SAF’s alliance with “soft” Islamists betrays recovery and revolution
SAF command before completing the recovery period: A soft landing for a faction of the National Congress Party – The Appointment of Dafallah Al-Haj and Omer Siddiq
By Yasir Arman
Where is the SAF Command heading, having not yet emerged from the depths of war and the recovery period following the recapture of Khartoum and the General Command Headquarters? Is it aligning with the invincible will of the people, or reverting to an old salvation project rooted in authoritarianism, albeit with new embellishments?
Is it in the army’s interest to remain an adversary of the December Revolution, with or without its burning tyres? When and how will the marriage of convenience between the military command and the Islamists conclude, paving the way for the establishment of a national and professional army?
The army finds itself in a predicament, primarily due to its association with an ideological political organisation at the expense of the people’s and the state’s interests. The only escape lies in renouncing this alliance, which has entangled it in numerous complications. To adhere to the firm bond, it must choose a new path – a national renaissance project founded on freedom, peace, and justice. This is the path of the people striving to build a professional army that preserves national unity and opens the door to daylight.
The streets of the December Revolution offer the foundation for building a professional army, not the Islamist brigades of al-Bara seeking power and the reproduction of the old regime. Sooner or later, the army must shed the cloak of the party in favour of the nation’s gown.
The forces fighting alongside the army include some Islamist salvation elements, who are after power and resources, and others with tribal social bases, as well as some movements from the marginalised areas that have lost their compass, veering towards power. The most dangerous among them all, despite their small numbers, are the Islamists.
– What does the appointment of Dafallah Al-Haj and Omar Siddiq signify?
This appointment follows a series of violations of the constitutional document, beginning with the coup, then the war, and the recent amendments that tightened the military leadership’s grip on power. These changes laid a new constitutional foundation for the marriage of convenience between the Islamists and the military command, a relationship that the December Revolution had shaken.
The military leadership is working to ally with a softer faction of the National Congress Party, one that could gain acceptance and pass through sieve of the regional and international community’s scrutiny without raising suspicions. There exists a misguided belief among some external parties that there are “good” Islamists and “bad” ones, and that the bureaucracy of the Islamists can be utilised in governance. This criterion will lead to rewarding the Islamists for their war efforts without openly acknowledging it, facilitating the return of both the “bad” and “good” Islamists together, and sowing the seeds of new conflicts.
There’s no need to debate whether Omar Siddiq is an Islamist or affiliated with the security apparatus, or whether Dafallah Al-Haj belongs to the Karti/Ali Osman faction or the Nafi/Ali Mahmoud faction. They are undoubtedly part of the interest groups encompassed by the large cartel of the National Congress Party. Their appointment to these positions was only possible through loyalty, vetting, and scrutiny by the Islamists and their party’s apparatus.
What transpired in the appointment of Dafallah Al-Haj and Omar Siddiq is distinct and significant – it marks the initiation of a relationship with a faction of the National Congress Party, presenting it as a softer wing to neutralise the Islamists and continue the war its external alliances. In reality, this move perpetuates authoritarianism and the old path, failing to resolve the army’s or the nation’s crisis.
– The political economy of war and power sharing
Both warring parties conduct their war and daily operations entirely at the people’s and civilians’ expense. Their leadership dominating the war, its theatre, and its interests aim to maintain a system that neither combats corruption nor authoritarianism, reconciles with impunity, and opens the door to resource plundering and the unquenchable thirst for power. This occurs amidst some external parties hastily seeking solutions and photo opportunities. The infiltration of Islamists within both war camps will increase the likelihood of moving towards power-sharing, away from addressing the historical national crisis, necessitating the continuation of the struggle, the revival of the spirit of Sudanese revolutions, and the establishment of people’s authority as an alternative to power-sharing.
– The Camps of War: The alliance of the cracked valley
Observing the army camp and the numerous contradictory statements from its allies quickly reveals the fragility of this alliance and the internal divisions and disagreements. This alliance may not withstand the war’s divisions, and if it does, it will end with the war’s mourning ceremony, and the recent inclusion of a faction of the Islamists will exacerbate the contradictions among its parties.
As for The Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis) camp, it stands in the arena of the struggle for power among themselves, far from the announced program, translating slogans into mere power-sharing.
– The Axis of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Africans, and the International Community and the Issues with Islamists
Our long experience with Islamists shows that they are a spongy, pliable group that can be dried out, and once they are saturated with the waters of power, they will return to their old practices. The military leadership needs them to consolidate their authoritarianism, and they need the military to leap over the army into power. The regional and international community must not squander the sacrifices and time of the Sudanese people by trying the tried and failed. It is certain that they will threaten regional and international stability, and we will tirelessly explain this to our regional neighbours and the international community.
– The state and the army
Many sincere Sudanese strive to distinguish theoretically and practically between the state and the army, and the long hijacking of the state and military leadership by Islamists, for the sake of establishing the state and building a professional army. However, one hand cannot clap alone, as they do not receive a positive response from the military leadership. Building the third bloc – the bloc of national democratic forces – is the only one capable of answering these important questions posed by the war about the future of the state and the army and restoring the core and spirit of the December Revolution to reach the state of the nation and confront the state of the party.
– Towards building a third bloc
Lastly, the future of Sudan and the resolution of the comprehensive national crisis, and the cessation of war first, then addressing its roots, begins with confronting the humanitarian catastrophe, violations, and protecting civilians. All this necessitates hastening the construction of the third civilian bloc – the bloc of democratic civil forces that is decisive and weighty, carrying the spirit of the revolution in facing the war independent of both warring parties, with firmness in speech and practice, and testing the will of the warring parties towards freedom, just peace, social justice, and non-discriminatory citizenship. This is the challenge and task facing the Sudanese national and democratic movement.