A politico-constitutional roadmap for Quad success in Sudan

By Professor Mekki El Shibly
Executive Director, Cognisance Centre for Strategic Studies

Sudan stands today at one of the most perilous crossroads in its modern history. Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, Sudan has endured dual authorities, a devastating split within the armed forces, and a dangerously fragmented civilian camp. The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), once the political custodian of the 2019 Constitutional Document, have weakened, leaving the transition in limbo.

Yet, within this bleakness lies a window of opportunity. The war has not only exposed the fragility of the past arrangements but also clarified what must change if Sudan is to restart its transition on solid ground. Equally, the war has exposed the destructive legacy of Sudan’s former Islamist regime, whose networks persistently undermined the December 2018 Revolution and its legitimate 2019 transition. These actors, as spoilers of democratic transformation, cannot constitute legitimate stakeholders in any renewed transition framework.

The way forward requires a politico-constitutional roadmap, anchored in legitimacy, inclusivity, and enforceable guarantees. This is where the Quad (comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom, with the expanded involvement of the AU and IGAD) can play a decisive role.

The Separation of Military and Civil Tracks

First and foremost, Sudan’s civilians must not be drawn into military bargains they cannot enforce. Ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should remain an exclusively military–security matter under Quad mediation.

Why? Because preserving this separation safeguards civilian independence, allows the SAF and RSF to negotiate without political distractions, and enables civilian actors to focus solely on their constitutional and political responsibilities once a ceasefire is in place. Separation of military and civil tracks also neutralises spoiler dynamics as the presence of divided politicians risks transforming ceasefire talks into political battlegrounds.

It is equally critical to ensure that Islamist spoilers, who seek to exploit military negotiations to re-enter the political scene, remain excluded from all stages of these talks. Their return would only deepen divisions and undermine the credibility of any settlement.

Amending the Constitutional Framework

The 2019 Constitutional Document remains the only legitimate basis for transition, but it must be updated. Its amendments must be carried out jointly by the original signatories (the SAF and the FFC), should:

• Replace the failed “civil–military partnership” with a new arrangement limiting the military to a protective, not political, role.
• Empower a technocratic civilian government to lead the transition and complete state institutions such as the legislature, the Constitutional Court, and the security sector reforms.
• Ensure that legitimacy flows from the rule of law rather than ad hoc bargains.

This framework must explicitly exclude Islamist groups that actively undermined the 2019 transition and continue to promote authoritarian restoration. Their isolation is vital for the integrity of the new constitutional process.

Integrating the RSF into the SAF

No transition can succeed while the country remains divided between two armies. RSF integration into the SAF is thus indispensable, but it must proceed along two parallel tracks:

1. Military–Security Track: Negotiations between the SAF and RSF on ceasefire and restructuring under the expanded Quad mediation.
2. Constitutional–Political Track: Provisions in the amended Constitutional Document mandating RSF integration into the SAF within a clear timetable, coupled with transitional justice, unified command structures, and a prohibition of military involvement in politics or commerce.

Here too, Islamist spoilers must be denied influence: the SAF’s restructuring cannot be permitted to serve as a backdoor for their return. Integration must serve national unity, not factional or ideological agendas.

The Critical Task: Unifying the FFC

For the constitutional process to succeed, the FFC must reunite. Divided, it cannot represent Sudan’s civilian voice; united, it becomes an indispensable partner in amending the Constitutional Document and transferring power from the military to civilians.

The unification process should be sequenced and time-bound:

• Month 1: A public declaration of intent and formation of a joint technical committee.
• Months 2–3: Internal dialogue workshops on constitutional reform, technocratic governance, and relations with armed movements and resistance committees.
• End of Month 3: Adoption of a Unity Charter and election of a transitional civilian leadership to engage with the SAF and the Quad.

This effort must reaffirm the FFC’s independence from Islamist factions. Their exclusion is not about narrow partisanship; it is about preserving the democratic vision that sparked Sudan’s 2018 revolution.

Synchronising the Timetable

The roadmap can be synchronised as follows:

• Months 1–3: SAF–RSF ceasefire talks under Quad mediation; FFC unity process launched.
• Month 3: Initial ceasefire; FFC completes unity and establishes leadership.
• Month 4: RSF integration timetable begins; constitutional amendment process launched.
• Months 5–6: Ceasefire monitoring and redeployment; formation of a technocratic civilian government and completion of state institutions.

Guarantees the Quartet Must Provide

To succeed, the Quartet must:

• Officially recognise the unified FFC as the sole civilian interlocutor.
• Secure a strict separation between military and civilian tracks.
• Provide international guarantees through the UNSC, AU, and Arab League.
• Condition aid and humanitarian support on compliance with the constitutional amendment and genuine civilian transition.
• Ensure Islamist spoilers are isolated from both military and civilian tracks to protect the legitimacy of the transition.

A Final Word

The path to stability in Sudan is difficult, but it is not impossible. It requires courage from Sudanese actors and clarity from the international community. The separation of military and civilian tracks, the updating of the Constitutional Document, the integration of the RSF, and the unification of the FFC are not abstract goals; they are the practical steps needed to rescue Sudan’s transition.

The Quartet holds the leverage to turn these steps into reality. The Sudanese people hold the resolve to see them through. Together, they can still salvage the promise of the 2018 revolution and lay the foundation for a Sudan that is democratic, legitimate, and stable, without the return of authoritarian spoilers who once hijacked the state.

melshibly@hotmail.com