Unite the FFC before it’s too late!
By Professor Mekki Medani Elshibly
Executive Director, Diraya Centre for Strategic Studies
The consequences of the FFC’s failure to strategically address its primary and secondary contradictions
As the war in Sudan intensifies and the humanitarian tragedy deepens, a fundamental question arises: Can civilian forces play a real role in stopping the war and building a different future? The answer, simply, lies with the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). Since the December revolution, the FFC has been the greatest hope for a democratic transition.
The painful truth, however, is that internal divisions have crippled the FFC. Caused by a failure to prioritize its battles and a struggle for power, this disunity has exposed it, both at home and abroad, as a group incapable of taking a unified stand. This weakness has opened the door wide for two parties skilled at exploiting a vacuum: the military, who present themselves as “guarantors of stability,” and the Islamists, who are attempting a gradual comeback by allying with power centres within the army and the deep state.
Civilian division… a double loss
The division among civilian forces is not a trivial internal dispute; it is a double loss. First, it has demoralized the Sudanese public, who have lost faith in politicians’ ability to rise above their narrow power struggles. Second, it has given the international community a justification to sideline civilians and rely more on the military to broker agreements. As a result, any external initiative, like that of the Quad (the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), lacks a strong civilian partner capable of filling the void and leading the next phase.
Unity does not mean dissolution
When we speak of unity, we do not mean erasing ideological differences or merging parties into a single entity. What is required is an agreement on a minimum program focused on the most critical issues: an immediate end to the war, the protection of civilians, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the start of a new democratic path based on a civilian state and institutional reform.
This is the program that can restore the civilian forces’ credibility at home and abroad, giving them the leverage to influence the political equation. Without it, international initiatives will remain mere statements, and the hopes of the Sudanese people will hang in the balance.
The Quad initiative… a conditional opportunity
The Quad initiative could be a turning point, but its success is conditional on the unity of civilian forces. If they approach it while divided, they will be used as a tool to reinforce military and Islamist control. However, if they can present a broad, unified civilian front, the initiative could mark a genuine start to ending the war and opening a new chapter.
This is where their responsibility lies: the FFC is not just defending its political position but the right of the Sudanese people to a responsible civilian leadership that reflects their aspirations.
Lessons from the December revolution
To avoid repeating history, we must reflect on past mistakes. The December revolution paid a heavy price for the FFC’s miscalculations. For instance, prolonging the sit-in at the General Command without a clear risk strategy led directly to the June 3rd massacre. This was not just a crime; it was the moment that broke the back of the mass movement, allowing the military and Islamists to regain the initiative.
Similarly, negotiations with the military council were plagued by confusion. Civilian leaders vacillated between maximalist demands such as “full civilian rule” and major concessions that frustrated revolutionaries, who felt it betrayed the martyrs’ sacrifice. This indecisiveness cost the FFC the initiative, giving the military the time and space to consolidate its position while the public grew disheartened.
Furthermore, a failure to distinguish between primary and secondary goals led to repeated splits. When unity was most needed, leaders became preoccupied with internal squabbles, fracturing the FFC into the Central Council, the National Charter, Taqadum, the Democratic Bloc, Somoud, and Tasis. This culminated in some Somoud leaders abandoning the cause of peace to join the pro-war “Battle of Dignity” camp.
Acknowledging these mistakes is not an exercise in self-blame, nor does it diminish the FFC’s successes. It is a necessary step toward building a more mature political path. Experience has taught us that slogans are not enough; civilian action requires a flexible, strategic vision that can distinguish the urgent from the deferrable and manage disagreements to fortify unity, not shatter it.
A broader civilian front
Experience has proven that politics cannot be confined to parties alone. The youth, resistance committees, professionals, think tanks, and civil society organizations were the backbone of the December revolution and remain resilient in the face of war.
Therefore, uniting the FFC must be the first step toward building a broader civilian front that includes all these vital groups. Only then can we speak of a genuine alternative that can convince both the Sudanese people and the international community.
Transparency first
No civilian front will succeed if it repeats the past mistakes of selective negotiations and opaque agreements. What is needed today is a clear and transparent agenda that places the people of the December revolution at the heart of the political process. This will restore their confidence that leaders are speaking for them honestly, not just negotiating power shares behind closed doors.
Towards an agreed-upon minimum program
After six years of damaging divisions, an urgent and realistic plan is needed. This can begin with a small, joint committee with balanced representation from all blocs, tasked with drafting a minimum program within a short timeframe, such as one month.
To ensure its success, an independent and respected national facilitator—whether a public figure or a think tank—must be appointed to guide the dialogue, manage disputes, and frame the conclusions in unifying language. A neutral facilitator would prevent any single party from dominating the process and help avoid the stalemates of the past.
This minimum program would focus on urgent, unifying priorities:
- An immediate ceasefire under regional and international auspices.
- The protection of civilians and guaranteed delivery of humanitarian aid, free from political agendas.
- A new, civilian-led transition focused on reforming state security and economic institutions.
- The formal inclusion of resistance committees, youth, professionals, and civil society alongside political parties.
This approach can restore the FFC’s credibility and end the cycle of divisions that has cost it its leading role.
The unity of the Forces of Freedom and Change is not a political luxury or a mere tactical manoeuvre; it is a strategic necessity. It is essential for the success of the Quad initiative and for rebuilding a civilian-led path forward. With the African Union and IGAD meeting scheduled for October 2025, the FFC cannot afford to sappear divided. A brief, decisive dialogue, facilitated by independent Sudanese experts, can produce the minimum program necessary to halt the war, safeguard civilians, establish humanitarian corridors, and resume the democratic process.
Any further delay means surrendering the future to the military and the Islamists. The October dialogue must be a breakthrough, not another missed opportunity.
If Sudan’s civilian forces can rise above their power struggles, they will offer the nation hope for a different future and prove to the world that the country is not a hostage to the gun or to extremist agendas. But if they fail, they will leave the door open to an endless, bloody conflict, squandering a historic opportunity that may never come again.
melshibly@hotmail.com