Sudan’s two governments have made the Washington conference obsolete
Professor Mekki El Shibly
Executive Director, Mamoun Behairy Centre, Khartoum
The Washington Conference on Sudan was initially designed as a platform to bring together the warring parties in Sudan under a manageable negotiation framework between two main actors in the conflict—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—under the supervision and sponsorship of external parties. However, this framework has been overtaken by developments on the ground, particularly the emergence of two rival governments: “Amal” (the Port Sudan coalition) and “Tasis” (the Nairobi coalition). This new reality reflects the fragmentation of political power in Sudan, with the country now split between two competing sovereignties, each backed by foreign allies, constitutional visions, and spheres of influence. The question before Washington now is whether it should push these two entities back onto a unified negotiation path or redesign its diplomatic tools to engage with a politically bipolar reality.
The Significance of the Washington Conference in a Proxy War
Although two Sudanese generals are waging the war, evidence suggests it is fundamentally a proxy war. Three regional powers, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, hold the keys to influence and the code of war. They finance, arms, and provide political cover to the factions. Without their coordinated pressure or approval, neither SAF nor RSF is likely to adhere to a ceasefire. Therefore, aligning these powers is essential for achieving any real peace, which makes the Quad (US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE) meeting both critical and complex.
Two Alliances, Two Power Projects
The “Tasis” coalition, established in Nairobi, presents itself as a foundational alternative to the old regime. It is led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemetti) and includes armed and political actors such as the SPLM-North (Al-Hilu) and various civilian formations. They advocate for a secular, decentralised state and a new constitutional launch. “Tasis” is not merely a military alliance—it seeks to embody the outlines of an emerging state through proto-institutions, a leadership council, and a declared vision that clearly rejects the military-Islamist structures around SAF.
On the other hand, “Amal,” based in Port Sudan, represents a parallel project backed by the Sudanese Armed Forces. With SAF’s military command and its temporary civilian front headquartered there, “Amal” aims to entrench a substitute seat for national authority, ensure the continuity of state institutions, and gain international legitimacy as the custodian of Sudanese sovereignty. In discourse, “Amal” presents itself as the legitimate state, though in practice, it is a political front for SAF’s war capabilities and the priorities of its regional allies— particularly Egypt.
These two alliances are not mere negotiating delegations but resemble “proto-governments”
that define constitutional parameters, build alliances, and seek international recognition. Their emergence disrupts the traditional “two generals at one table” model and forces Washington to ask a new question: how do you negotiate peace between competing state projects, not just armed factions?
The Impact of Washington’s Rejection of the Tasis Government
The rejection of the “Tasis” government by the US, the UN, and the African Union reflects a desire to prevent the imposition of political facts on the ground. Yet it simultaneously confronts Washington with the dilemma of managing a conference with two centers of authority.
It’s worth recalling that the conference was previously postponed due to Washington’s insistence on not directly inviting SAF, to avoid granting it full legitimacy, an insistence that irritated Cairo and possibly Riyadh. Therefore, Washington’s attempt to involve the “Amal” government is not necessarily favoritism toward the military but rather a pragmatic attempt to engage with forces that control territory while still maintaining political pressure. The delicate balance Washington is trying to strike is to give SAF some space without full recognition, while simultaneously preventing “Tasis” from dominating the agenda and empowering civilian platforms as a possible alternative.
The Dilemma Between Bipartite Mediation and Managing Multipolarity
The original logic of the Washington Conference was to bring together the regional backers of SAF and RSF to lay the groundwork for a political transition. But this logic no longer applies with the emergence of “Amal” and “Tasis,” both of which are seeking to use the conference to secure recognition. “Amal” seeks to be recognised as the legitimate authority, while “Tasis” seeks to be acknowledged as the basis of a new Sudanese state. Consequently, participation, representation, and agenda-setting have become high-stakes political wagers.
The traditional sequencing—“security first, then politics”—has broken down. The central political question is now: Who is the legitimate government of Sudan? The creation of these rival governments has hardened regional proxy dynamics. Egypt is expected to push hard for “Amal” to be recognised as the sole representative, while the UAE will likely resist any structure that excludes “Tasis.” Qatar and the UK advocate for a broader civilian track that partially includes “Tasis”—a move that “Amal” views as undermining state continuity.
Thus, Washington faces a difficult choice: should it impose unity through a single transitional framework—with the risks of walkouts, stalemates, and hollow deals—or design a multi-track process that acknowledges competing power centers, while linking them to shared humanitarian, security, and governance benchmarks?
Who Gains and Who Loses?
The Sudanese people are the main victims of this institutional fragmentation. Millions face worsening humanitarian conditions due to the ongoing war, contested legitimacy, deepening economic and security crises, and mass displacement. Access to essential services and humanitarian aid is shrinking amid a suffocating political deadlock. The polarisation has weakened prospects for peace and prevented the achievement of even a minimum level of stability and dignity.
Civilian pro-democracy advocates find themselves politically marginalised, lacking executive authority or sovereign recognition, and unable to protect their base or impose their agenda amid the chaos. While “Amal” and “Tasis” may achieve fleeting, fragile gains, both suffer deeper, lasting losses. Each seeks to impose itself as a de facto authority over part of Sudan, yet both face daunting challenges in establishing legitimacy, gaining regional and international recognition, and governing their areas economically and securely.
Both entities suffer from diplomatic isolation and difficulty attracting comprehensive foreign support. Their respective areas remain plagued by displacement and deteriorating services. In the end, neither “Amal” nor “Tasis” can be considered true winners—their rivalry has plunged Sudan into a spiral of fragmentation, endangering its unity and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, the Sudanese people remain the greatest losers in this protracted crisis.
The Washington Conference risks paralysis like its predecessors. The multiplicity of actors means more veto players. Without a strict, phased framework and real consequences for spoilers, the conference rooms will become a marketplace of recognition rather than a venue for genuine peace.
How “Amal” and “Tasis” Hijacked the Conference Agenda
The original agenda of the Washington Quad Conference centered on halting the war and laying the groundwork for a political transition after the failure of most previous regional and international initiatives. The agenda included discussions on a ceasefire, launching a comprehensive peace process, exchanging ideas among the parties’ backers on conflict management, and pressure to bring SAF and RSF back to the table. It also aimed to explore political solutions, such as power and wealth-sharing or transitional arrangements, clearly ruling out military victory as an option, and coordinating humanitarian efforts and civilian protection.
Yet the conference’s agenda is inevitably shaped by the geopolitical interests of its participants—regional stability, Red Sea and maritime security, preventing war spillover, and containing Iranian or Russian influence in Sudan. Divergences remain among Quad members regarding the role of the military and civilians in Sudan’s future.
The emergence of “Amal” and “Tasis” will cast a heavy shadow over this original agenda. Focus may shift from ceasefire arrangements to constitutional engineering amid the competing state projects seeking legitimacy and recognition. Discussions around sovereignty, secularism, federalism, and security sector reform will likely be unavoidable. Any ceasefire deal may unravel if these clashing visions are left frozen.
Moreover, the conference’s agenda—expected to be coordinated by a unified Quad—may devolve into a contested mediation process involving the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UK, and the US, all driven by their strategic differences. Without firm rules imposed by Washington—a tall order given the “reverse veto” effect that small powers hold over larger ones, as seen in the collapse of the London Conference in April 2025—the event could witness conflicting drafts, parallel rooms, and competing communiqués. The conference risks veering off track from ceasefire talks to constitutional battles over the re-founding of the Sudanese state. Washington will be forced to choose between endorsing a new constitutional path or salvaging a “modified continuity” that many Sudanese reject.
Three Trajectories Before the United States
Pretending unity through a “Single National Delegation” that includes the Port Sudan coalition. This might appease Egypt and some U.S. security circles, but it is fragile and would result in a “paper peace” while the conflict morphs into new forms.
Recognising pluralism while managing convergence by accepting “Amal” and “Tasis” as negotiating poles, compelling them to adhere to shared tracks (humanitarian corridors, ceasefire monitoring, economic normalisation), while deferring complex constitutional issues to a nationally-led, time-bound civilian process. This path is complex but realistic.
A civilian reset by redesigning the Washington Conference so that civilian platforms define the political roadmap, while military blocs are compelled to implement security arrangements and integration under civilian oversight. This requires strong U.S. resolve and unified Gulf and Egyptian support—both of which are currently elusive.
The Paradox of the Reverse Veto: When Power Fails to Control Sudan’s Proxy Patrons
Theoretically, the United States and the United Kingdom possess immense diplomatic, economic, and military capacity to steer Sudan’s war. But practically, they lack coercive influence over the warring Sudanese parties. Paradoxically, real leverage lies elsewhere. Cairo and Riyadh view SAF as a bulwark against the return of Islamists, state collapse along the Nile, and security chaos across the Red Sea. Abu Dhabi has heavily invested in Hemedti, his gold- based financial networks, and his exploratory reach across the Sahel and Libya to achieve economic and strategic goals.
These are not fleeting alliances but structural dependencies. They have enabled both Burhan and Hemedti to disregard Western warnings and sanctions as long as their regional patrons keep financial, logistical, and political pipelines open. This is why the London Conference failed and why the Washington Conference is faltering: peace cannot be imposed on proxies whose agents are either absent from the table or are present with fundamentally conflicting goals.
What Should Washington Do Differently from London?
Impose a single, actionable framework: multiplicity of alliances doesn’t mean multiplicity of processes. Washington can define dual tracks—humanitarian/security on one hand, political/constitutional on the other—elevating civilians as lead actors in the latter.
Link recognition to measurable behavior, not identity: legitimacy should be earned through tangible commitments such as documented humanitarian access, militia control, acceptance of civilian supremacy in politics, financial transparency, and cooperation with monitoring mechanisms.
Pressure regional patrons: Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar must be made to understand—through both public and private messaging—that undermining any settlement or deepening competing sovereignties will incur costs: sanctions on networks, arms restrictions, and diplomatic isolation.
Reject abusing civilian fronts as mere facades: any political settlement lacking the endorsement of credible civilian platforms must be deemed illegitimate. If either “Amal” or “Tasis” refuses this, it exposes them as anti-democratic.
The Separatist Ripoff of “Amal” and “Tasis” and the Unifying Bestowal of Civilians
The creation of “Amal” and “Tasis” comes amid Sudan’s gravest crisis since independence— deep political divisions, a worsening humanitarian and security disaster, and an ongoing war over legitimacy. “Amal” emerged from sharp polarisation and lack of consensus between military and civilian actors, undermining its chances to unify the country or halt the war. “Tasis” has revealed internal contradictions among its military and civilian components, containing the seeds of its own failure.
Having two rival governments not only deepens Sudan’s crisis but heightens the risk of fragmentation, regional and tribal conflicts, and eventual partition. This institutional division may prove Sudan’s greatest modern ordeal, pushing the country toward state disintegration, dual de facto authorities, and diminishing prospects for a comprehensive political settlement— while exacerbating the suffering of millions in need of humanitarian aid.
The emergence of “Amal” and “Tasis” has not only intensified negotiations ahead of the Washington Conference but also altered the chemistry of international diplomacy around Sudan. The conference can no longer pretend it is reconciling two military factions within a unified national space. Instead, it confronts clashing constitutional projects that have moved past the gestation phase.
The choice now is between guiding this fragmentation into a realistic, civilian-led unification process or overseeing a broken impasse shaped by regional proxies but marketed as peace. If Washington does not adapt to this reality and push for the pragmatic path, “Amal” and “Tasis” will not merely complicate the conference; they will become its defining outcome.