Three Triangles at Sudan’s War: can New York unlock peace?
By Professor Mekki El Shibly
Executive Director, Cognisance Centre for Strategic Studies
Trigonometry in the Sudan war
Sudan’s war has entered its third year, leaving millions displaced and the country on the edge of collapse. Yet international diplomacy remains paralysed. The conflict is best understood through three interconnected “triangles” of power and influence: the Arab Triangle of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; the Western Triangle of London, Washington, and Geneva; and the Sudanese Triangle of the army (SAF), the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and civilians. Together, these triangles shape both the continuation of the war and the elusive path towards peace.
As world leaders gather for the UN General Assembly in New York from 23-29 September 2025, the question is whether the West can coordinate effectively to overcome Arab obstruction and empower Sudanese civilian voices before the war fragments the country beyond repair.
The Arab Triangle: proxy Interests and the “reverse veto”
The Arab states have been decisive in sustaining Sudan’s war. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE share concerns over Red Sea security, Islamist resurgence and migration flows, but they diverge sharply on whom to back. Cairo supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Riyadh seeks balance, while Abu Dhabi has been accused of supplying the RSF.
This divergence has produced what Sudanese analysts call a “reverse veto”: any conference hosted by one Western capital, London, Washington, or Geneva, has been undercut by one or more Arab states siding with their preferred faction. This dynamic scuttled momentum at the London Sudan conference in April and again blocked US attempts to convene a joint ministerial in July. The result: paralysis, with the Arab Triangle acting less as a stabiliser and more as a spoiler.
The Western Triangle: capacity without unity
By contrast, the Western Triangle, London, Washington and Geneva, holds unmatched institutional capacity to mobilise resources, convene multilateral forums and set the terms of international mediation. But Western diplomacy has lacked unity and urgency.
The UK, despite its historical ties to Sudan, has appeared hesitant; the US has engaged episodically, often constrained by regional disputes; and Geneva-based institutions, including the UN and humanitarian agencies, have struggled to break through the Arab veto. Without coherent coordination, Western capitals have allowed the Arab Triangle to dominate the narrative and the battlefield.
The upcoming UN General Assembly offers a rare chance for the Western Triangle to move in lockstep. By agreeing on common principles and elevating the civilian agenda, they can begin to reframe diplomacy around Sudanese needs, not Arab rivalries.
The Sudanese Triangle: where the real struggle lies
At the heart of the war is the Sudanese Triangle: the SAF, the RSF, and the country’s diverse civilian actors. The SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has entrenched its military rule in Port Sudan, bolstered by Islamist networks. The RSF, under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), has consolidated power in Darfur and is accused of widespread atrocities. Both forces have rearmed and recruited extensively, preparing for a protracted war.
Yet civilians remain Sudan’s greatest hope for peace. Networks such as the Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), largely run by the December Revolution youth and women, have provided essential humanitarian relief. Political coalitions, including Somoud (the Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces), are seeking to unite fragmented pro-democracy voices into a broad civilian front. Sudanese think tanks and research centres are also generating ideas for governance and reconstruction, even amid collapse.
But these civilian actors face three obstacles: limited access to formal negotiations, the deliberate efforts of the warring parties to divide and discredit them, and the international community’s tendency to default to “men with guns” in search of quick-fix power-sharing deals.
Breaking the deadlock in New York
The General Assembly offers a critical test. If Western capitals treat Sudan as a secondary crisis, the war will drag on, deepening the humanitarian catastrophe and risking partition. But if the Western Triangle asserts leadership, three steps are possible:
- Overcoming the Arab veto by building coordinated pressure on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to support, rather than block, ceasefire talks.
- Prioritising civilian inclusion, not as an afterthought but as the centrepiece of any diplomatic track.
- Designing a peace process that starts with a humanitarian ceasefire, expands civic space, and builds towards a political settlement rooted in justice and equal citizenship.
These are not abstract ideals. They are lessons drawn from Sudan’s own December Revolution, which toppled Omar al-Bashir without foreign mediation. They are echoed by civil society voices still risking their lives to deliver aid, organise communities, and envision a democratic state.
Three triangles, one choice
The interplay of the Arab, Western, and Sudanese triangles will determine whether Sudan descends into permanent fragmentation or charts a path towards peace. For now, the Arab Triangle’s reverse veto has set the terms, and the Sudanese Triangle remains squeezed between two predatory armies. Only the Western Triangle has the leverage to shift this balance by empowering Sudanese civilians and preventing another decade-long war on the Red Sea.
In New York, the choice is clear: either the General Assembly becomes yet another missed opportunity, or it becomes the moment when global diplomacy finally recognises that Sudan’s war cannot be ended without Sudanese civilians at its core.