Institute of Peace in collaboration with Concords International and the preparatory committee for the Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (February 2008). The meetings made serious democratic discussions about the wise steps needed to achieve the security and development of Darfur in practical terms. Our generous reader will find a brief report by the Organization on this unique conference, which succeeded apparently in showing up a high consciousness by

the Darfur intellectuals in Diaspora on problems of their region and the Nation, and their grave concerns to end a crisis deeply affecting the Continent of Africa and mankind.

The Darfur intellectuals considered key avenues to restore the human rights of victims to compensate them for the dear losses of the loved ones and their stolen or destroyed property. The Darfuri women persevered to keep up the hopes of life in strong determination, more than other humans did, as they suffered with their children and families the injustices, aggression, and negligence devastating Darfur. Our report noted, the representation of Darfuri women in the meetings urged the conference to pay due attention to enforce the role of women in the security and development of the region. Towards the accomplishment of this demand, however, we believe that upcoming deliberations must be firmly based on 50 percent representation for women to allow them to contribute effectively in the effort to develop the region.

Readers will also find in this Quarterly two important studies expressing human rights concerns by Central Sudan writers over the state of affairs in the Gezira Agricultural Scheme, which has been steeply deteriorating by the grave pauperization of its farming and working force. The situation is due to the biased system of production relations against the productive people of the scheme, whose debts accumulated over the years in increasing default. The writers argued that the scheme might soon fall in the hands of private owners from inside or outside Sudan, irrespective of its historical belongingness or indigenous abilities. The authors called on Sudanese jealous nationalists to urge the government, Gezira board, and farmer partners to bring about a fair and just formula that should reform the Gezira. The partners should listen carefully to the expert

advisements and intellectual visions together with those of the Farmers' Federation, seasonal workers, and professional unions to be able to assess correctly all needs of the scheme.

The heart of the problem, then, is the extent to which the Government might be willing to allow the public opinion higher levels of participation in decision making: Government must appreciate the role organized unions have been playing in the Gezira civil society, and the deep knowledge, independent thought, and workaday activities of the unions, as popular organizations, regardless of government intrusions and problematic policies.

## **The Situation of Human Rights**

**October 1 – December 31, 2007**

**Secretary General**

**Mohamed Hassan Daoud**

Between the first of October and the end of December 2007, the human rights violations continued unabated in Sudan: Unprecedented violence was escalated in Darfur at the time the African Union Peace Keeping Force failed to protect civilians. Hundreds of citizens were extra-judicially killed by acts of violence. The work of relief agencies was severely handicapped, as their residences and property were attacked at least twenty times during the three months included in this report.

The relations of the two partners of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, NCP and the SPLM, deteriorated seriously almost to a degree of no return. The latter froze its participation in the government of national unity to protest delay of the CPA implementation earlier agreed by the other partner in January 2005, especially the provisions for North-South borders, democratic transformation, withdrawal of the government army from the South, and fair distribution of the national resources. The SPLM action came about as a consequence of repeated alarms by international officials concerning possibilities of the CPA failure. SPLM called back all its assigned ministers in the government (18 ministers) and three presidential advisers until the NCP would end all violations of the CPA in order to carry out principled implementation. Earlier, however, the government rejected the recommendations of an international committee to resolve disputes over North-South borders.

Emphasizing that the People's Defense Forces (PDF) constituted

a legitimate creation of the salvation revolution, the President ordered PDF headquarters by mid November to reopen training camps and recruit the mujahideen (militant fighters). On the other side, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) considered PDF a non-constitutional activity in contradiction with the CPA.

The withdrawal of the SPLM ministers from the government took place a few days before the start of a round of peace talks at the city of Sarta in Libya between the government and Darfur rebels, under the auspices of regional and international mediators. The withdrawal led to the failure of Sarta meetings: On October 24, six rebel groups boycotted further a meeting organized by the United Nations and the African Union in Juba to unify the negotiating position of the Darfurian rebel movements. The withdrawing groups claimed the government wasn't quite legitimate since the SPLM ministers withdrew from its ranks. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had equally rejected the talks. Six other groups, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA - led by Ahmed 'Abd al-Shaffi, Ibrahim Ahmed Ibrhaim, Jar al-Nabbi 'Abd al-Karim, and Mohamed 'Ali Clay, in addition to a battalion of North Darfur and another rebel group in Western Darfur), said that the government had not shown good faith towards the talks since it had recently escalated military action in the region.

December 12, following a meeting between the president and his first vice-president, the SPLM agreed to return ministers to the government. Opting for transparency in the oil revenues and a preparatory work for the 2009 referendum, the two partners agreed on a time table to withdraw their forces behind the borders. But the Abyie problem and the dispute over South-North borders were not resolved. The government was not able to work together until De-

ember 27, after the SPLM ministers were sworn to office.

November 24, the advent of 135 military engineers joining the Darfur international force was rejected by both rebel groups and civilians. In the first days of December, tens of thousands of the displaced citizens at the Kulma Camp in the State of South Darfur demonstrated against the participation of Chinese and Bangladesh forces in the peace keeping force.

October 24, the Security Council renewed unanimously the mission of the 18,000 members of the international peace force in South Sudan for 6 months.

December 4, the UN Secretary General called on all States to help in the arrest of two Sudanese nationals, namely Ahmed Haroun and 'Ali Koushaib, who had been accused of crimes against humanity before the ICC; and yet, the Government of Sudan refused to surrender the accused.

On December 14, the UN Human Rights Council renewed the mission of Human Rights Envoy, Dr. Sima Samar; but the Council failed to extend the work of the Darfur investigators team, which had been composed of experts representing relevant UN bodies since March 2007.

### **Freedom of the Press and Expression**

The violation of the press and expression freedoms continued throughout the reported period. The ruling NCP monopolized the national media, radio, T.V., and newspapers for partisan interests. The interrogation, arrest, and detention of journalists were not abated. The Press and Publications Council (NCP) and security apparatus exercised censorial activities against the press. In his visit to the United States, the First Vice-President, President of the Govern-

ment of South Sudan, complained in the media about the one-party practices of his partner, the NCP.

By the end of the first week of October, the NCPP directed its working committees on the press and complaints to take administrative and legal measures versus newspapers accused of sedition, or religious, ethnic, and racial hatred.

October 7, al-Tigani al-Tayeb, editor-in-chief of the al-Midan paper, was summoned with respect to information reported by the state security department to the Press and Publications' Attorney (PPA). Also, the security department accused journalists Suhair 'Abd al-'Aziz and the photographer Mohamed Mahmoud among others.

October 9, a government-controlled journalists' union issued a statement criticizing the participation of Sudanese journalists in a training session organized in The Hague by the ICC. The union considered the journalists' participation "without its consent" a violation of the state's commitment to the national judiciary: "an action that breached the rules of nationalism... which must be questioned, according to the charter for journalist honor."

On October 22, journalists Hanan Kishaa and Ahmed Hajam were subjected to police interrogation at the Kalaklat station to account for published materials exposing "the missing relations between citizens and police."

November 5, the security department summoned three human rights journalists, Sabah Mohamed Adam, Limya al-Gaili, and Faisal al-Baqir, and held them for five hours at the Khartoum North security office without charge. The journalists were asked furthermore to report in the next day at the security office.

November 9, in response to a law suit by the al-Sudani newspaper, the Constitutional Court approved a decision by the Prosecutor General that nullified authority of the PPA to use section 130 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to suspend papers.

November 10, the authorities re-imposed a ban on the papers publishing news concerning the case of persons accused of acts of sedition and sabotage.

November 11, the al-Midan editor-in-chief Tigani al-Tayeb was summoned before a Khartoum North court, acting on crimes against the press and publications, to account for press violations, according to security accusations. The PPA summoned with al-Tayeb journalist Suhair ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and advocate ‘Alamaddin ‘Abd al-Ghani.

November 15, the PPA summoned writer al-Tayeb Mustafa of the al-Intibaha paper according to information by the state minister for humanitarian affairs Ahmed Haroun, the official required to surrender to the ICC. The said minister protested publication of an “insulting” essay to his person in the paper. On December 2, the PPA accused the paper of defamation and harmful lies, and suspended the paper for two days.

November 17, the Khartoum North Criminal Court sentenced al-Sudani paper with SL20000 in retaliation of a column written by Nuraddin Medani who criticized “the security mess” in the arrest of four journalists on their way to cover the events of the Kajbar Dam. The court imposed on editor-in-chief Mahgoub ‘Irwa and journalist Medani a fine of LS10000 or imprisonment for two months for each. The two journalists rejected the fine and went to jail at the Omdurman Prison in protest of a legislation that penalized journal-

ists for writing in papers.

November 19, a journalism court of Khartoum fined with SL10000 or 2 months imprisonment the al-Hayat wa al-Nas paper's editor-in-chief Muna Abu al-'Azayim. Journalist Manal 'Uthman was fined as well with SL 5000 or a month imprisonment, in addition to SL10000 or 3 months imprisonment for unallowable published news. Muna preferred the prison term to the fine in protest of the heavy fines that "broke the back of journals." She was placed in jail with writer Saif al-Yazal Babiker and the al-Sudani journalists in the Omdurman prison.

By November 21, the journalists in jail became five since Manal 'Uthman refused to pay the fine. The journalists' position aroused a wide range of support from all legal, media, political, and civil society groups. On November 24, 16 parties and civil society groups signed a Popular Charter for the Defense of Freedoms. On December 29, the journalists were released from jail.

The first week of December, a group of Sudanese journalists and workers, including al-Haj Waraq, Rabah al-Sadiq, al-Tahir Satti, and 'Abd al-Mun'im Suliman, received anonymous threats on their lives.

December 14, authorities of the Red Sea State suspended the Port-Sudan weekly paper issued by the Port-Sudan Madiniti organization. The police attacked the paper's space and forced the journalist group outside their offices. The decision suspended all activities of the organization, which had been previously approved by the ministry of social affairs.

On December 16, State Security Prosecutor (SSP) suspended Salma Adam of the Wihda journal and another journalist working

with the al-Wifaq paper, accused of having a statement previously disseminated by the opposition group, the National Democratic Alliance, in the course of the trial of persons accused of sedition and sabotage at the Khartoum Criminal Court.

On December 23, the Gedarif State police force arrested for an article posted in a local paper, 'Abd al-Gadir Mahmoud, a writer with the Ray al-Sha'b journal, according to orders by the PPA.

December 26, the ministry of justice PPA issued an order which banned publication of all accusations pending legal investigation.

December 31, the Nyala police arrested journalists Mahgoub Hasoun (correspondent of al-Sudani) and Gamal Dahawi (correspondent of Ray al-Sh'ab) at the central station of the town. The journalists were interrogated for news published in their papers about violence at Nyala University.

### **Public Freedoms**

By mid October, the governor of the White Nile State outlawed public assemblies and political forums in the state.

October 20, legal activists, advocates, and politicians appealed to the Constitutional Court to disapprove of the judicial fees and regulations of adjudication that violated the constitutional right to equality before the law. For example, the fees in the amount of SL200100 required for submission of a constitutional appeal, defaulted most cases in appeal.

By the end of October, the president decided to reinstate to service 251 employees earlier dismissed from the public service. The decision dealt a severe blow to tens of thousands of the employees purged since June 30, 1989, who had been waiting for a presiden-

tial decision to return to their jobs, or to receive sufficient compensations. The reinstated employees, however, rejected the president's decision because it did not fairly place them with their counterparts in the public service.

On November 11, the police dispersed a peaceful demonstration by University of Khartoum students. The demonstrators aimed to deliver a memorandum to the minister of justice to release detainees accused of sedition and sabotage.

Two days after a resolution by the Human Rights Commission to end States' implementation of death penalties, the minister of justice affirmed, in mid November, the insistence of his government to apply death sentences as "a Shari'a punishment by the Book of Allah and the Sunna of the Prophet." Here, it should be mentioned that of 12 citizens condemned to death by court decisions during November and December, only two cases were executed.

On November 10, the Burri Criminal Court condemned to death by hanging 10 Fur persons accused of complicity in the killing of journalist Mohamed Taha Mohamed Ahmed last year. The condemned persons were Ishaq al-Sanoasi Jum'a Salih, 'Abd al-Hai 'Umar Mohamed Khalifa, al-Tayeb 'Abd al-'Aziz Ishaq, Mustafa Adam Mohamed Suliman, Mohamed 'Abd al-Nabbi Adam Isma'il, Sabir Zakriya Hassan 'Abd al-Gadir, Hassan Adam Fadl Khamis, Adam Ibrahim al-Haj 'Umar, Gamaladdin 'Issa al-Haj, and 'Abd al-Mageed 'Ali 'Abd al-Mageed Ahmed. Later on December 31, condemned of raping a female child, Mutasim 'Abd-Allah Khair-Allah (27 years old) and 'Imad Teen (18) were hanged to death.

November 26, following a complaint by the ministry of education on behalf of parents, the authorities arrested the British teacher Gillan Gibbons accused of insulting Islam since she allowed her pupils to name a bear toy after the name of Muhammad. The teacher who had been working in the Unity School at Khartoum was sentenced 15 days imprisonment on November 29th, as well as deportation from the country, instead of flogging, as feared by many observers. On December 3, the president, however, pardoned the teacher in response to wide international pressures.

In November, the Dongola authorities of the Northern State instructed the Congress Popular Party (CPP) to convene its party conference nearby the airport, not inside the city. The party leaders considered the instruction a violation of political freedom and an attempt to handicap opposition activities. A public meeting held earlier on November 26 at al-Gaddar town, addressed by the party secretary-general Ibrahim al-Sanoasi, was subjected to offensive acts by elements of the ruling party. The city police, however, did not secure the meeting despite petitions from the CPP leaders, who claimed the authorities had been planning to prevent their conference by some confrontations, as previously occurred.

On December 4, the National Council passed the Armed Forces Act 2007, which contained many violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution. The law, which would be applied on both military and civilian subjects, stipulated provisions releasing the military from criminal responsibility with immunity. It allowed, nonetheless, infliction of the humiliating penalty of flogging in the army. Section 34 (2) prohibited prosecution of the officers or the regulars who commit acts of crime in the course of doing their duty, or by execution of any legal order issued

to them as such. The law reduced the national entity of the armed forces by Section 6 (d), which dictated that their mission “is to originate, make high, and entrench the values of religion,” although Sudan is a multi-religious nation. The law authorized by Section 8 the president alone the right to declare and/or to prepare war, or a state of emergency.

December 9, the police forces disassembled a peaceful meeting by students of the Islamic University in Omdurman asking for the right to set-up a students’ union to represent them, and to care for their rights.

December 16, a Khartoum court sentenced two Egyptian workers with a term of imprisonment for 6 months because they exhibited a book for sale at the Khartoum International Fair. The book contained insulting statements against the Prophet’s wife ‘Aisha. ‘Abd al-Fatah ‘Abd al-Raouf and Mahrous Mohamed ‘Abd al-‘Aiz were tried under section 125 of the Sudanese Penal Code, the same section by which the British teacher had been tried.

By the end of the year, authorities in the National Capital Khartoum prohibited all public parties celebrating the New Year. The prohibition included musical shows at Khartoum hotels by the Egyptian singers Ihab Tawfeeq, Tamir Hosni, and Assala.

### **Arrests**

Early in October, the security authorities arrested Dr. Ahmed ‘Abd-Allah, an activist resisting construction of the Kajbar Dam in the Northern State.

By mid of the month, the Northern State security authorities detained 12 students of the Mashkaliya and Nuri League on heir way to Wadi Halfa with a medial convoy. The authorities confiscated

medical drugs and relief materials worth of about 18 million Sudanese pounds. The detainees were Mohamed Hussain Mohamed, Fawaz Idris Mohamed, Tallal Ahmed Nasr, 'Abd al-Allah Mohamed Salih, Tal'at Mohamed 'Uthman Himmat, Rami Fawzi Yassin, Sami Mohamed 'Ali, Sami Izzaddin, al-Mu'iz Hamza al-Haj, Amjad Salih Adoul, Ahmed al-Sir Mohamed Haj Nur, and 'Ali Malik al-Nasir. The students were released in the next day after they signed bonds not to exercise further activities in the area of Kajbar.

At the same time, a police force attacked with security forces the court space where Darfur students in universities and colleges were put to trial after they had been demonstrating peacefully last month at the University of Khartoum. The forces arrested all audience in the court, and further extended arrests in a number of residential areas in Khartoum.

November 5, the Orshi Students' League in universities and high institutes of education called on the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A - the Minawi group in alliance with the government) to release 9 students detained by the SLM/A. The students included Salih Hassan 'Ali, Adam 'Uthman Sam, Salih Ibrahim Hassan, Abbakar Mohamed 'Abd-Allah, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibrahim Dafa'-Allah, Mandi 'Uthman, Ahmed Jum'a Wadi, Harun Hamid Qinawi, and Yagoub Abbakar Mohamed.

November 14, the security authorities in al-Baoqa town arrested and interrogated Khidir Hamid for disseminating a statement by the Communist Party; but released him lately.

November 21, the security authorities summoned the chair of the Khartoum Center for human rights and environmental development advocate Amir Mohamed Suliman and his colleagues Masha'ir

‘Abd-Allah ‘Umar and Madiha ‘Abd-Allah, an Ayyam journalist, in addition to Nageeb Najmaddin, director of the Amal Center for victims of torture. The activists were put under arrest the whole day; and then subjected to interrogation in the next day.

November 23, the Khartoum security authorities arrested the SPLM media secretary in Khartoum ‘Amar Najmaddin al-Jalak, on his way from Khartoum Airport to Juba, without charge. His family and a SPLM lawyer were denied the right to meet with him.

In December, the security forces detained Darfuri students and activists in Khartoum, Nyala, and al-Doaim. December 2, the security detained Mustafa Nasraddin Tambour (al-Neelain University), Khatab al-Mahdi (Bakht al-Ruda University in al-Doaim), Ishaq Mohamed (Shendi University), and Yasir al-Mado (Neelain University). December 4, Mustafa Sharif (University of Khartoum) and Khalid Mohamed Adam (al-Neelain University) were arrested in custody.

December 2, the authorities released Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi from jail after 4 months in detention for accusations of sabotage. Still, 30 other detainees stayed in jail for the same allegation.

December 14, Colonel Hamad Hassan Mohamed, JEM at the African Union’s cease-fire committee, was arrested at Kalbas Airport by security and intelligence elements on his way from al-Fashir to Kalbas on board of an AU aircraft, dressed in AU badge, and carrying AU identity card.

By mid December, the security forces arrested a number of students at the University of Khartoum, including ‘Abd-Allah ‘Abd al-Rahman (2nd year, mathematics).

December 17, Dr. Fakhraddin ‘Awad, a leading member of the

Unified Democratic Unionist Party, and Shawqi ‘Azmi Mahmoud Hassanain (a nephew of ‘Ali Mahmoud Hassanain of the Democratic Unionist Party) were arrested inside a Khartoum tribunal trying persons for sabotage. The two persons were accused of disseminating leaflets against the government. They were made to tour several security offices before they were finally interrogated by the SSP who moved them to a court trial in the next day.

December 27-28, the police and security forces arrested scores of students in the State of South Darfur, following student protests at the Nyala University. On December 30, the authorities released 76 students without further action.

About the end of December, the security authorities arrested tens of citizens in al-Dabab to the west of South Kordofan State, in response to earlier fights between Messairiya and government troops, in which 3 Messairiya persons were killed on the 22nd and 23rd of the month.

December 31, the authorities released 30 civilian and military persons arrested for 5 months, accused in a case of sabotage. The accused released by presidential decree included lieutenant-general (retired) Mohamed ‘Ali Hamid al-Tom, major (retired) Mustafa Ibn ‘Oaf Mohamed Taha, captain (retired) Salah ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Fahal, lieutenant-colonel (retired) ‘Atta al-Manan Seed Ahmed, lieutenant-colonel (retired) ‘Ali Khalifa Mohamed, brigadier (retired) Khalifa Ahmed Mohamed, brigadier (retired) Taj al-Sir Mahmoud Hassan, police lieutenant-general (retired) Salahaddin al-Nur Mattar, ‘Abd al-Galil al-Basha (the Umma Party for reformation and renewal secretary general), Hassan Mohamed Haj Musa, Ahmed Suliman al-Dud, Musa’ad Yagoub Yahya Adam, sergeant (re-

tired) Tawir ‘Uthman Tawir, lieutenant-colonel (retired) Mohamed Hassan Nasr, Kabashi Khidir Mohamed Ahmed, ‘Abd al-Rahman Shimaila Khalil, lieutenant-colonel (retired) ‘Uthman Mohamed al-Sayed Sakran, captain (retired) Waheeb Ahmed al-Amin, lieutenant Walid ‘Awad Hassan, Ibrahim ‘Abd-Allah Abu Gurun, lieutenant Hatim Adam Suliman, al-Tayeb Ahmed Khalid, Salahaddin Hamad al-Sayed, Siddiq Khalid ‘Abd al-Nabbi, ‘Ali Mahmoud Hassanain (the Democratic Unionist Party deputy chairperson), sergeant Mohamed ‘Ali Suliman, corporal Ahmed Yunis Mohamed, Hassan al-Basha Ahmed, Adam Mubarak, and Mahir ‘Umar Hussain Khamis.

### **Extra-Judicial Violence and Killings**

October 6, soldiers belonging to government troops fired at a group of the South Sudan police force in Yambio that refused to surrender regulars suspected in an earlier killing of an officer. Three policemen were killed and several others wounded.

During October 8 and 9, violent fights erupted in the area of Tawila, nearby al-Fashir, between elements of the SLA (Manawi group) and government soldiers. The SLA accused janjaweed and government troops of killing 48 civilians and four SLA members.

October 11, ‘Abd-Allah Kadada was killed, and two other citizens wounded, in armed assault on a residential area at al-Jinaina town in the State of Western Darfur.

By mid October, a group of JEM kidnapped 5 workers at the Dafra field in South Kordofan: Egyptian engineer Joseph William Samuel and Iraqi citizen Ahmed Hayman Mohamed, in addition to Sudanese nationals Isamaddin Dafa’-Alah Mohamed, Kamal ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Ali, and Khalid Dirar Ahmed. The kidnapping group asked China, India, and Malaysia to end oil works in the region

since the government used the revenue in arms sales to kill people of the region. The kidnapped persons were released on November 12.

October 19, shootings were heard inside the Kulma Camp of displaced Darfurians of whom many were killed or injured by assaulting persons. In another report, elements of the Habaniya people attacked the Salamat people at the Manzola village south west Nyala, killing 20 persons and wounding many others. The same day, more than 25 persons were killed and 20 injured at the 'Afo-ana mosque at al-Myram town in the State of South Darfur when an armed group fired at attendees performing the Juma' prayers.

October 20, 43 persons were killed and more than 20 wounded, as a result of tribal feuds between the al-Majaneen and the al-'Iraifiya groups of al-Haj al-Layin area in the locality of Bara, North Kordofan.

October 22, a soldier shot a woman carrying a child near al-Hasahisa Camp for displaced people at Zalingi. In the same day, a militia member killed a child with gunfire.

Resulting in the killing and wounding of many citizens, fierce fights occurred in West Darfur between SLM Free Will groups and government-supported militias at Um Dukhun.

October 22, the al-Salamat people launched retaliatory attack against the Habaniya; 120 citizens were killed.

October 24, the Janjaweed pillaged and burnt the Marari villages south east Um Dukhun.

October 26, the Habaniya and al-Salamat peoples resumed fighting in which 16 Salamat were killed.

In the Majok area neighboring the Kulma Camp, a police force

ordered more than 600 displaced families already in the run from Kulma to move outside Majok, else they would be beaten up, killed, and their homes burned.

October 28, three persons were killed and four others injured at the area of Mirla in South Darfur, due to conflicts in between Zagawa peoples.

October 28, five students of the faculty of education at the Gezira University were injured in scuffle with the police, who used tear gas to disperse the students protesting shortages of services in the dorms.

October 29, two displaced persons were killed and nine others wounded at the 'Atash Camp in Darfur, as a consequence of attacks by disciplinary forces pushing upon people to leave the camp.

Early in November, a number of citizens were subjected to killing and injuries in an armed feud between the Qumur and the Fellata at the Qubaish area, west of Talas, in the State of South Darfur. Al-Sammani Mohamed, 'Abdu Abu al-Reesh, Khamis Yunis, and Mansur 'Ibaid were among the wounded.

November 4, the Yambio commissioner of police, Joseph Armino Mandi, and two senior officers were killed with a number of policemen in a fight between joint forces and the Yambio police force.

November 10, an armed group burned two tents at the Kulma Camp in the State of South Darfur. Nine persons were killed, including 'Uthman 'Abd-Allah, Ahmed Ibrahim, Fatima Mohamed, Abu al-Qasim Ibrahim, Toma Mohamed, Suliman Harun, Abbakar Ahmed, and Salahaddin Adam.

November 17, a group of Morli attacked Dinka Bor near Padak, east of the city of Malakal. Eight Dinka were killed and 7000 cattle rubbed. The next day, the Dinka went after the Morli to restore their cattle. Trapped, 28 Dinka were killed, and the acts of violence continued between the two groups.

November 27, unidentifiable persons killed the owner of a commercial place and rubbed his place at the 'Atash Camp.

Early in December, a woman and three men were killed at the Khidir area south west al-Mujlad in South Kordfan – an outcome of fights between the armed forces and a group of citizens who asked government to compensate them for agricultural lands provided for oil companies, and to investigate violations committed against them. Al-Mukhtar al-Qaseer al-Shaf'i, Mohamed Suliman, al-Dodo Ahmed, and Um 'Asal Mohamed were extra-judicially killed in the fight.

December 14, fights renewed between JEM and government troops at the Jinaina-Kalbas road and Serba north of Jinaina.

December 22, Messiriya militias supported by Khartoum launched an attack against soldiers of the SPLA near the North-South borders at the Bahr al-Ghazal region, which resulted in scores of deaths on both sides.

The last week of December witnessed clashes ensuing in 5 injuries at least between students of the Nyala University and the police and security forces. News was repeatedly reported that two students were killed. The students had been protesting the imposition of examination fees in violation of the Abuja Agreement and the president's decision to exempt Darfur students from school fees.

### **Attacking Relief and International Activities**

October 1, armed men kidnapped under threat a UN car in al-Fashir. In the same day, armed persons kidnapped a car and a truck with a driver working for an international NGO near the Kassab Camp.

October 3, two armed persons in military uniform obstructed a car working with an international NGO at the Nirtti-Thor route, West Darfur.

October 5, armed persons kidnapped under threat a UN car on its way to Kutum.

October 8, the area was subjected to attacks between the SLM/A (Minawi group) and local opposition elements.

October 9, a UN spokesperson said that 29 employees of two relief agencies were moved away from Muhajiriya in South Darfur.

In mid October, three drivers working for the FAO were killed in South Darfur. Around the same time, all relief agencies withdrew from Muhajiriya and Haskanita in South Darfur due to the insecurity of the area.

October 18, an armed group stopped two commercial trucks hired by the UN on their way to Jebel Marra at Habra, north east Nyala. The group rubbed the personal belongings of the driver and escaped with the two trucks.

October 24, a convoy of two UN cars and a car in the service of an international NGO was attacked near Donki station of al-Fashir. The travelers were rubbed, and the two trucks were also stolen.

October 27, two armed persons sacked an international NGO camp in the area of Shangali, south of al-Fashir, and stole the wages of workers.

November 1, an armed group kidnapped a UN hired truck loaded with 24 tons of relief materials near Jebel Hissa, north east al-Fashir.

November 7, the governor of Darfur ordered an international official to leave the State claiming that the latter had not adhered to the rules of humanitarian aid. The deported official was Wa'il al-Haj Ibrahim (Canadian citizen), who worked as director of the UN coordinating office for humanitarian aid in South Darfur. The Khartoum officials said later that the UN official had been urging the displaced people to stay in camp, instead of returning to their villages. Last month, international employees mentioned that there was available evidence the government had been forcing the displaced population to return to their villages from the 'Atash Camp in the suburbs of Nyala.

November 15, armed persons stopped a UN car transporting two employees near Nyala. The employees were then battered and rubbed.

November 22, an armed group stopped and rubbed a commercial truck working with the UN, near the Sudanese-Ugandan border. November 25, an unidentifiable armed group attacked a convoy of two UN hired trucks transporting relief materials south east al-Fashir, and wounded the drivers.

November 29, armed persons attacked a truck hired by the UN near the al-Kholi village of al-Di'ain area and wounded gravely the driver.

November 29, a tribal armed group attacked a hospital administered by Doctors Without Borders at Bor of the Jonglie State in South Sudan injuring scores of people, killing four individuals, and

injuring a fifth person inside the organization's car.

December 1, an armed group kidnapped a car working for an international NGO in West Darfur, used to transport patients to hospital. The same day, armed people stopped a truck hired by an international NGO on its way from Nyala to Minwashi and stole its shipment.

December 3, some persons attacked a center of an international NGO for food distribution inside al-Neem Camp, near al-Di'ain, and stole food under threat. The same day, the camp of an international NGO was attacked by armed persons in Kabkabiya.

December 14, an armed group stopped two cars working with an international NGO at Garsila and stole the cars. Also in Fashir, an armed group attacked the car of the AU chief-of-staff and wounded seriously his driver.

## **How to Democratize**

### **The State's Security?**

**Mahgoub El-Tigani**

The security, justice, and judicial departments of Sudan aim theoretically to serve the public by constitution and law. In actual reality, however, the relations of these state organs have been adjusted to influences by the authority and the personal interests of ruling individuals and/or groups. This affected the performance of these institutions since pre-independence times up to this day, as they became authoritative instruments of power, instead of doing their formal obligations towards the people who respect their legal mandates and privilege them with high remuneration.

Because their formal control by the ruling authority required them to place the wishes of rulers above the public, the internal conditions of these departments have often alienated them from constitutional and legal duties. This situation was never successfully removed by the national reforms that failed to ensure consistently full independence of the Judiciary, in constitutional and practical terms. The national strategies thus far experienced in this respect failed to ensure effective separation of powers between the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of government. The Judiciary was repeatedly manipulated by politicians for partisan interests, and the judges were not granted union rights to enjoy independence of their system from all types of seduction: influences, pressures, threats, limitations, or intrusions, in any direct or indirect forms.

It is only with these straight-forward relations that the Judiciary performs properly its duties, which further allows ruling groups to gain the public trust. This clear jurisdiction, in turn, will have a pos-

itive impact on the national security of the country if the Judiciary is not harassed by the parallel system of private courts that executives frequently impose.

The independence of the bench must be accompanied by the independence of legal advocacy, at the same time. The collapse of justice in Sudan has been well-documented by the US-based Lawyers Committee (1991), Taha Ibrahim (2006) book on the non-constitutionality of the NIF salvation revolution and ruling regime, besides works by Amin Mekki Medani and the other jurists who criticized legislations issued by the government against the Bar Association. The government has brutalized the latter by confiscating the association's office space, and abrogating the act granting lawyers' professional autonomy. Also, it was the first time in the history of Sudan that the salvation government dared to subject lawyers to tortures in "ghost houses" and dismissed hundreds from jobs, as it purged hundreds of judges from Judiciary.

This shameless destruction of the legal institutions of the country did great harm to the legal personality of the profession and the socio-national status of both lawyers and judges. The security departments were equally affected especially the state security and police forces which work closely with the legal profession. We will discuss briefly some of these negativities.

### **The Security and Police are Civilian Forces**

The post-independence governments, especially the democratically elected ones immediately succeeding the October Revolution 1964 and the March/April Uprising 1985, helped to protect the security and police forces from authoritative rule. These governments granted separate headquarters for the forces, apart from the armed

forces, in addition to applying a spirit of civil mindedness amongst their domain to respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of people. As such, the forces made an effort not to act as a supervisor of the public; but rather, a servant of people without discrimination or partisan preferences. The short terms of these particular governments, which were repeatedly usurped by long-term non-democratic regimes, however, frustrated these orientations.

Because of democratic policies, the police forces managed to run several strikes to improve standards of the service, rejected many orders to act violently against street activities, and stood by the side of people against authoritative rule. Contrary to these noble stands, the forces were pushed to violent armed confrontations by dictatorial regimes, particularly those of the single-party presidential system of Nimeiri and the Bashir 1989's NIF-supported dictatorship vis-à-vis civilian opposition up to this day. All these conditions worsened the relationship of the security and police departments with citizens, to the extent that the people of Darfur rejected strictly any sort of cooperation with the security or police forces since they considered them repressive tools of authority.

Our country suffered obviously a real crisis in the relations of security forces with the generous People of Sudan. This crisis called on immediate solutions in the short-term and the long-term as well, that should be tackled by a democratic government accountable for all its policies and practices to a parliament democratically representative of people; free civil society; and independent judiciary.

The Police Law and the Act of National Security must be abrogated as a genuine measure to provide an opportunity to establish democratic laws and institutions committed to the rule of law and

the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms – the foremost condition to create appropriate relations between the public and these important departments.

Since colonial times up to the post-independence era, the laws governing the security and police forces devoted these disciplinary groups to superiority of senior orders, even if they violated the law. The forces acted as a reserved national guard to the armed forces, thus losing their civilian nature. The forces were further subjected to military law, although they were never meant to be trained as military ranks trained only to fight in the battlefield, thus subjected to death penalty in specific cases. Because their real function was to service civilian public, the security and police forces were not in need of military law.

Most recently, the authority allowed further the president or the minister of interior to create private forces within the security and police forces to repress the right of the public to exercise freedoms of opinion, peaceful assembly, and demonstration. These private forces, nonetheless, comprised the same militias that devastated the social life of people in Darfur, South Sudan, and the other regions.

The liberation of security forces from all provisions of repression constitutes the utmost condition to liberate the Nation from injustices and intimidation, to open the path for the People of Sudan to enjoy real freedom and independence.

One of the most important facilities of such reforms for the security and police forces is the need to re-apply the decision of the democratic government in 1986, which abrogated the authority of the state security department to arrest or detain any suspect or accused person. Only the attorney chamber or police forces were en-

trusted with such tasks.

To strengthen the democratic functions of the security and police forces, we believe the hierarchical relations of these forces must be restructured so that the commissioner or chief of security ceases to take individual decisions on the budgets and major policy-making issues. Instead, these leadership tasks should be exercised by elected councils in each unit, representing all ranks, and fully responsible for the policies, transference and promotion regulations, besides the internal and external training, etc.

Removing death sentences and harsh penalties from the security and police laws, reforming police summary and non-summary courts, realizing the right of the accused police or security officer to receive police-paid legal consultation from the Bar, and undertaking reconciliatory procedures within the ranks comprise key measures to improve performance of these forces in order to move them progressively in the service of people.

## **Security and Development in Darfur**

### **The Darfuri Diaspora**

### **In North America**

The United States Institute of Peace, in collaboration with Concordis International and the preparatory committee for the Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, provided good opportunity for a group of the Darfuri Diaspora, resident intellectuals in the North America United States and Canada, as a significant segment of civil society, to discuss the situation of Darfur with a view to conclude in practical solutions to achieve the security, peace, and democratic administration of the region. The group participated in their personal capacity without formal representation of a specified party, movement, or organization.

The conference's main areas of discussion touched deeply upon the stability, development, unity, and security of the region. The Darfuri participants exchanged opinions about the rights, compensations, and government responsibilities towards the region; positions of the Darfur armed movements; human rights of the people who have been displaced by force from their homes and agricultural lands, thus subjected to acts of genocide by unprecedented deaths and illnesses; and the roles to be played by the international community to end this tragic humanitarian crisis.

Chief among agreements of the participants was a condemnation in the fullest and strongest terms of the Government of Sudan and its militias for all of the crimes they committed against humanity, including the large-scale extra-judicial killings, rapes, and tortures, and the outcome of this criminality with respect to forced displacements, destruction and pillaging of villages. The restoration of vic-

tims' rights, lands, and farms with sufficient compensations for their huge losses in the dear ones and property, and the surrender of all individuals responsible for these crimes to independent judiciary comprised fixed agenda for the peace of Darfur. A Truth and Reconstruction process, drawing from best practices of processes in other countries, but tailored to meet Darfurian needs and culture, should be implemented in order to account for crimes committed. Protection must be assured for those civilians who give account of crimes committed against them, as a means to ensure that these accounts are made.

It was equally agreed that the restoration of people to their homelands and the guarantee of their compensations should be simultaneously accompanied by a process of social and economic development by the State. Here, the participants recommended strongly the wealth from oil and other natural resources should be directed toward peace, development, and social rehabilitation programs in Darfur.

At this point, it is the opinion of SHRO-Cairo that the country's wealth has been wasted, from the most part, in the luxury of the ruling party and the wasteful processes of security and militias' aggressive attacks.

The situation of security and the environment safety occupied a significant portion of the conference concerns. Also, the participants recommended that mechanisms should be immediately put in place for disarming groups and individuals. Incentives must be incorporated into the disarmament program to encourage actors to disarm, including measures to ensure their protection. Those who disarm must be assisted in developing new livelihoods through job

training, employment placement, etc., and to ensure that those who have disarmed and received program benefits remain committed to pursuing nonviolent livelihoods. The participants observed the important role of local leaderships, the African Union, and the United Nations in the disarmament process and training programs.

Concerning the position of security forces, in general, and the role of police forces, in particular, the participants agreed that the Government of Sudan must be held accountable for the safety and security of all Sudanese people, in all regions, and from all tribes and religions. The government was held fully accountable for the disturbances in the region and the ensuing disasters. To end this situation, a new police force should be created with inclusive representation to all the various peoples within Darfur and Sudan, and trained to be committed to the official duties of police, namely the protection of humans and property, crime prevention, and prosecution of all crime doers.

The Darfur State must have responsibility over its police force. At present there is little trust in the national police force established by the Government, which has been responsible for violence against civilians. The central government should not be permitted to establish private police forces, as stipulated in the police law. The role of the army should be to protect the territorial integrity of Sudan. The security forces should investigate issues that threaten security, but should take military action only in defense of external threat or foreign invasion.

The participants emphasized the prominence of the rule of law to boost the position of women and the vital activities by civil society groups. They affirmed that the training and education programs,

particularly in human rights and international humanitarian law standards, must be implemented for security forces and police. The participants recommended that women must be incorporated into security forces and police in order to make them more representative. Additionally, there must be gender-sensitivity training and education of present and future troops in order to reduce gender-based violence.

Darfurian civil society needs channels to advocate for itself safely. As such, the UN should establish safe zones in which security can be assured for Darfurian civil society groups to meet and organize their activities. Military buffer zones might also be established to create separation between armed groups. The participants reminded the Government of Sudan with the international obligation conferred upon it to abide by indictments by the ICC.

The issues of native administration were discussed in great detail by the participants concerned with the immediate needs of civil society and humanitarian associations in the light of the violent aggression by government and militias, which led to escalated armed and political conflicts. Most importantly, the recognition and realization of the role that native administration used to play in Darfur was elaborated upon before the government attacked the prevailing system to enforce ruling party's planned domination by military coup. The well-entrenched native administration traditions among multi-ethnic and cultural groups in Darfur were sufficiently able to resolve conflicts, secure tranquility of people, and share effectively in the due process of law and the peace making and peace keeping processes between various nomadic and agricultural communities.

The participants agreed that the devastation by the central gov-

ernment of this efficient socio-administrative system has been a factor in the continuous violence throughout the region. The participants recommended putting in place the native administration's system in the constitution reform without government intrusions, in order to maintain the right of Darfurians to select the forms of administration most suitable to their needs. The security and development of Darfur will take advantage of the legal practices of dispute resolution: law, communal governance, and justice should be reinvigorated in close cooperation between the State of Darfur, native administration, and the international peace force. Local customary law should be respected in constitutional reform, including respect for Darfurian interpretations of Shari'a.

The achievement of these recommendations hinges on the existence of a stable national democratic regime. The Sudanese national government must be reformed to assure equal representation of all regions and communities within Sudan, proportionate to their percentage of the national population. This representation must exist in all sectors of governance including the judiciary, civil service, and military. In addition, cabinet ministry positions must be representative, and influential ministry positions must be allocated in a fair manner. In order to create an effective democratic structure in Sudan, constitutional and judicial reform as well as political restructuring is necessary. National discussions that include all communities and the grassroots must be initiated to conceive and implement an appropriate democratic system for Sudan.

The recommendations envisioned, Darfur should remain a unitary state, headed by one governor; but commissioners or representatives from North, South, and West Darfur should form part of the governance structure. Liaison officers should be elected who can

link Native Administrations with local and national governance structures. Local administration must be empowered with training programs to democratize its representation in practical terms, independently from government manipulation or exploitation of the natives.

The conference resolved in strategic recommendations in the economic arena. Compensation programs must be established in order to begin to restore the dignity and livelihood of Darfurians. These programs must be tailored to meet individual, familial, village, and community needs. Development programs must be people-centered and sustainable. When possible, Darfurians should be employed in development projects, and industry should be created in Darfur to create manufacturing job opportunities and investment; infrastructure must be rebuilt with the World Bank and GoS financial contributions managed and distributed through local communities groups.

Strictly, the participants recommended that an administrative body with representatives from both nomadic and farming communities is needed to create standards of engagement that can reduce conflict over land and water. Standards for timing and pattern of migration, land use, access and use of wells, and so on, can be established through this commission to create common practices throughout Darfur that will help ensure peaceful coexistence. A commission must be established to address land ownership issues. This commission should be composed of the international community and local leadership (sheikhs) who have knowledge of the local historical hakura system.

More immediately, creating a peaceful environment is necessary to bring about a secure environment for which the international

community must send in a robust peacekeeping force potentially through the UN Security Council's invocation of Chapter 7. A comprehensive and effective peace agreement, which includes the disarming of the Janjaweed, is a necessary precondition for a peace process to recommence with greater monitoring and accountability for violations in this ceasefire agreement.

This Diaspora conference was highly concerned with issues of security and development. The actively leading participation of several intellectual Darfuri women in all discussions mirrored the grave concerns of the women who suffered the ongoing tragic disaster in the region, while still facing increasing responsibilities with great sacrifices for the people of Darfur.

Besides the strong recommendation to assure representation of women and other minority groups within local and national governance, SHRO-Cairo notes that the recommended representation of Darfuri women should be based on a 50-50 formula in the next meetings, to raise the voice of women in both theoretical and practical terms.

## **Labor Rights in the Gezira Scheme**

**Dr. Abu Sifyan Mohamed Elbashir**

The Gezira Scheme is the Sudan's pioneering economic and social development, the oldest of its modern agricultural projects, and the largest scheme centrally administered in the world on an area of 2.1 million feddans that represent 12 percent of the total cultivated land of the country, as well as 50 percent of its irrigated agriculture. About 80 percent of the Gezira State population inhabited the scheme, which provided a significant portion of the national income, including 7 percent of the working force of Sudan.

The scheme created a vibrant social milieu, a melting pot of the country's cultures and ethnicities, especially the West African migrants'. In this productive environment, the population enjoyed a unique peaceful co-existence and social stability based on the village, as a social unit, and the coherency of the extended family. The particularities of this interaction made of the Gezira humans a knowledgeable people about economic and social dynamics - citizens aware of the political life of the Nation in both local and national standards.

The government, board of the scheme, and farmers shared administration of the scheme since its inauguration. The board has been directly responsible for the formal finances of the project, while a few farmers have been financed by commercial banks. Aid from family members, personal savings, and shail (usury loans) from some rich merchants constituted the informal financial resources of farming. Insufficient, untimely, and costly, or rather scarcely reimbursed funding, in addition to abstention by financiers from funding due to absence of reliable information, and the lack-

ing of a viable policy to allocate specifically the necessary land for crops led to increased risks and debt. In the meantime, the government and the board have been often blamed for their untimely budgets and the inappropriate methods they followed to collect accumulated debts from farmers. The latter have been compelled to seek funding from informal resources that dealt them severe losses, especially poor farmers regularly exploited by the shail system and other usury practices.

The problems of administration included methods of assessing the crops by the agricultural inspectors who used average productivity as an assessment criterion, regardless of the financial status and performance of farmers.

The administration's training programs have been criticized because they ignored the actual needs of units and trainees. The training programs should address these needs, according to the jurisdiction and competencies of both units and farmers.

Accounts of the scheme experienced a partnership system of accountancy by which the revenue of cotton, the main crop of the scheme, would be divided between government, board, and farmers by calculated proportions of expenditure. This system increased the farmers' debt for it failed to provide them with an incentive to increase productivity. Another system of accountancy was adopted for farmers as individual producers. This system aimed to secure high productivity for farmers via a competitive environment of production, by which a producer would pay all costs of production, including water, land rent, and loans with respect to cotton mainly, in addition to other crops, to some extent, provided that the producer would then receive all revenue. The heavily accumulated debts of

the farmers, however, have deeply affected the productivity and systems of accountancy in the scheme. This situation called on a comprehensive revision to modernize these systems, besides a critical need to maintain fully the rights of farmers and agricultural workers, administrative methods and training programs, and the reforms earlier mentioned towards a workable agricultural policy to boost productivity and the wellbeing of producers, simultaneously.

The scheme relations with the central government, Gezira State, and the board and farmers of the scheme also required deep revisions. The monopolization of decision-making by the center has already excluded the state from participation in decision making, although the scheme itself is part of state lands. This exclusionary policy weakened the scheme's share in state investments, which impoverished the farmers and worsened the situation of unemployment in the scheme.

Moreover, the central government's influential relations over the ministry of irrigation, added to several financial and industrial groups, often neglected farmers' expertise or their needs to have access to modern industries, rural development, and marketing agencies. The demands, ideas, and claims by the Farmers' Federation and professional unions of the scheme on these issues have been totally ignored, year after year.

In 2005, the government imposed an Act on the scheme. The major forces of the scheme, especially the farmers' federation, professional associations of scheme employees, landlords, and population of the Gezira state as a whole were never consulted in act legislation. The legislator enforced an act of law to organize the scheme without consideration to the laws related to the scheme, for exam-

ple the law on land acquisitions and family law. The application of the act, therefore, generated multiple negativities in the societal life, including a collapse of production relations between farmers, government, and board. The act, for instance, introduced a new partnership for private sector with farmers and government, which many suspected as a preparatory step to allow the private sector to appropriate the whole scheme.

The new privatization entry by enforceable code unto the scheme constituted a grave concern for the regular forces of the scheme that anticipated - in the absence of a comprehensive settlement to the needs and interests of farmers, board, and state - the occurrence of losses in the forces of skilled and unskilled labor, and the farmers who constituted the primary groups of scheme, to the detriment of all social and economic institutions of the scheme.

It is expected that the application of the act would disintegrate the social fabric of the scheme, which was founded on the solidarity life of villages and the extended families that might abandon their own homelands by collective migrations. This would certainly increase problems of displacement and unemployment in the cities in economic, social, and moral terms. The resolution of the Gezira deep crisis would be further handicapped by insistence of Government to implement the Act, which apparently added to the injustices of farmers in the scheme.

The reforms that should redress the crisis might be summarized in the following recommended measures, which should be applied in full consultation with the Farmers' Federation and professional unions by agreement with the board and government to:

1. Maintain the ongoing production relations between farmers,

government, and scheme board with a view to reform production relations in the scheme;

2. Include the scheme within investments of the Gezira State;

3. Reform institutional relations in between the scheme and the ministry of irrigation;

4. Establish rural banks inside the scheme to finance farmers and support productivity;

5. Create marketing cooperatives for all crops;

6. Encourage small industries;

7. Activate the agricultural advisory body of the scheme, and mobilize its recommendations to improve agriculture.

8. Establish a separate administration from the board for the marketing of cotton;

9. Set-up a micro administrative council for each administrative unit composed of farmers, administrators, and agriculturalist membership to plan, execute, and supervise over programs of the administrative unit; and

10. Divide the scheme into administrative units throughout the 18 sections of scheme, in accordance with recommendation 9.

## **Production Relations Of the Gezira Agriculture**

**Dr. Mohamed Yusif Ahmed Elmustafa**

The study conducted by the World Bank in 1965 to develop the Gezira Scheme modeled the subsequent research on the scheme and the other irrigated projects of Sudan. The notion of production relations was a target for capitalist development in the WB research. The succeeding local studies tried simply to specify income sharing in the distribution between the State and farmers; thus ignoring the ownership forms of the means of production, the relations of power distribution, and the stratification of different sections of the population in the direct or indirect processes of production.

In this paper, we will layout a few research parameters on the social dimensions of the process of production in the Gezira scheme and the Manaqil agricultural extension. To begin with, the scheme board experienced different income distribution formulas since initiation of the project, including enforcement of the Gezira Act 1950, and the amendment of shares to the government, farmers, scheme board, farmers' reserved fund, local councils, and social services. Further amendments were introduced in the seasons 1963/64 and 65/66 that raised farmer share up to 48 percent and government share to 36 percent of the total account.

These repeated changes indicated primarily a manifestation of the conflict between government and farmers represented by their Federation, as a direct expression of the competing forces throughout the political changes of the country.

The October Revolution 1964 made a great stride in the farmers' share up to 48 percent of the net revenue in appreciation of the ac-

tive contribution by farmers in the triumph of the uprising. But the post-revolution governments endeavored to form production relations, commensurate only with interests of ruling groups, to boost profit margins of the State in income distribution.

Mandated by the government, a working committee on the scheme (1967-64) believed that the partnership system, which inhibited innovation and technical modernity of the scheme, failed to induce farmers to increase cotton productivity. The small size of farming acquisitions exerted a negative effect in the revenues. The committee asked for cancellation of the partnership system to be replaced by a land-renting system and a decentralized administration for the agricultural processes of the scheme. These recommendations might be compared with the WB advisement to increase the size of farms and State business in the project.

Influenced by the WB and government experts, the State decided to take sides directly against interests of the poor farmers, agricultural workers, and employees.

On July 11th, 1980, the former president announced a replacement of the distribution system of production costs and profits in the tripartite partnership by imposing an individual account for the farmer, who would pay for irrigation and land renting from the State - without protection or compensation for risk or loss.

August 2005, the government passed another law stipulating a complete withdrawal from administration of the scheme, except for collection of irrigation fees and empowerment of private sector, irrespective of nationality, to control assets of the project for modernity purposes. These orientations announced a new turn in the discourse of the scheme.

The adopted measures, in our opinion, indicated a close alliance between the State, with its neo-colonial style, and the global nature of capitalism versus labor represented by local farmers and seasonal workers. It is clear that the State played with its bureaucratic authority the role of a mediator in the process of surplus accumulation and the ongoing exploitation against interests of small producers, i.e., the farmers, seasonal workers, and other laborers. The current attitude to strengthen the private sector would lead to paralysis in the efficiency and supervision of the public sector in production relations.

A bias towards interests of labor, namely the farmers, agricultural workers, and laborers of the scheme, articulated in a general call on nationalization of the scheme lands to assure effectiveness of the community. In this case, the State would not maintain only the right to utilize the land; it might include equally the transference of the legal and economic ownership of scheme in the interest of society. This call emphasized further the establishment of highly efficient public institutions and cooperatives to finance agricultural operations and provide for production inputs strongly supported by State. The call also stressed the formulation of lawful comprehensive policies to guarantee the well-being of farmers, including their social insurance and the right to pension.

The social and class structures of the Gezira rural population were seriously transformed by production changes in the scheme, which centered on the cotton cash crop, as an object of local and global conflict over revenue and redistribution of profits between producers and financiers.

In summary, the transformations in question included:

a. Crystallized growth of a wealthy class of farmers embracing significant national strata with economic and social visions on the present scheme and its future;

b. Continuous effort by influential strata to tighten control on the local and national instruments and the institutions of economic, political, and administrative activities; and

c. Increased quantitative and qualitative expansion in the size and segments of poor farmers.

We noticed several demographic changes in the age and sex composition of the farmers' community; contradictions in the capitalist advances; and tragic economic and social repercussions in correspondence with the enforced capitalist path of development that packed the traditional structures in Gezira with a new energy. The latter prepared the grounds for a segmentation ideology, which played an important role in the organizational activities of farmers.

Despite all changes, it is expedient to note that the ideas and decisions on the present conditions and fate of the scheme, besides the extent of its control by State or private sector, would not reach climax without a broad social and political dispute.