How regional powers obstruct peace in Sudan
Reverse Veto: The political economy and geopolitics of the enduring Sudan war
Professor Mekki Medani El Shibly
Executive Director, Cognisance Centre for Strategic Studies
From a peripheral war to a global puzzle
The war in Sudan, initially dismissed by some international actors as a mere localised power struggle between two rival generals, has evolved into a geopolitical pivot in a broader regional game and a severe test for global diplomacy. The cancellation of the Washington Conference on Sudan in July 2025, under veiled pressure from Egypt and the UAE, revealed a deeper truth: a new form of influence has emerged, what we call the “reverse veto”, whereby relatively smaller states, historically subject to the veto power of great powers, are now exerting a form of veto of their own.
Typically, veto power is reserved for global powers, but in the Sudanese context, mid-level regional actors like Egypt and the UAE have acquired disproportionate influence, using it to obstruct peace efforts led by Western powers, and reshape Sudan’s political economy and geopolitical landscape. The reverse veto has moved beyond a temporary phenomenon to become a structural feature of the new order governing war, diplomacy, and the economy in Sudan.
It is no exaggeration to say that the reverse veto now poses one of the gravest threats to Sudan, not just as a conflict zone, but as a political entity seeking independence from external domination. In a pivotal moment in Sudan’s history, international decisions on ending the war or reviving the political process are no longer shaped by Sudanese will or international legality. Still, they are instead hostage to the whims of regional capitals that monopolise battlefield access, with the tacit blessing of global powers that have chosen transactionalism over principle.
This article sheds light on the reverse veto as an analytical tool for understanding Sudan’s current reality, and raises a pressing question: how do we confront this new form of domination, which not only imposes its will but actively prevents viable national alternatives from emerging? The suffering of the Sudanese people has been prolonged not only by the war itself but also by the fact that decisions to end it are made beyond Sudan’s borders, through a toxic nexus of wealth, power, and narrow interest.
- What Is the reverse veto?
The “reverse veto” refers to the ability of regional actors, despite having limited formal power compared to global players, to obstruct or derail international initiatives through geographically proximate influence, financial muscle, and logistical and military support.
In Sudan, Egypt and the UAE exercise this reverse veto by backing the warring factions: Cairo supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while Abu Dhabi supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Their backing goes far beyond military support to include funding, supply routes, smuggling networks, port access, control over migration corridors, and media and diplomatic influence. Any political or negotiation initiative that fails to accommodate the calculus of these two regional actors risks collapse, no matter its seriousness or level of international backing.
- Geopolitical consequences – multipolar disorder
The reverse veto reflects the growing fragmentation of the international order. While the US, UK, and EU continue to issue statements calling for a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and democratic transition, they lack the leverage to impose their will. They must rely on regional partners who are no longer neutral. Egypt and the UAE have adopted independent, bold, and pragmatic foreign policies. Their ability to derail the Washington Conference, ostensibly due to the absence of SAF and RSF representation, underscores the limits of Western diplomacy in a multipolar world.
Russia and China tacitly support this dynamic, shielding Cairo and Abu Dhabi’s positions in international forums and opposing Western-led resolutions. This reinforces a state of “multipolar disorder” in Sudan and perpetuates fragmentation in peace efforts.
- The UAE reportedly supported over 100–150 military flights to northern Chad between May and September 2023, supplying the RSF with arms, ammunition, vehicles, and drones.
- Chinese- and Serbian-made weapons, such as GB50A guided bombs and AH-4 howitzers, were found on the ground in Khartoum and Darfur, used by the RSF, and were traced back to the UAE, the only documented importer.
- Egyptian troops were captured by RSF at Meroe Airport in April 2023 during joint training with SAF, evidence of Cairo’s direct operational footprint inside Sudan.
Such military and logistical influence enables both Cairo and Abu Dhabi to veto any initiative that does not pass through them.
III. Impact on the political economy — war as a booming regional market
The reverse veto has fostered a war economy with regional and international dimensions. The UAE benefits from continued conflict through its informal control over Sudan’s gold supply chains from RSF-held areas. Egypt, meanwhile, uses the war to secure its southern borders, bolster its position in the GERD negotiations, and control trade routes in the Red Sea.
Humanitarian aid and reconstruction are now effective tools of soft power. Resources are channelled to loyal actors and denied to opponents, thus reshaping Sudan’s economy based on the war sponsors’ interests rather than development or stability.
- Sudan produced 64 tonnes of gold in 2024, generating $1.57 billion in official revenue; however, 50–80% of it was reportedly smuggled, mainly to the UAE via RSF networks.
- 91% of Sudan’s official gold exports go to the UAE, totalling $1.6 billion, according to official UAE sovereign fund data.
- A pro-RSF TV channel helped mobilise funds and logistics for RSF, reportedly backed indirectly by Emirati interests and Sudan’s deep state.
War has become a direct revenue stream for regional powers, reducing their incentive to end it.
- Humanitarian catastrophe — deferred diplomacy, denied rights
- Since April 2023, the war has claimed over 16,650 lives, displaced over 11 million internally, and pushed 2 million into exile.
- Documented war crimes and mass atrocities, especially in Darfur and Khartoum, suggest systematic violence by SAF and RSF forces against civilians.
- Humanitarian access is weaponized as aid is withheld or granted based on loyalty, undermining neutrality. International agencies are trapped between professional ethics and the imposed realities of battlefield control.
The reverse veto blocks coordinated, effective humanitarian responses. Life for Sudanese civilians has become a parallel political battleground.
- Legitimacy vacuum — two governments, zero state
The reverse veto has entrenched institutional division in Sudan. Two rival governments now operate: the Amal SAF-led administration in Port Sudan, and the Tasis RSF’s civilian front in Nyala. Neither enjoys popular legitimacy, and both depend on external support for survival.
Regional loyalties are also divided: Egypt supports SAF, while the UAE supports RSF. Civilian democratic forces are marginalised and perceived as Western proxies. This fragmented scenario risks creating a de facto partition, where divergent security regimes rule different regions under foreign influence.
- Breaking the reverse veto cycle
Countering the reverse veto requires a multilayered strategy:
- Empower independent Sudanese voices, particularly civil society, the diaspora, and democratic forces, to operate outside regional patronage.
- Smart conditionality: tie military or humanitarian aid to measurable progress on ceasefire and political reintegration.
- Neutral actors: engage international and regional mediators with balanced, non-partisan credentials.
- Name the problem: acknowledge Egypt and the UAE’s role in fuelling conflict instead of appeasing them.
- Build a new national consensus: redefine legitimacy on democratic and peaceful foundations beyond militarised divisions.
Conclusion: Who deciphers Sudan’s war?
Sudan’s tragedy is no longer a local crisis. It is a test of the global system’s ability to respond to novel threats, where power no longer lies solely with the great powers but with those who control the battlefield, the gold, and the refugees.
The reverse veto is not just an analytical term; it encapsulates a daily political and moral tragedy in Sudan. When peace initiatives are obstructed because a regional actor disapproves, and aid is weaponised, and legitimacy is traded, Sudanese sovereignty is effectively auctioned off.
Recognising the danger is the first step. Sudanese citizens, civilian and military, elite and grassroots, at home and in exile, must realise that reclaiming national sovereignty begins by disrupting this regional custodianship.
The international community must abandon double standards and treat regional actors not as stability partners but as contributors to chaos, unless confronted with firm policy responses.
Ultimately, Sudan’s war will not end in Geneva, Washington, London, Addis Ababa, or Nairobi. It will end when regional powers decide the war no longer serves them, or, more decisively, when Sudanese actors build a new national consensus that understands and neutralises the reverse veto, instead of denying it.