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رئيس الحركة

### **SLM - HUMANITARIAN TEAM**

# REPORT ON SECURITY SITUATION AND PEACE PROCESS IN DARFUR

Between: <u>Dec. 15. 2016 to March 15.2017</u>

<u>Deteriorating Security, a Protracted Peace Process, and</u>
<u>Diminishing Opportunities</u>

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### Foreword

The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) presents the following report on the humanitarian situation in Darfur, covering the three-month period from December 15, 2016 to March 15, 2017. This report, conducted by the SLM Humanitarian Team (SLM-HT) represents the SLM's new initiative to monitor and respond to the humanitarian situation in the war-affected region of Darfur. Specifically, the report's findings are the result of daily monitoring efforts to track and report on the violations committed by government forces and government-sponsored militias.

The report contains a wide range of information on the government's humanitarian violations, including patterns and frequency of the manifestation of violence against civilians, both inside and outside the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. It further provides information on the security threats in Darfur, as well as the indicators of the prevailing security situation in the region. The indicators covered in the report include, among others, the government's policies and actions to empower the militias and convert the Janjaweed into the RSF, the expulsion of UN partner international humanitarian aid organizations, the weakening of UNAMID and the government's calls for its expedited withdrawal, the resettlement of outside groups on indigenous people's lands, the international community's encouragement of the government's actions by lifting of sanctions, the government's intransigent positions that impede the peace process, the governments increasingly common use of systemic rape as a weapon, the government's fueling of internal tribal conflicts, and the impunity of perpetrators.

I would like to thank all those who helped in any way to prepare this first report, and I call upon everyone concerned with the humanitarian situation in Darfur to contribute to the enrichment and development of future periodical reports of the SLM-HT. Also, I hope this report will help inform all those concerned with Darfur—including individuals, organizations, and countries—when they develop and offer their suggestions for mitigating this dire humanitarian situation in Darfur.

Mini Arko Minawi Chairman SLM 08/06/2017

#### Introduction

Many of the reports on the humanitarian and security situations in Darfur are inaccurate. The reports often inadequately report the number of displaced persons, the occurrences of violent incidents, the patterns of crimes committed, or the aggregation of war-related death tolls. These reports further fail to adequately reflect the grave nature of the humanitarian situation on the ground in Darfur, especially the dire living condition in the IDP camps.

The inaccuracies and inadequacies of most reports on Darfur has been caused by the Government of Sudan's propaganda and massive disinformation campaigns. Unfortunately, many have fallen under the influence of the government's disinformation campaign, which seeks to project a false picture of the situation in Darfur. Accordingly, many of these reports tend to perpetuate the Government's false narrative that diminishing violent confrontations and clashes between the Government's forces and allied militia on one side and the opposition movements' forces on the other has led to decrease in violence against civilians in Darfur and created a relatively stable security situation in Darfur. This is not the case.

The Government's claims about stability and peace in Darfur are totally false and directly contradict the realities on the ground in Darfur. The Government's narrative is easily be disproven by the actual number of instances of violence against civilians, the actual number of victims, the system patterns and levels of violence, and the nature of forces involved in carrying out such violence. Civilians in Darfur are still subjected to extreme and near-constant violence of all sorts, such that they live in total fear of the Government forces—particularly its allied Janjaweed militia, now called the Rapid Support Force—who perpetuate the violence against them. The Government, through its media manipulation and public diplomacy, is trying to hide these facts and paint a false picture of the situation facing civilians in Darfur.

The greatest fear and concern about the Government's disinformation tactics is the possibility that other actors involved in reporting on the situation in Darfur could—even inadvertently—be influenced by the Government's narrative and base their own positions and suggested solutions on the Government's false information. Furthermore, the Government's approach is designed to encourage an accelerated withdrawal of the UNAMID forces, which would lead to a further deterioration of the situation on the ground

and deprive Darfur or outside monitoring and reporting on the situation on the ground.

In contrast to the information produced by the Government of Sudan or contained in the many reports based on false information, the information contained in this report conducted by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) Humanitarian Team clearly shows that, irrespective of the absence of clashes between Government forces and those of the Movements, the violence against the civilians still continues in all forms and patterns, and sometimes at even higher rates than in the past. The information in this report shows that there has been no improvement in the security situation on the ground in Darfur.

The SLM Humanitarian Team Report covers the period between December 15, 2017 to March 15, 2017 and documents the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Darfur and the protracted peace process. The Report also focuses on the indicators used to measure the security situation in Darfur, as well as the potential dangers of using the prevailing approach adopted by many organizations and reflected in their subsequent reports on Darfur.

The SLM Humanitarian Team report deals with different aspects of the humanitarian situation in the following sequential pattern:

# Chapter 1 – The Absence of Security and Manifestations of Violence

The absence of security and the increasing levels of violence against civilians in Darfur manifests in many ways. As the facts and figures contained in this report show, the rate and pattern of violence, such as killings; rapes; abductions; torture; looting; burning of villages, market places, and farms; and attacks on IDP camps, have increased such that they now occur on daily basis. This deteriorating situation was also quite aptly reflected statement made by the US Ambassador Nikki Haley during a UNSC briefing on Darfur (May 4, 2017) as well as in the press release issued by the U.N. Secretary General following that meeting. The following situations further prove that the situation on the ground has not improved.

#### 1- The Use of Chemical Weapons

The recent accusations leveled against the Government of Sudan by human rights bodies, especially Amnesty International's 2016 report on the Government's use of chemical weapons against the civilians in the Jebel Marra area in Central Darfur is but one of the more recent examples of the heinous war crimes committed by the Government. The Government's use of internationally prohibited weapons of mass destruction constitutes a war crime and a crime against humanity. Under normal circumstances, such accusations coming from an experienced and reputable organization like the Amnesty International would be sufficient to be taken into consideration by the international community, especially when the report claims that about 200 to 250 civilians were killed as a result of the chemical weapons use. Of course, Amnesty International's report refutes the arguments advanced by other organizations and reports claiming that the violence against the civilians has subsided. The Government of Sudan has also undertaken every effort to prevent other organizations from corroborating the Amnesty Specifically, the Government has obstructed and International report. prevented UNAMID from accessing the Jebel Marra area to investigate the accusation of chemical weapons use. The Government's uncooperative stance and refusal to allow access to Jebel Marra for international agencies charged with preventing the use of such weapons, as well as the heavy-handed actions against independent investigators such as the British Chanel reporter, Mr. Philip Cox, all indicate that the government is hiding something under its gloves.

### 2 – The Increase in the Use of Systematic Rape as Weapon

The phenomena of Government militias (Janjaweed turned RSF) using systematic sexual assault and rape as a collective punishment against women from targeted African tribes is continuous and exponentially increasing in frequency. This is particularly true in the rural and more remote areas of Darfur.

Even the Government of Sudan's own statistics acknowledge the increasing prevalence of the systematic use of rape as a weapon. A report presented by the acting Minister of Interior, Mr. Babiker Aimed Digina, before the National Parliament found 43 more registered cases of rape between April 2016 to March 2017 than between that same period in 2016.

As other reports frequently find, this devastating criminal act is being used as a collective punishment against civilians and with the aim to humiliate victims, disintegrate their families, and endanger their integrity. However, despite frequent reports on this issue, the figures contained in these reports still fail to fully reflect and report the actual reality on the ground because of the inability of the reporters to monitor the incidents or reach the victims. Most of the victims usually shy away or even refrain from telling their stories because they feel bound by societal traditions, fear the tarnishing of their personal honor, or seek to avoid damaging the reputations of their families, tribe, or communities. It is thus important to note the context as to why these figures are far below the actual number of incidents taking place on the ground. As the aforementioned reasons prevent investigators from accessing the sites of incidents or the victims, obtaining accurate figure becomes impossible, and it is even difficult to get reasonably close estimates of the actual figures.

The absence of deterrent measures and effective monitoring mechanisms have allowed the Government militias to continue committing these devastating criminal acts. That is why this phenomena constitutes one of the gravest security threats for civilians in Darfur, especially since there is also an increased possibility of acts of revenge, which further diminishes chances for future social and community reconciliation efforts.

Curtailing or minimizing the damage this situation requires immediate intervention to establish more capable and effective protective mechanisms, including increasing protection for civilians and developing monitoring system for reporting that are more effective and efficient than the existing ones.

The continuing impunity for the perpetrators of rape and sexual assault is tantamount to a war crime, and any delay in taking effective preventive measures will further give a green light to the Government's criminal behavior.

### Examples of Personal Testimonies From Rape Cases:

### - Rape Destroyed Entire Family

My name is A.M.O, I am 25 years from Tawila village west of Al-Fashir. Every body remember when in 2005 Janjaweed raided and burnt our village and looted our properties. At that moment I was inside our house and heard the shout and bullet noise and rushed out and saw fire every where and three men raping my mother not far from our house. She was screening and struggling. I also saw my little sister who was 8 years shouting and desperately trying to rescue our mother. She was shut by Janjaweed man and immediately died. I could not belief my eyes. It was like a night dream. I tried to pull the men but I was forcefuly taken away by other four Jannaweed men who tied me at gun point and threw me into car. I was crying and shouting. I spent with them three nights. It was a hell in my life. I wanted to commit sucide but I did not have a way to do it. I was also thinking of my dead sister and my screening mother. They raped me day and might for three days. I saw three other girls whom I knew them. They were all raped. They chained us and tied us in tree so that we could not escape. They kept telling us we are useless and do not even deserve to be as slave girls. They said they were doing that to humiliate us. Every one of us refused to eat for those three days. Before they release us they put pepper in our private parts and shaved our hairs with knief. When doing that they were laughing and smoking. One Janjaweed lighted his cigaret in the breast of one of the girls. I do not want to remember that moments. It was horrible. It was a hell. One of those girls who got pregnant later on died with her child while giving birth. Her father refused to take her to hospital because it was shameful to the family. My selef I got pregnant but thank God I managed to abort. My father got sick since that time untill now. He refused to speak for long time. After that my small brother joined the rebels. He told us he was going to revenge for our honor. But I heard he died later on. Those people are wolfs and not human being. They are heartless. They do not have mercy for human beings. Even as I am in this IDP camp, I feel they could attack me at any time. We need to be rescued from those people. Now I have nothing to loose. I lost every thing. I only pray to Allah (God) to punish those criminals like the way they punished me and my mother and killed my little sister.

From an interview given to SLM-Humanitarian Team reporter on 20.02.2017

### Testimonies of Rape in Darfur by Amnesty International.

Rape is devastating weapon in Darfur.

Pro-government Janjaweed militias in Sudan's Darfur region are using mass rape in order to punish, humiliate and control the non-Arab groups to which they belong, says human rights group Amnesty International.

In its report Rape as a Weapon of War, Amnesty publishes the testimonies of some of the hundreds of women its researchers have spoken to:

#### - Singing when raping

I was sleeping when the attack on Disa [village] started. I was taken away by the attackers, they were all in uniforms. They took dozens of other girls and made us walk for three hours. During the day we were beaten and they were telling us: "You, the black women, we will exterminate you, you have no god." At night we were raped several times. The Arabs guarded us with arms and we were not given food for three days.

### - Rape to humiliate

Amnesty says in many cases, women have been raped in public, in front of their husbands, relatives, or the wider community. This is in order to humiliate her, her family and the entire group.

### - 12 year old raped

A, a 66-year-old farmer from Um Baru told that Janhaweed took KM, who is 12 years old in the open air.

Her father was killed by the Janjaweed in Um Baru, the rest of the family ran away and she was captured by the Janjaweed who were on horseback. More than six people used her as a wife; she stayed with the Janjaweed and the military more than 10 days.

### - Raped by six men

M was raped by six men in front of her house in front of her mother. M's brother, S, was then tied up and thrown into fire.

### - Pregnant women raped

Amnesty says that pregnant women have not been spared. An ethnic Irenga woman from Garsila villageI says she was with another woman, Aziza, aged 18, who had her stomach slit on the night we were abducted. She was pregnant and was killed as they said: "it is the child of an enemy"

#### 3 - The Attacks on UNAMID, the UN and Humanitarian NGOs

Indicators of the absence of security and the prevalence of violence also manifest in the continual attacks on the personnel of the UNAMID, the UN, and humanitarian NGOs on the ground. While these numerous attacks indicate the level of the absence in security, the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators (as the government refuses to bring them for punishment and the relevant agencies hesitate in perusing such cases in earnest manner) has encouraged their criminal activity. The perpetrators are even further encouraged by parties' propensity to positively respond without hesitation to the perpetrators' request when they ask for ransom.

# 4 – The Politicization and Militarization of Tribes Fueling Internal Conflicts

The politicization and militarization of local tribes, and the fueling intertribal conflict, in Darfur remains one of the NCP Government's key tactics in effecting its divide-and-conquer strategy to solidify its political control and management.

An inescapable reality when dealing with the conflict in Darfur is that the Government fabricated and disseminated false information with the deliberate intent to create an impression that the African tribes intend to eliminate the Arab tribes from Darfur. That narrative helped to mobilize a great number of Arab tribes against the African ethnic groups through the organization of the Janjaweed militia, which created havoc and committed well-documented atrocities. Thus, throughout the Darfur conflict, the Government has sought to portray the ongoing crisis in Darfur as an inter- tribal conflict.

More recently, the Government has turned its approach and engineered, ignited, and fueled an Arab-Arab inter-tribal conflict so severe that UNAMID has had to intervene in several instances to control these clashes. Since 2008, the government-fueled Arab-Arab conflicts have killed at least 7,000 people, displaced more than 400,000 civilians, and led to the loss of hundreds of thousands in animal stocks. In all these conflicts, heavy machineguns were used and government-sponsored tribal militia and other high government officials participated.

While the situation is still potentially explosive across Darfur, the most notable clashes include: Northern Rizigat versus Bani-Hussain in Northern Darfur, Southern Rezigat and Maalia in Eastern Darfur, Maalia and Hamar in Eastern Darfur, Habania and Falata in Southern Darfur, Bani Halba 10 of 52

against Gimir in Southern Darfur, Salamat and Targem in Central Darfur, Habania and Targem in South Darfur. The security situation remains tense, particularly around the bloodiest clashes, such as the one between Southern Rezigat and the Maalia and that of the Messirya and Targem in Central Darfur.

The Government's role in fueling the inter-tribal conflict takes different means and forms, including creating and supporting militia within all the conflicting parties, creating agent provocateurs and saboteurs, implanting spoilers, and pardoning or protecting the culprits, among others. One of the most concrete roles of the government in spoiling reconciliation efforts was when the government was reluctant to enforce the accord reached between the Rezigat and Maalia in what is known Meroe Agreement. Though the negotiations were supervised at the level of the First Vice President, Gen. Bakri Hassan Saleh, the government is reluctant in pushing the parties to commit themselves to uphold the Agreement. Another example of the Government's this interference and perpetuating of conflict is that when the Northern Rezigat and Bank Hussain reached and agreement signed by Shiekh Musa Hilal on behalf of Northern Rezigat and a representative of the Bani-Hussain, the officials of the ruling party (the NCP) publicly relinquished its responsibilities. Amnesty International reported that high ranking government security officers belonging to both tribes were publicly seen participating in the fight using heavy machineguns and government vehicles. Furthermore, in the conflict between Targem and Missayria in South Darfur, the state governor at the time, retired general Adam Mahamoud Garuelnabi, publicly stated that officials of the ruling party (NCP) were part of those who planed and participated in the fighting between the two tribes.

Though these conflicts are initially orchestrated and fueled but the Government, they often get out of control and spill over beyond its capabilities of containment. The repeated need for intervention by the UNAMID forces to in pacifying these conflicts shows the inability of the government to guarantee security in Darfur.

### 5- The Failure of Voluntary Return

Among the strongest indicators of the absence of security and prevalence of violence in Darfur is the continued refusal of the IDPs and refugees to return to their area of origin. It is clear that where the OCHA has kept records on the numbers of the displaced persons, it failed to publicly show any figures of voluntary return. This also confirms the fallacy of the government propaganda on this issue.

### Chapter 2 - Aggravating Humanitarian Crisis

Described as catastrophic situation, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is steadily worsening in all respects, including protection and service provision in the IDP camps (food, medicine, shelter, and education). In clear violation of international humanitarian law, the Government continues to systematically and collectively punish the civilians by committing all kinds of atrocities against them. The Government's expulsion of international humanitarian NGOs in 2009 was also part of its plan, and has had a serious impact. To make it worse, the Government also made it difficult for the few remaining humanitarian organization(s) to operate by creating an extremely restrictive operating environment. Moreover, the inability of UNAMID to fully discharge its mandate to protect civilians from the militias' attack is worsening the situation.

Outside of the IDP camps, the situation is even more critical. All forms of violence—including random killing, rape, abduction, arrest, torture, and burning and looting of properties—are commonplace and occurring with increasing frequency. This dim situation is also coupled with the diminishing chances of any peaceful settlement through negotiations as the Government keeps impeding the peace process.

Tables in this report, covering the period from December 15, 2016 to March 15, 2017, present these facts in figures.

In comparing these figures with those presented in the U.N. Secretary General report in the same period (December 15, 2016 – March 15, 2017), it is obvious that the SLM Humanitarian Team figures substantially exceed other reports. While the differences are in every aspect, it particularly notable in the differences in rape cases by 23, killings by 122, abductions by 23, arrests by 25, lootings by 132, and burnings by 327.

For more detail about the SLM Humanitarian Team report figures see Table (A.1)

Table (B) - Shows the Differences of Figures of Violation in the UN Report and the SLM-HT Report for December 15, 2016 to March 15, 2017

Type of Violation	UN Figures	SLM-HT Figures	Differences
Killings by GDS and Militia	84	216	122
Other War Related Deaths	106	480	374
Rape and other Sexual Assaults	181	279	98
Injuries Including by Fire Arms	138	276	129
Looting Cases	104	236	132
Abduction	44	67	23
Displacement	Not Reported	6530	6530
Arrest	Not Reported	38	30
Burning (Including Villages/Farms and Shops)	7	334	327

### Chapter 3 - Security Threats and Indicators on the Ground

The following indicators constitute elements that pose consistent security threats.

### 1- The Government Strategy of Empowering and Strengthening the Militia

Empowering the pro-government tribal militias has become the cornerstone of the government's strategy. The Government has undertaken many measures 13 of 52

to support this empowerment policy. The Government offers more trainings, provides more heavy weapons, and secures additional finances for these militias, in addition to legalizing and protecting their status by law. Thus, the Janjaweed are now legalized as the Rapid Support Force (RSF). This force now operates above the law and operates without accountability and with full impunity for its members.

Unfortunately, many reports on the humanitarian situation in Darfur ignore this fact, which constitutes one of the strongest security threat in Darfur.

### 2 – The Continuation of the State of Emergency in Darfur

While the continuation of the state of emergency in Darfur reflects the state of security in the region, it is important to note that the Government uses this status as an excuse to abuse all kinds of freedoms. Government security forces and militias arbitrarily undertake measures to prosecute individuals and groups that belong to particular tribes and ethnic groups, using the state of emergency as an excuse for their discriminatory actions.

### 3 – The Strategy of Weakening UNAMID to Accelerate its Withdrawal

While the shortcomings of UNAMID in performing its duties constitutes a security problem in Darfur, the influence exerted by the Government to disturb the mission's role is even more practically and potentially dangerous and reduces any expected future opportunities for stability. The government exercises direct and indirect means of influencing UNAMID to weaken its performances, including: directly targeting UNAMID employees and service personnel through killing, preventing their movement, denying their visas, hijacking their cars, and interfering with their reports....etc.

The UN acceptance of the Exit Strategy is also too early and premature, especially when the security situation on the ground is taken into consideration. In addition to the above, the government is making every possible move to put maximum diplomatic pressure and influence over UNAMID's troop contributing countries to further expedite the exit strategy. The cases with South Africa and Burkina Faso are obvious examples. All these blackmailing attitudes employed by the government are effectively limiting the role of the mission to the disadvantage of peace and security of the region.

### 4 - The Expulsion of Humanitarian NGOs and the Impacts on the Ground

There is a continuous shortage and deterioration in the humanitarian service in Darfur, particularly among the IDPs, including for the provision of food, health, shelter and education. One major cause is the absence of the U.N. partner humanitarian organizations. Since their expulsion in 2009, a great gap has emerged in service provision to the war affected civilians in Darfur. This vulnerable situation represents a grave security threat.

### 5 – The Inconsistency in the Aggregate Number of the War-Related Death Toll

Ignoring and/or avoiding calls to update the figures of war-related death toll remains a major defect that characterizes several reports related to this situation in Darfur and by all means constitutes a potential security threat. While the number of IDPs are occasionally updated (the last U.N. report stands at 2.6 million people - UN Secretary General report, December 15, 2016 to March 15, 2017), reports are largely silent on the exact number of the war related deaths, and most of those figures have not been updated. The figure of 300,000 deaths used in many reports is the same estimate obtained during the early days when the conflict erupted in late 2003 to early 2004.

These figures do not incorporate the many new reported deaths featured in interim reports over the last decade. Failing to update the total death toll and for Darfur and aggregating that total (by adding to the original old figures of the 300,000) remains a major concern and needs to be rectified.

As some reputable reports put the estimate of the death toll to a figure of 500,000 persons since the start of the conflict (see recent Eric Reeves report), the prevailing inconsistency in aggregating the death toll leaves the door open for speculation and disputes over the real figure of the war-related deaths in Darfur. Whether this approach is an act of commission or omission, it constitutes a security threat.

# 6 - The impunity of the Perpetrators and Lack of Accountability

The impunity and lack of accountability enjoyed by the perpetrators of war crimes in Darfur remains a major factor for the continuation of the cycle of violence against the civilians and seriously impacts the already catastrophic

humanitarian situation. Furthermore, the slowdown of the ICC investigation, the non-cooperative positions taken by some countries signatory to the ICC (in particular their failure to arrest the perpetrators), and the non-adherence to or refraining from implementing of the UNSCR 1556 (disarmament of Janjaweed militia) have all combined to encourage the government to disregard its obligations towards the issue of justice. International silence and inaction has further encouraged the Government to comfortably rebrand the Janjaweed militia under the new name Rapid Support Force. This slowdown in effecting the justice is practically creating the impression that committing further crimes against the civilians in Darfur is a permissible act, not subject to any accountability and where the perpetrators can easily be pardoned.

In this regards it is important to clarify that, what has been undertaken by the so-called Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes is not more than an act of deception and is at best a mere cosmetic lip-service exercise and has nothing to do with achieving justice. The act only adds insult to injury and offends the victims. The fact of the matter is that, as the victims consider the ongoing delay tantamount to a denial of justice, the consideration shall have serious security repercussions.

### 7 – Targeting Darfur Students

For more than ten years, the Government of Sudan has been waging a systematic, selective and sustained attacks against tertiary education students from the Darfur region, especially against those hailing from African ethnic groups that the Government considers enemies. This policy is by all means an extension of the Government's genocide and ethnic cleansing strategy.

The cornerstone of this policy is to deprive these students from pursuing their study by fabricating unsubstantiated charges against them through subsequent arrest, detention, abduction, expulsion from their respective colleges, and even killing under dubious and/or suspected circumstances. In the last decades, many Darfur students were denied basic rights such waiver opportunities and subsidized housing. Furthermore, the Government imposed extra tuition fees upon them, prevented them from undertaking political activities, and subjected them to constant harassment by security elements claiming the students were supporting or allying with rebel movements. These policy of draining the sources against the Darfurians also constitutes additional security threat and crime against human rights.

### 8- The Presence of Foreign Combatants in Darfur

Another major factor that continues to augment and perpetuate the insecurity in Darfur is the presence of the foreign combatants. The presence of these well-armed forces who conduct their operations from Darfur (both against their respective governments and within Darfur) obstruct the possibility of any constructive Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) or effective Ceasefire in the region. The foremost of these forces are the Chadian opposition fighters in Northern Darfur, the forces from Central African Republic (known as SILECA) in South and South West Darfur and other elements hailing from Nigeria, Mali and Northern Africa.

The presence of these forces, armed with modern heavy weapons, and their ability to infiltrate and hide within some ethnic communities in Darfur for protection always complicates the issue of security. This complication becomes more relevant as more than sixty percent (60%) of the RSF elements hails from these foreign fighters (including most of the ranking commanders). These forces serve as allies to the Government, engaged in committing violent atrocities against the ethnic communities considered rebellious in Darfur, as well as in fighting the Armed Movements.

Statement made by the former minister of Interior (Gen. Esmat Abdurhanan) testifies this dilemma. In his report on the security situation before the National Assembly (the Parliament), he disclosed that there were more than 3,000 well-armed foreign elements in Jebel Amir, (a mining location in Northern Darfur). He subsequently asked Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to intervene and restore peace in the area. As the former Army commander in Darfur region until 2007, his statement was considered as disclosure of state secrets, and he was immediately fired.

### Chapter 4 — The International Community's Non-Reciprocal Reward to the Government

The emerging rapprochement sought by the international community with the government of Sudan for the purposes of combating illegal migration, coupled with the move to lift sanctions by the US government, will have serious repercussions on humanitarian situation and peace process in Darfur.

### 1- The Lifting of Sanctions

There are grave fears emanating from this premature move. As the US move

is propelled by a presumption that the violence against civilians in Darfur has subsided and that the security situation is steadily progressing as the result of diminishing clashes and confrontations between the government forces the movements forces, the mistake in this approach is that the violence against the civilians is not totally determined by the absent of such clashes but by the fact that the Janjaweed militia (now RSF) are not deterred nor disarmed . As long as this situation prevails, the violence will be continuous. Lifting the sanctions before compelling the government to control and disarm these militias will encourage the government to further unleash the militias against the civilians and continue commit more atrocities. Such a move is equal to rewarding the government without reciprocating any move on the ground.

### 2 - Assigning the Government to Combat Illegal Migration

The move to assign the Government of Sudan to combat the illegal migration problem facing northern Africa and Europe only serves to further empower the Janjaweed militia (RSF). As the RSF militia forces are part of government security apparatus and have a leading role in supposedly combating illegal migration, they stand the first beneficiary from the resources provided by the EU (being financial, logistical, communication equipment, and/or training facilities), as found in the report launched by US Enough Project conducted by Dr. Suliman Baldo (former African director for International Transitional Justice). This also implies protection and political support for the RSF from the international community.

While all such facilities constitutes part of rewarding incentives, it contradicts the EU's own moral values and humanitarian principles and violates UNSCR 1556, which obliges Sudan to disarm these militias and bring their leaders to justice. The government also sees this international recognition as a *de facto* approval of the impunity these militia currently enjoy. The move is also an offense to the victims and a threat to security in Darfur.

### Chapter 5 - Resettlement of Alien Groups

For a quite long time, the reality on the ground is that the government has actively engaged in implementing a resettlement program of alien groups (foreign tribes and ethnic groups from which the bulk of the Janjaweed militia elements hail). This resettlement program of alien groups (viewed as an advanced phase of the ongoing genocide) is taking place at the expenses of the indigenous tribes whose land is forcibly grabbed. The plan also supports the government's attempt to transfer the IDP camps for a permanent residential

purposes.

The resettlement program is taking place throughout Darfur, particularly in the areas like Wadi Saleh and Bendisi in Central Darfur, Habila, Kerenik in Western Darfur, Tawila areas in the West of Al-Fashir city, and Wadi Howar areas in Northern Darfur. Heavily armed militia are deployed to protect these areas and to use those areas as launching ground to attack civilians. Resettlement is also particularly acute in Southern Darfur where states are demarcated alongside tribal Cantonments to favor certain tribal groups.

This resettlement policy takes different forms, including fast track naturalization, appointment and promotion of tribal chiefs of these alien groups, giving them more powers (including registration of land titles) and representation in government institutions such local councils, state legislature, national parliament and administrative posts. Besides the fact that this policy constitutes war crimes and crimes against humanity, it also poses real security threat.

### Chapter 6 - How the Government is Obstructing Peace Process

The government has undertaken numerous efforts and strategies to obstruct and delay the peace process to its advantage, further undermining the security situation in Darfur.

### 1 - Impeding the Peace Process

To resolve the Darfur conflict as part of a comprehensive settlement of Sudan's chronic crisis, the international community has, since 2014, managed to revive Darfur peace talks through the auspices of African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP) led by former South African president Mr. Thabo Mbeki under the banner of a one-process, two-tracks approach. Throughout this process there have been several rounds of talks, including official and informal consultations under the auspices of the AUHIP, as well as with facilitation from Qatar and the Government of Uganda.

The talks that were intended to negotiate a CoH for humanitarian purposes, and to be followed by political and final security arrangements (including a final ceasefire) were until the last round of August 2016 only focused on defining limited areas on the CoH, including the differences on defining the areas or location of forces of the parties, disagreement on the establishment of Joint Humanitarian Mechanism, release of prisoners of war, and the status of Doha Document. The fact is that government's intransigence on

conditioning the Doha Document as the base for any political talks before concluding the CoH was the primary cause that torpedoed and prevented any progress. It is obvious that international unreciprocated concessions encouraged the government to take such this position.

### 2 - Undermining The National Dialogue

Contrary to the NCP's traditional approach of using piecemeal tactics in dealing with Sudan's crisis, the SLM (together with other movements and political forces) have resolved that a comprehensive approach is the only way to settle Sudan crisis in a coordinated fashion. Many efforts were excreted, including different initiatives, contacts, discussions and debates, and the SLM played a pioneering role in that effort before AU Resolutions 456 and 539 set out a coordinate process with multiple tracks for the Darfur negotiation track, Two Areas negotiation track, and National Dialogue.

In that process the SLM offered comprehensive answers on all the fundamental Darfur-specific and national issues, including on identity, relations between state and religion, freedoms, system of governance, criteria for power sharing and distributions of wealth, land issues, foreign relations, reforming civil service and security sectors, ideas on constitutional conference, etc. Furthermore, the SLM offered constructive ideas on procedural issues that should govern the process of National Dialogue such as the agenda, admiration, timelines, and mechanisms and modalities for implementation. As usual, the Government again obstructed the process by preventing the mediation from proceeding towards the procedural phase, closed the doors, and declared the end of the National Dialogue before it was born. As such, this the government bears and take the responsibility of this political failure.

As it is the considered view of everybody, the so-called outcomes of the Government's own exercise has nothing to do with any genuine National Dialogue as it was not inclusive and does not address the root causes of the national crisis.

### Chapter 7 - Other Issues of concern

### 1 - Substantial differences in Figures.

Different reports on the humanitarian situation in Darfur usually present different figures. What is worrying is that such differences are substantial to the point that it cannot be tolerated, especially in key areas such as reporting on the numbers of killings, rapes, abductions, and lootings and burnings of

properties.

Recognizing that such problems arise, at least in part, from the inability of some agencies to access the scene or reach the victims, there is an urgent need to immediately rectify this lack of access issue. Previously, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) effectively resolved this fundamental problem through establishment of a joint mechanism known as Joint Commission.

### 2- Absence of Human Rights Monitors and Independent Media

Another matter of concern is the absence of permanent human rights monitors and independent media. This stumbling block prevents the flow of accurate information on the violence in Darfur.

### 3- Absence of Joint Humanitarian Mechanism

The absence of a mechanism whose main role is to monitor the unhindered flow of relief aid to the affected civilians and to report on who obstructs aid has caused major problems in the smooth operation of relief efforts in Darfur. The government used the absence of monitoring to hinder the operation and subject affected persons to starvation.

### Chapter 8 - Recommendations

- 1- UNAMID shall be completely independent and free from GoS interferences in accessing, assembling, assessing, and writing its reports on humanitarian situation. Any interference from the parties involved in the conflict shall be considered as a violation to International Humanitarian Law and held accordingly accountable.
- 2- The process of Exit Strategy for UNAMID shall be determined by U.N. standard criterion and with a clear benchmark set by the Mission in accordance with its assessment, not to be influenced by the Government of Sudan.
- 3- In contrast to the increasingly common tendency to reduce troops, UNAMID shall be expanded (particularly in terms of mandate and capacity) to protect the civilians.
- 4- Troop contributing countries to UNAMID shall not succumb to GoS blackmailing tactics.
- 5- Janjaweed militia (now RSF) shall be disarmed in accordance with

UNSCR 1556, and its leaders shall be brought to justice.

- 6- Resettlement of the alien groups shall be stopped with immediately effect and deemed a war crime and crime against humanity.
- 6- International humanitarian aid organizations (in partnership with the UN) shall be allowed to return and resume work.
- 7- For the purposes of humanitarian aid access to the affected civilians, the international community shall pressure and help the parties to establish a Joint Humanitarian Unit.

### Table (A-1) shows violations took place from Dec. 15. 2016 to March 15.2017.

### **GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS**

# CC = Camp Coordinator

# LCL = Local Community Leader

# R.D = Radio Dabanga

# SLM-LS = SLM-Local Sources

# PR = Police Report

# E.W = Eye Witness

# D.L.A = Darfur Lawyers Association.

# S.T = Sudantribune

NO	TYPE OF VIOLATI O N	NUMBER OF VICTIM OR PROPERTY LOST	PLACE OF INCIDEN CE	DATE OF INCIDEN CE	SOURCE	REMAR KS
1	displaced people looted	20 people	Morney IDP Camp	15.12.201 6	R.D, SLM.LS , CC	
2	Burning	1	Kalma IDP camp	15.12.201 7	R.D, SLM.LS , CC	
3	Looting of vehicles	2 vehicles	Between Zalingie and Saraf Umra	15.12.201 6	SLM.LS, R.D, LCL E.W	
4						
5	killings	4 IDPs	Yasin area S. Darfur	16.12.201 6	EW, LCL, R.D	
6	Arrest	15 people	Sirba Lcality W.Darfur	16.12.201 6	E.W, LCC, R.D, SLM.LS	
7	Injures	13 people	N. Nertit W.Darfur	12.12.202 16	SLM. LS LCL, R.D, EW	

8	looting	1	North Dqrfur	12.16.201	SLM.LS R.D, LCL,	
			1 "		E.W	
9	Cattle looting	66	Dolbe area, S.West of Elfashir	17.12.201 6	SLM.LS R.D, LCL, EW	
10	Cattle looting	1	Nyala	17.12.201 6	SLM.LS R.D, LCL, E.W	
11	Looting	Dolbe area	Dolbe area	17.12.201 6	SLM.LS, R.D, LCL	
12	Killing	1 farmer	17.12.201 6	Sirba area	SLM.LS R.D, E.W, LCL	
13	Rape	6 women	Debba Nayra, Tawila Locality	20.12.201	SLM.LS R.D, LCL	4 were unreport ed
14	killing	1 person	Sirba	20.12.201	SLM.LS R.D, LCL	
15	Killing	1 IDP Person	Abusoruj IDP Camp	20.12.201	SLM.LS R.D, CC	
16	Looting	1 person	Sirba IDP Camp	20.12.201	R.D, SLM.LS , CC	
17	Looting	1 person	Nertiti	21.12.201	PR, SLM. LS	
18	Rape	1 Displaced woman	Molgo, Nertiti	22.12,201	PR, LCL	
19	Abduction	4 DISPLACED Women	Kabkabya area	22.12.201	SLM.L S R.D, LCL	

20	killing	3 people	Mojar area	22.12.201	E.W SLM. LS
21	Looting	1 person	Abuhamra area	22.12.201	SLM.L S R.D, E.W
22	Killing	1 person	Abuhamra S.Darfur	22.12.201	E.W, R.D, CC
23	Injures	5 person	Abuhamra , S.Darfur	22.12.201	R,D, E.W, SLM.LS
24	Abduction	3 person	Soronty IDP Camp Kabkabya	23.12.201	R.D, E.W, CC
25	Burning	100 houses	Salam Camp	23.12.201	R.D,
26	killing	4 People	Salam Camp, Nyala	23.12.201	PR, SLM.L S
27	Injures	6 people	Salam Camp	23.12.201	PR, CC, SLM.LS
28	Rape	2 young female students	Kassab IDP Camp	24.12.201	R.D, LCL, CC, SLM.LS
29	Attack and looting	13 IDP Wome	Kassab IDP Camp	24.12.201	R.D, SLM.LS , CC
30	Killing	1 person	E.Darfur	24.12.201 6	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
31	Killing	1 Child	Mokjar, C. Darfur	24.12.201	UNAMI D, R.D

32	Looting	1 person	Fanga locality	24.12.201	UNAMI D, R.D	
33	Rape	2 women	Forega camp	24.12.201	RD, SLM.LS , LCC	
34	Abduction	1 person	Dobo Umda, E. Jebal Mrra	24.12.201	R.D, LCL, EW	
35	Injures	8 people	Dobo Umda, E. jebal	24.12.201	R.D, E.W, LCL	
36	Killing	6 people	Forbarang a, W. Darfur	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W,	
37	Attack and burning	1 village	Bergi village, Mokjar locality	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS	
38	Killing	6 person	Bergi village, Mokjar locality	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS.	
39	Injuries	8 person	Bergi village, Mokjar locality	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS	
40	Injuries	2 people	Komondu area	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS	
41	Rape	3 women	Dolo locality	26.12.201 6	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS	One unreport ed
42	Injuries	1 person	Mokjar locality	26.12.201	PR, SLM.L S	
43 6 of	Killing	12 people	Raheed Alberdi, S. Darfur	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W	

44	Injuries	10 people	Raheed Aberdi, S. Darfur	26.12.201 6	R.D, E.W
45	Attack on farm	1	Raheed Alberdi, S.Darfur	26.12.201 6	LC, R.D, SLM.LS
46	Rape	4 women	Katoor locality in Jebel Marra	26.12.201 6	E.W, R.D, LCL
47	Looting	9	W.Darfur State	26.12.201 6	R.D, SLM.L S
48	Rape	4 women	Zagolona, Katool, Korma locality	19 to 26.12.206	LCL, E.W, SLM.LS
49	Killing	6 people	Suwani village, Melem locality	27.12.201 6	R.D, LC, SLM.LS
50	Attack on village	1 village	Suwani village, North Melem locality	27.12.201 6	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS
51	Looting of cattles	250 cows	North Melem locality	27.12.201 6	R.D, LC, SLM.LS
52	Killing	1 student	Forbarang a, W.Darfur	27.12.201 6	E.W, SLM.L S
53	Injuries	9 students	Forbarang a locality, W.Darfur	27.12.391 6	E.W, SLM.L S
54	Killing	16 people	Raheed Abaerdi locality, S. Drfur	27.12.291 6	E.W

55	Injuries	27 people	Raheed bardi locality, S. Darfur	27.12.201 6	E.W, SKM.L S
56	killing	4 people	Garsila locality, C, Darfur	28.12.201 6	E.W, SLM.L S
57	Killing	1 student	Zalingie Town	28.12.291 6	E.W, SLM.L S
58	Rape	11 women	Mokjar Locality, C. Darfur	Between 28 Dec. to 5.91.2017	LC, E.W, SLM.LS
59	Looting	1	Fogodogo locality, C. Darfur	28.12.201	LC, SLM.L S
60	Injuries	2 people	Geraida IDP Camp	29.12.201	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS
61	Rape	2 women	Kabkabya locality	29.12.201 6	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS
62	Abduction	1 person	Kabkabya locality	30.12.201 6	R.D, E.W
63	Looting	50 people affected	Artala area, Mokjar locality	30.12.201	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS
64	Killing	11 people	Nertiti	01.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
65	Injuries	24 people	Nertiti	01.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, LC, SLM,LS
66	Killing	1 person	Obeid IDP Camp	01.01.201	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS

67	Killing	1 person	Elgenena town	02.01.201	R.D, E.W SLM.LS
68	Looting	1 market	Nertiti market	02.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
69	Injuries	39 people Women and children	Nertiti	02.01.201	R.D,LC, SLM.LS
70	Rape	6 women	Elgenena area	02.01.201	LC, SLM.L S
71	Killing	1 person	Kabkabya locality	03.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
72	Injuries	2 people	Nadu villag, North Nrtiti locality	03.01.201	RD, E.W, SLM.LS
73	Abduction	3 people	Kabkabya town	03.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
74	Looting	3 women affected	Between Elfashir and Tawila	03.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
75	Looting money	200000 SP	Tondobay village, N.Darfur	03.01.201	R.D, SLM.L S E.W
76	Killing	2 people	North Fnga locality	04.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
77	Attack and Looting	7 people affected	N, Fanga locality	04.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
78	Rape	3 women	Mokjar locality	04.01.201	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS

79	Arrest	8 Darfuri students	Khartoum	05.01.201	R,D, E.W, SLM.LS
80	Attack on farmer	1	Garsila locality, C.Dafrur	05,01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
81	Rape	8 women	Abuzerega locality	05.01.291 7	LCL, SLM.L S
82	Killing	2 people	Garsila locality, C. Darfur	05.01.201 7	R.D, SLM.L S
83	Killing	4 people	East Jebal Marra	06.01.201 7	R.D, SLM.L S
84	Killing	7 people	Elgenaina	05.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
85	Injuries	11 people	Egenaina	06.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
86	Injuries	3 displaced people	Abu Idrees, West of Geraida locality	06.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
87	Killing	1 displaced woman	Abu Idrees, West of Geraida locality	06.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
88	Rape	7 women	Arasholo area, Shangil Tubay locality	96.01.201	SLM.LS
89	Looting	450 cows and goats in one raid	East Jebel Marra	06.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS

90	Burning	1 village	Jadeed Alseel, North Elfashir	07.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
91	Rape	5 women	Daressala m locality	07.01.201 7	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS
92	Killing	1 person	Daressala m IDP camp	09.01.201 7	PR, SLM.L S
93	Killing	1 person	Aidan IDP camp	09.01.201 7	PR, SLM.L S
94	Killing	1 person	Umbalula IDP camp	09.01.201 7	PR, SLM.L S
95	killing	2 person	Babanusa IDP camp	09.01.291 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
96	Abduction	2 children	Soronsi camp	09.01.201 7	R.D, LCL, SLM.LS
97	Killing	4 children	Derbat camp	10.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
98	Rape	3 women	Arti Mershing area	01.01.201 7	SLM.LS , LCL
99	Killing	2 people	Geraida locality	11.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLM.LS
100	Injuries	9 people	Geraida locality	11.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
101	Burning and displacem ent	60 House 30 family	Safia Umged, Daressala m locality	11.01.207	R.D, E.W, SLMLS

102	Abduction	28 person	East Jebel Marra	11.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
103	Rape	4 women	Kassab	12.01.201 7	R.D, SLML S	3 unreport ed
104	Looting	1200 goat/ sheep	East Nyala	12.01.201 7	E.W, SLML S	
105	Rape	3 women	Wadi Balanga	12.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
106	Attack on Darfur Students	8 students affected	University Khartoum	12.01.201 7	R.D, SLML S	
107	killing	1 person	Kassab	13.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
108	Killing	2 people	Sortoni, Kabkabya locality	16.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
109	Rape	7 women	Gink, Shangil Tubay locality	16.01.201 7	LCL, R.D, SLMLS	5 unreport ed
110	Killing	1 person	Kutum	16.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
111	Injuries	4 women	Tawila locality	16.01.201 7	R.D, LCL, SLMLS	
112	Rape	2 women	Morny IDP camp	16.01.201 7	R.D, CC, SLMLS	
113	Attack and injuries	4 people	C. Darfur state	16.01.201 7	SLMLS	
114	Abduction	2 people	Tirbowa village	16.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
2 of	52					

115	Abduction	1 woman and her 2 children	S. Darfur state	16.01.201 7	E.W, R.D, SLMLS
116	Rape	1 woman	Soronti IDP camp	16.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
117	Abduction	1 person	Soronti IDP camp	16.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
118	Killing	12 people	Senaidara area	20.01.201	E.W, R.D, SLMLS
119	Killing	4 people	Zalingie area	20.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
120	Rape	7 women	Tima, Baasheem area	20.01.201	LCL, SLML S
121	Rape	2 women	Tamoru, in Eastern Jebel Marra	20.01.201	E.W, LCL, R.D, SLMLS
122	Killing	1 person	Kabkabya	20.01.201	E.W, R.D, SLMLS
123	Looting	2 lorries	Kutom	21.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
124	Abduction	1 student	Berkundi area	21.01.201	E.W, SLML S
125	Rape	6 women	Koria, E. Jebel Marra	22.01.201	R.D, LCL, SLMLS
126	Attack and Injuries	5 people	Arara area W. Darfur	23.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
127		15 farms	Arara area, W. Darfur	23.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS

128	Injuries	2 IPDs	Forika IDP camp	23.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
129	Rape	2 women	Tuwisha locality	23.01.201	LCL, SLML S
130	Injuries	1 person	Forika IDP camp, S. Darfur	23.01.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
131	Rape	13 women	North Kutum	January 15 to January 23 2017	PR, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
132	Killing	2 people	Thabit	26.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
133	Rape	3 womn	Thabit	26.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
134	Rape	4 women	Nabagaya area	26.01.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
135	Killing	2 person	Umdokho n locality	26.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
136	Killing	1 person	E.Jebel Marra	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
137	Attack	1 village	Kushna village, N. Darfur	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
138	Killing	1 person	Abuzayed, E. Jebel	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
139	Killing	3 people	Umdokho n town	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS

140	Car hijacking	1 vehicle	East Golo C. Darfur	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
141	Rape	3 women	Tumi area	27.01.201 7	R.D, LCL, SLMLS
142	Injuries	1 person	Kushuna village, North Darfur	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
143	Rape	1 woman	Morne IDP camp	27.01.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
144	Rape	2 women	Forbarang a locality, W.Darfur	27.01.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
145	Attack and Injuries	1 person	Fata Burno IDP camp	27.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
146	Rape	1 woman	Umtarir locality	27.01.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
147	Burning of village	26 houses	Fata Burno locality	30.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
148	Killing	2 people	West of Elfashir	31.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
149	Looting	95 Cows	Tawila locality	31.01.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
150	Rape	2 female teachers	Elgenaina town	01.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
151	Displacem ent	530 person	Balili in East Jebel Marra	02.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
152	Rape	3 women	Thabit locality	03.02.201	PR

153	Killing	4 people	South of Korma locality	04.02.201	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
154	Killing	2 people	Gadeed Alssail	04.02.201 7	R.D, E.W
155	Looting	200 sheep and goat	Tawila locality	04.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
156	Rape	6 womn	Kaima area, N.Darfur	04.02.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
157	Killing	1 woman	Kbkabya	04.02.201 7	R.D, E.W
158	Rape	2 women	Katur area E.Jebel Marra	04.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
159	Injuries	1 woman	Katur area, E.Jebel Marra	04.02.201 7	R.D, SLML S
160	Killing	1 person	Kutum locality	04.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
161	Rape	2 teenager girls	Umarda locality	04.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
162	Rape	8 women	Shangili Tubaya locality	Between 222 Feb. 2017	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
163	Looting	IDPs	Fata Burno IDP camp	05.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
164	Killing	2 people	Kutum	06.02.201 7	E.W, SLML S

165	Abduction	9 people	West of Kutum	06.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SKMLS	7 were family members
166	Killing	2 people	Tulus locality S. Darfur	07.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
167	Arrest	1 IDP person	Abukarink a	07.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
168	Attack and Injuries	4 people	Tawila locality	08.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
169	Injuries	8 people	Habila locality, W. Darfur	08.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
170	Looting	4 vehicles including one belong to UNAMID	Hamad village	08.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
171	Displacem ent	430 families	East Jebel Marra	09.02.201 7	R.D, UNICE F	
172	Rape	2 woman	Ruanda IDP camp	09.02.201 7	SLMLS, LCL, E.W	
173	Unicef declaratio n	40 percent of children in Darfur deprived from education	All Darfur states	09.02.201 7	UNICEF , R.D	
174	Rape and sexual assaults	11 women affected	Tobaya area	From Jau.15 to Feb10. 2017	LCL, SLML S	Non was reported to official authoriti es.

175	Killing	4 people	Tawila locality	10.02.201	LCL, SLML S	Non was reported to official authoriti es
176	Injuries	9 people	Tawila locality	10.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
177	looting	45 cows	East Jebel Marra	10.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
178	Burning	64.houses	Darelsala m IDP camp Umbalola IDP camp	11.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
179	Rape	2 women	Tarne locality, East Jebel Marra	11.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
180	Burning	School	Zemzem IDP camp	11.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
181	Burning	Market	Bergy market, alsalam IDP camp, Kabkabya	11.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
182	Rape	1 woman	Kombo Tombo camp	13.02.201 7	LCL, SLML S	
183	Killing	1 person	Tira, Tawila locality	14.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
184	Abduction	5 people	Tawila locality	14.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
185	Killing	2 peole	Arula IDP	15.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	

186	Abduction	1 person	Lymona, Kass locality	15.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
187	Rape	4 women	Beer Konjara	15.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS	
188	Rape	2 women	Kass locality	15.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS	
189	UN Declare food shortage in the IDP	5 IDP camp affected	Tawila locality	15.02.201 7	R.D, UN	
190	Burning	22 houses burnt	Geraida IDP camp	16.02.201 7	R,D	
191	Killing	2 people	Burbojat area, Tawila locality	16.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
192	Maternity Death in the IDP camp. Short of medical service	2 women	Otash IDP camp, Nyala	16.02.201 7	R.D, E.W	
193	Rape	9 women	Khazan Jadeed locality	Between Jau.5 to Feb. 16.2016	SLMLS	None was reported to official authoriti es
194	Abduction	3 women	Kutum locality	16.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS	
195	Killing	3 woman	Kutum locality	16.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS	

196	Burning	10 houses	Elfashir East	17.02.201 7	E.W, SLML S
197	Declaratio n of absence of protection by camp coordinato r	40000 IDPs affected	Morny IDP camp	18.02.201 7	R.D, CC, SLMLS
198	Rape	5 women	Mirshing and Manawash i IDP camps	18.02.201 7	E.W, SLML S
199	Killing	1 person	Mokjar IDP camp	18.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, CC, SLMLS
200	Governme nt Threatene d to close IDP camp	IDP were threatened	Otash IDP camp	20.02.201	R.D, CC,
201	Injuries	1 person	Kalma IDP camp	20.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
202	Rape	1 woman	Sharafa locality	20.02.201	R.D, E.WW, LCL, SLML
203	Attack on students	12 students affected	Kassab IDP camp	21.02.201	R.D, E.W, CC, SLMLS
204	Rape	2 women	Umbaji locality	21.02.201	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS

205	Arrest	2 people. School headmaster and camp coordinator affected.	Sirba locality in W. Darfur	21.02.201	R.D, CC, SLMLS
206	Arrest	1 person. Medical assistant in IDP CAMP	Kindibi IDP camp	21.02.201	R.D, E.W, CC, SLMLS
207	Killing	2 people.	Bilail locality, S.Darfur	21.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
208	Attack	2 people affected	AlDeain	21.02.201	R.D, SLML S
209					
210	Rape	2 women	Tangarara area	21.02.201	E.W, SLML S
211	Rape	1 woman	Katur locality, East Jebel Marra	21.02.201	R.D, LCL,SLM L S
212	Rape	1 woman	Shagle Tobaya locality	21.02.201	R.D, E.W. LCL, SLMLS
213	Declaratio n of security deteriorati on	IDP affected	Kabkabya IDP camp	21.02.201	R.D, CC, SLMLS
214	Rape	3 women	Sortini locality	21.02.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
215	Food ratio stopped in IDP camp	75 family affected	10 camps in S.Darfur	21.02.201	R.D, CC, SLMLS

216	Killing	12 farmers	Abukarink a locality, E.Darfur	22.02.201	R.D, LCL, SLMLS
217	Injuries	19 people	Abukarink a locality, E.Darfur	22.02.201	R.D, LCL
218	Killing	2 people	Hashaba locality	23.02.201	PR
219	Burning	100 houses burnt, 600 families affected	Alneem IDP cam, Aldeain	23.02.201	PR
220	Killing	1 woman	Mokjar locality	23.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
221	Incidence of Sexual violence	9 women affected in Sortoni IDP camp.	Darfur	23.02.201	Independ ent Human rights expert
222	Lack of security concern	IDPs	IDP camps	24.02.201 7	R.D, CC, SLMLS
223	Rape	4 women	Mirshing	24.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
224	Declaratio n of death among vulnerable by malnutriti on	480 child and women	IDP camps		CC
225	Killing	1 child	Mokjar locality	24.02.201 7	UNAMI D, R.D
226	Killing	1 person	Dora in Kass locality	25.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS

227	Rape	12 women	Konjara village,	24.02.201	E.W, LCL, PR,
			West Jebel Marra		SLMLS
228	Killing	2 people	Wadi Saleh area	27.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
229	Looting	7	Kutum area	27.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
230	Killing	2 people	Kutum	27.02.201 7	LCL, E.W, SLMLS
231	Killing	3 people	Debat, E.Jebel Marra	27.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
232	Killing	1 person	Derbat area, E.Jebel Marra	27.02.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
233	Rape	2 women	Donke Derasa	28.02.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
234	Rape	4 women	Boldong, Toor area, E.Jebel Marra	28.02.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
235	Looting	1 person affected	Kassab IDP	28.02.201 7	r.d, e.w,slmls
236	Killing	1 person	Mirshing	28.02.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
237	Attack on students	20 students affected	Kassab IDP camp	01.03.201	CC, SLMLS
238	Attack	13 people affected	Kssab IDP camp,Kut um	01.03.201	CC, E.W, SLMLS

239	killing	2 people	Kutum	02.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
240	Killing	1 people	Karkar, Kutum	02.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
241	Rape	5 people	Bir Jibaya	Between Feb. 27 to March 2.2017	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
242	Rape	2 women	Kunda and Kurua	02.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
243	Injuries	1 person	Kutum Secondary School	02.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
244	Looting	3 people affected	Aradeeb AlAshara	02.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
245	Attack and torture	2 people affected including N. Darfur camp youth leader		02.03.201	DLA, SLML S
246	Arrest and torture	2 people	Kabkabya	02.03.201	R.D, D.L.A, SLML
247	Rape	2 people	Abdulshak ur, North Kuum	02.03.201	E.W, LCL, R.D, SLMLS
248	Arrest	1 Darfur student	Khartoum	02.03.201	R.D, E.W, D.L.A, SLMLS
249	Arrest	3 teachers	Geraida, S.Darfur	02.03.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
250	Arrest	1 person from IDP camp	Kassab IDP camp	02.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS

251	Arrest	2 person (IDPs)	E. Jebel Marra	04.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
252	Rape	1 woman	Ardeba	07.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
253	Killing	1 person	Melem	07.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
254	Student prevented from Exam	17 student affected	Kerenik locality	08.03.201 7	R.D, LCL, SLMLS
255	Rape	1 woman	Sufaya, Geraida locality	08.03.201 7	LCLR, SLML S
256	Rape	4 women	Siba locality	08.03.201 7	LCL, E.W, SLMLS
257	Rape	3 women	Konjara area	08.03.201 7	LCL, E,W, SLMLS
258	Rape	1 woman	Katur, Jebel Marra	08.03.201 7	E.W, LCL SLMLS
259	Killing	2 person	North Melem locality	09.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
260	Injuries	1 person	North Melem	09.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
261	Burning	20 houses. 500 people affected	Katul village, w. Darfur	09.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
262	Rape	7 women	Kutum area	09.03.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
263	Killing	5 people	Kutum locality	09.03.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS

264	Rape	6 women	Delaij, Jebel Marra	13.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
265	Rape	4 women	Shig Ardeeb	13.03.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
266	Killing	3 people	Shig Ardeeb	13.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
267	Arrest	4 person	Nertiti	13.03.201 7	D.L.A, LCL, E.W, SLMLS
268	Injuries	2 people	Katul, E. Jebel Marra	13.03.201	P.R., E.W., SLMLS
269	Rape	3 women	Alfirdos locality	13.03.201	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
270	Looting	10 affected	E.Sheref Umra	13.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
271	Looting	4 people affected	North Kutum	13.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
272	Killing	4 people	Katur, Jebe Marra	13.93.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
273	Displacem ent	6000 people	Nayer area, N.Darfur	13.03.201	S.T, E.W, SLMLS
274	Arrest	1 person	Nertiti	13.03.201	S.T, E.W, SLMLS
275	Rape	1 wo men	Karkur area, Jebel	13.03.201 7	S.T, LCL, SLMLS
276	Looting	1 person affected	Timu, E. Jebel Marra	14.03.201 7	S.T, E.W, SLMLS

277	Killing	1 person	Khazan Tunjur	14.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
278	Killing	1 person	Tarny, E. Jebel Marra	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
279	Injuries	4 women	Kebi area, N.Nertiti	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W
280	Looting	2 pe ople affected	Fanga area, E. Jebel Marra	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
281	Looting	5 people affected	Ntertiti area	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W., SLML
282	Killing	1 person	Umjanaha , Edalfursan locality	15.03.201 7	E.W, SLML S
283	Rape	3 women	Deleej area,	15.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
284	Killing	3 people	Marra area	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
285	Injuries	4 people	Kebi, N.Nertiti	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
286	Burning		Kalma IDP camp, quarter 1	15.03.201 7	E.W, SLML S
287	Killing	1 person	Umjanaha	15.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
288	Rape	7 women	Garsela locality. C.Darfurf ur	15.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS

289	Looting	Market	Sagadir, Jeldo locality	15.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS	
				,		

## Table A-2

290	Attack and Injuries	5 people affected	Maleet Market	20.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
291	Attack and Injuries	7 people affected	Abunahala area	20.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
292	Attack and injuries	5 people affected	Maleet market	20.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
293	Rape	1 woman	Amara village	22.03.201	R.D, E.W, LCL, SLMLS
294	Rape	1 woman	Tawila locality	23.03.201	PR, LCL, SLMLS
295	Rape	3 women	Tawila locality	24.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS, PR
296	Killing	7 people	AlDaeen	24.03.201	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
297	Attack and injuries	7 people affected	Al.Daeen locality	24.03.201 7	E.W, R.D, SLMLS
298	Attack and injuries	2 people affected	Al.Daeen locality	24.03.201 7	E.W, R.D, SLMLS
299	Rape	3 women	Delaj IDP camp	27.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, SLMLS
300	Killing	17 people	E.Darfur Kamal and Khatuwa Awaja	27.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
301	Attack and injuries	2 people affected	E.Darfur	27.03.201 7	E.W, R.D, SLMLS

302	Rape	2 women	Sirba IDP camp. W.Darfur	28.03.201 7	E.W, LCL, R.D, SLMLS
303	Killing	3 people	Sirba IDP camp	28.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
304	Killing	1 person	Joketti area	28.03.201 7	R.D, E.W, SLMLS
305	Looting	1 person affected	Dessa area, Kutum locality	28.03.201 7	E.W, R.D, SLMLS







