The Darfur Peace Agreement: What they never talk about

By Steve Paterno

July 27, 2008 — The successful trip to the US by Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) leader, Abdel Wahid al-Nur, will no doubt shed new lights on prospects of the renowned internationally concern conflict and peace in Darfur. Until recently, the prevalent argument the world got used to, the West and US in particular, is the one advanced by the professed Western experts who forged the failed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), negotiated in Abuja, Nigeria. To them, the best chance for peace in Darfur lies with the DPA. They argue that the “DPA provides a blueprint for progress in Darfur.” However, since the DPA was signed in 2006, they attributed the escalation of violence and the worsening of humanitarian conditions in Darfur to at least three major factors; that:

a) There were many Darfur factions represented at the DPA negotiation, making it difficult to reach consensus and compromises

b) The DPA is a good deal that meet at least more than half of the demands of the parties involved, but the only problem is that it is not implemented to the letter

c) The groups who never sign the DPA are responsible for the failure of the agreement.

As convincing as those arguments sound, they sadly miss fundamental points. To begin with, the Darfur movement groups had no input on the DPA document. The document was rather a draft from the mediators (courtesy of Dr. Alex de Waal) shoved onto the Darfur movements to be signed. According to one of the top mediators in the talks, the draft was not a “take it or leave it” proposal. Instead, it was a “take it, but not leave it.” The alleged author of DPA acknowledged in his own words, that the mediators “certainly, disappointed the rebel Movements” who reacted that the draft of the peace proposal was “a sell-out to Khartoum.” Upon realization that the document was far from the expectations of Darfur movement groups, the mediators, in a desperate act then frantically approached the groups individually to accept the document as oppose to work with the entities in reaching negotiable compromises. For example, individuals such as Abdel Rahman Musa, Ibrahim Madibo, Abdel Rahim Adam Abu Risha and Adam Saleh Abbaker—all took advantage of the situation by signing the agreement as individuals—defecting from the movements that they once represented. It is no wonder that some individuals were found as far away as in Libya and Ethiopia to sign the agreement negotiated in Nigeria. Of course, they signed the agreement, on behalf of their own selves as oppose to their movements or constituencies. And it is not surprising that the agreement faltered so badly.

In reality, there were no many Darfur factions at the negotiation. Those supposed factions were rather individuals created by the mediators and the work of Khartoum government in attempts to have signatures on the agreement. There were only three major groups that were initially acknowledged by African Union (AU) to be participants of the Abuja talks. These groups included the SLM/A of Minni Minawi, the SLM/A of Abdel Wahid al-Nur, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

The argument that the DPA is a good deal but the problem is that it is not implemented is equally absurd. How one will come to this conclusion is beyond reason. A good agreement must include safeguards and guarantees mechanism in place, necessary for implementations. Some of those safeguards and guarantees must be prerequisites for negotiations; some are short terms; and others are long terms. These, for examples, must include but not limited to:

– Immediate deployment of a robust and swift AU/UN peacekeeping force
– Immediate disarmament and disbandment of Janjaweed and other militia groups
– Maintaining of separate Darfur armed groups as a deterrence force
– Strict enforcement of no-fly-zone in Darfur
– Immediate settlement of the displaced and compensations for the victims
– Equitable sharing of power and wealth
– Immediate transformation of the country into democratic secular state

Otherwise, a genuine and serious peace is not simply convincing, manipulating and bribing individuals to append their names on a prepared piece of paper. Doing so ignores the real cause of the conflict and will not lead into any lasting peace, as it is the case with the DPA. The problem of Darfur is a real one that involves genocide, displacement of people, rape, torture, and other human rights violations. In other words, it is a matter of live and death.

Those who involved in the Abuja Peace Talks, the mediators in particular, find it very convenient to blame the Darfur movement groups who never signed the DPA. Such a blame is also misplaced. There were at least few genuine individuals and groups who were willing to talk and make peace, but their efforts were thwarted by those with personal ambitions and the groups who were outright not genuine to begin with. For example, the National Congress Party (NCP) of the indicted international criminal, Omer al-Bashir of Khartoum went to Abuja with a different aim than making peace. The NCP used the old trick from the book. They approached JEM and promised an alliance against their archenemy from the South, the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Worst on the flip side, they corrupted individual SPLM/A members on the peace delegation so as to bribe the Darfur movements’ delegations.

In their part, the young and inexperience Darfur delegations, were counting much on the support of SPLM/A. They admired the SPLM/A delegations, especially the Rev. Clement Janda, the chairperson of SPLM/A Task Force for Darfur whom they popularly refer to as Abuna (an Arabic for a Father or a Priest). The SPLM/A delegation falsely portrayed itself as both experience and skillful in negotiations. They promised that they were ready to put their experience and skills into task at Abuja talks. This reputation was later shuttered when the SPLM/A delegations—in particularly—Dr. Lam Akol who was then Khartoum foreign minister and Dr. Lual Deng, the Khartoum state finance minister—acting on behalf of NCP, begun to backhander maneuvers of the Darfur delegations. In one instant, Lam Akol promised key individual members of a Darfur movement group a lifetime of happiness. To prove his point, he issued them blank checks that they should write any amount they wish on those checks. In another instant, Lual Deng was promising a lifetime career for some individuals in any positions they wish. Instead of asking the Darfur movements delegations for their version of peace proposals, he asked for their resumes.

The foreign mediators at the talks were equally at fault as they were more interested in maintaining their personal reputations, legacies, and jobs. Notorious among them is a Briton by the name Dr. Alex de Waal, the alleged author of the DPA. De Waal’s expertise on Africa started when he wrote his masters and Ph.D. dissertation on famine in Darfur region of Sudan in mid 1980s. In other words, de Waal’s expertise on Africa is his ability to write and speak clearly in Oxford English about Darfur, Sudan, or Africa (whatever that he writes or speaks). For that he was hired to consult for AU mediation on Darfur. Sadly though, his expertise never yielded any better result. He is perhaps the only one left who is still advocating that the DPA is a perfect agreement that only needs to be implemented. He argues, “the African Union’s ‘Darfur Peace Agreement’ is not only a good deal on paper, but is workable on the ground.” He has written more than a series of dozen articles, justifying the agreement, talked about it in panel discussions around the globe, and still writing to justify the agreement. And, there is Dr. Salim Ahmad Salim, a special AU envoy to Darfur and a chief mediator to the talks whom most African intermediate pupils associate him with the failed Organization of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner of AU. Salim could find no other scapegoats than to blame the Darfur groups who refused to sign the DPA. And then there was Olusegun Obasanjo, the president of Nigeria, the hosting country for the peace talks, and the then chairman of AU. A typical old African leader, Obasanjo thought he could use his age and status in intimidating the Darfur groups to sign the DPA. As his effort failed, he completely cut-off the Darfur groups who showed reservation on DPA, casting them as “outlaws.” Not even the American with their number two top diplomat, Robert Zolleck knew what they were doing in Abuja. Perhaps the only genuine and reasonable voice on the Abuja talks was that of UN envoy on Darfur, Jan Pronk. All the way to the end, he was insisting on “broadening the circle of signatories, focusing on implementation of the agreement in order not to let it slip away, and, last but not least, stopping the Janjaweed.” In order to achieve a lasting peace, Pronk deplores the idea of branding others as “outlaws.” He insists, “to brand them as outlaws would imply that possible bridges towards them would be blown up and that their positions would harden.”

Hopeful by now, the world must come to its right senses and find a better solution to Darfur problems. Since the DPA was signed, many developments have taken place. These should serve as lessons for way forward and usher opportunities for new beginning. It is time to go back to the drawing board. Of course, the situation in Darfur on the ground got worst than ever before. Experts such as Dr. Alex de Waal are still holding their titles and are obsessing with DPA. De Waal adamantly proclaims that no matter what happen to DPA, the “formula of a solution will remain unchanged”–a suggestion that the DPA is the magic solution to Darfur. That is probably why the Darfur movement groups don’t want him to do anything on or with Darfur. Omer al-Bashir is already an international criminal, waiting to be arrested. The SPLM/A is confused in the middle of all the chaos, with its chairman supporting the an embattled NCP and its secretary general fighting against NCP. Minni Minawi and his accomplices, who signed the agreement never found what they were promised in Khartoum, especially beautiful Arab women, money, positions, power, and luxurious life. Minawi is reported to be hiding somewhere in the desert since he deserted from Khartoum. Dr. Salim Ahmad Salim is still holding firmly his position. One will only hope he learned something by now. President Olusegun Obasanjo is not anymore the president of Nigeria. His bid to stay permanently in power (or to be a life-presidency, as they know it in Africa) has failed. However, he managed to secure himself immunity from prosecution for corruption by handpicking his successor. Jan Pronk of the UN have long been expelled from Sudan by authorities in Khartoum for speaking the truth. He continues to speak the truth on Darfur and Sudan. Hopefully he should be considered for any international role on Sudan. Of course, the US has finally gotten it right, and hopefully it stays the course. The prospect for conflict and peace are both high. So, it all depends on the major players on how this time around they are going to tackle the situation. A repeat of Abuja I, is certainly a disaster. That much we know, given the benefits of hindsight.

Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Romain Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at [email protected]