Army Reshuffle: A strategic shift or a tactical manoeuvre?

Professor Mekki El Shibly
Executive Director, Cognisance Centre for Strategic Studies

In mid-August 2025, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan made one of his most controversial moves since the war began: a sweeping reshuffle of the army’s high command. He forced several senior generals into retirement and brought Islamist brigades and allied militias under the military’s direct control.

For some, this was the long-awaited moment—a clear sign that al-Burhan has finally decided to confront the deep-seated Islamist influence within the military. For others, it was merely a tactical ploy, indistinguishable from his past manoeuvres, aimed solely at preserving his grip on power.

Breaking the islamist incubator

For decades, Islamists have acted as a hidden “colonizer” within the Sudanese army. They infiltrated its ranks during the Bashir era, establishing loyalty networks that still control key levers of power, even after the 2019 revolution. By bringing Islamist militias under formal army command, al-Burhan has opened the widest rift yet between the military leadership and the Islamists who bet on the war to reclaim their lost influence.

This rift presents a rare window of opportunity. It tightens the noose on the Islamists, stripping them of the leverage they have long exploited. It also opens the door to genuine security sector reform and creates the conditions for a ceasefire. But this window will not stay open for long.

Pressure from all sides

However, let’s be clear: al-Burhan’s actions were not driven solely by patriotism. Just weeks ago in Switzerland, he met with the US administration’s advisor on African affairs, Mes-sád Boulos, where ceasefires and humanitarian corridors topped the agenda. The Americans and their European partners have sent an unequivocal message: an Islamist return to power is unacceptable.

Egypt has its own calculations, preferring a stable, centralized army in Khartoum over a patchwork of militias, despite its lingering suspicions about al-Burhan’s intentions. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE view reining in the Islamists as a prerequisite for regional stability. In this context, al-Burhan is positioning himself on the world stage as a “bulwark against chaos and extremism.”

A historic test for civilian leaders

This creates a paradox: if Sudan’s democratic civilian forces fail to act swiftly, al-Burhan may be forced back into the arms of the Islamists, who still command formidable networks of mobilization, money, and ideology. The Islamists are waiting for a single misstep, a moment of hesitation, to reassert themselves on the political stage.

Civilian forces, therefore, face a stark choice: remain silent, fearing they might legitimize a man synonymous with coups and repression, or issue a conditional endorsement. Such a statement would welcome the move to weaken the Islamists but insist it be followed by concrete steps toward ending the war and reforming the military.

Reforms, not slogans

What Sudan needs now is not rhetoric, but a concrete, 90-day reform agenda that includes:

• Criminalizing all partisan political activity within the armed forces.
• Appointing an independent Inspector General and military judicial body with African and international oversight.
• Publicly declaring the command structure of all paramilitary forces and launching a formal Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program.
• Immediately opening humanitarian corridors as a confidence-building measure.

This is not a political luxury; it is the bare minimum for al-Burhan to prove his seriousness. Only then can civilian leaders and the international community offer political recognition and tangible support in return. If he stalls, he must be met with coordinated pressure he cannot possibly withstand.

A Narrow window of opportunity

The civilian voice is more than symbolic—it’s a source of real negotiating leverage. Suppose democratic forces can table an alternative political framework, coordinated with the US, EU, AU, IGAD, and key Arab states. In that case, they can offer al-Burhan a viable non-Islamist base of support. This would prove that breaking with the Islamists does not mean political isolation. Crucially, it would also keep civilian leaders at the heart of the political process, empowered to enforce accountability and parliamentary oversight over the armed forces.

Time is not on Sudan’s side. The war is consuming the country, the humanitarian crisis is deepening, and political alliances are in constant flux. Meanwhile, the Islamists are biding their time, waiting for a moment of weakness to offer their services in exchange for a return to power.

The true test of this military reshuffle, then, will not be the number of generals retired or promoted. It will be whether this move paves the way for a durable ceasefire, the dismantling of partisan militias, and the restoration of Sudan’s democratic transition.

Al-Burhan has played his card—whether strategically or tactically. The ball is now firmly in the court of Sudan’s civilian leaders and their international partners. Will they seize this fleeting opportunity, or will they, once again, let it slip away for the Islamists to exploit?