Beyond Burhan’s shuffle: A true roadmap for reforming Sudan’s army
By Yasir Arman
Amid the pressures of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has issued a series of significant decisions. These orders have reorganized the army’s command structure, removed influential Islamist officers, and mandated that all armed groups fall under the military’s authority. While noteworthy, these actions demand a critical and objective evaluation.
Rather than praising these decisions or dismissing them as serving the interests of Ali Karti or Nafi Ali Nafi, the best approach is to evaluate them objectively as much as possible:
- The Armed Forces suffer from structural and historical flaws linked to their formation, their entanglement in politics and the economy, and their involvement in wars in the rural Sudan.
- The coup of June 1989, led by the Islamists, was a qualitative development that gravely damaged the professionalism and national character of the Armed Forces and their reflection of Sudan’s diversity. The Islamists seriously sought to turn the Armed Forces into the military wing of their movement. Even Omar al-Bashir, who came from its ranks, feared them. They established parallel armies, from the Popular Defence Forces to the Rapid Support Forces, and used militias in rural areas.
The Commander’s decisions raise more questions than answers:
- Are these decisions the beginning of a new direction?
- Are they linked to the Switzerland meeting and the search for internal and external legitimacy?
- Were they made to consolidate the Commander-in-Chief’s grip in pursuit of a future role for himself and the army in shaping the coming political order?
- Are they simply a change of faces, replacing one Islamist figure with another from the second tier?
- Do they merely reflect an internal conflict among Islamists between Karti and Nafi?
While these questions are all relevant, they are secondary to a more fundamental issue. A proper evaluation of General al-Burhan’s decisions must be grounded in the essential, non-negotiable conditions required for building a truly national and professional military. These are:
First: It is impossible to build or even reform the Armed Forces into a professional, national force without ending the war. Second: Building a professional, non-politicized army that reflects Sudan’s diversity and does not wage wars in the countryside can only come within a comprehensive plan for state-building, with new political and economic orientations, accountability, and addressing the root causes of conflict in order to establish a new system. Third: Purging the army of Islamists is a fundamental condition for stability, democracy, development, and improved relations with neighbouring countries and the international community. The Armed Forces must not contain any political factions. Fourth: Democracy and subjecting the security sector to a democratic civilian authority—during the transitional period and later under an elected government—are essential for continuing structural and institutional reforms in the army. Fifth: The Armed Forces cannot prescribe the cure for themselves in isolation. Reform requires a nationally backed plan, supported by the public and enjoying sufficient consensus. Sixth: The decision to place other forces and militias under the Armed Forces requires ending the war, so that no one in government speaks with the weight of his weapon. New arrangements must enforce a strict separation between the security sector and political life. The security sector must be under state authority, while politics must unfold in a peaceful civilian space, where people do not assert themselves by the length of their rifles.
In conclusion, General al-Burhan’s recent decisions—whether removing Islamist officers or asserting the army’s monopoly on arms—are insufficient on their own. True reform requires a national, consensus-driven project aimed at a democratic civilian transition and comprehensive state-building. This must be the starting point for any meaningful dialogue about Sudan’s future.
