Sudan’s drift toward militia rule and the capture of the finance ministry
The State and the Ideology of Militias: The Ministry of Finance as Jibril Ibrahim’s Favoured Fiefdom
Yasir Arman
When the state entered intensive care and lost the very foundations of its existence as a unifying project for all, it resorted to militias to achieve tactical objectives in rural wars that have now spread to the centre of the state. Now, militias are moving toward swallowing the state itself; some emerging from those same rural wars under the banner of “liberation” and the paradoxical claim of establishing a new system.
Islamists have been the kings of militias. They initiated the hijacking of the state, and when they failed to fully control it, they rented the guns of new militias. Today, we are entering a profound national crisis in which the ideology and discourse of militias is becoming normalized, shifting from sharing power and wealth to dividing the state itself among warlords. The state has, in effect, entered the era of militia ideology and jurisprudence.
In today’s reality, one must speak according to the length of one’s gun. Instead of equal citizenship, rights without discrimination and equality in constitutional rights and duties, rights are now measured by the weapons of militias, which determine the division of power and wealth. Each militia claims its own “fiefdom” of authority and money, and the blood and institutions of the state are scattered among them. Gradually, we are drifting away from the dream of building a national state based on citizenship, social justice, and democracy. Rights are derived from guns, and today, no voice rises above that of militias.
As for Jibril Ibrahim, he has carefully chosen his fiefdom within the Ministry of Finance to serve his family and a circle of business associates tied to corruption, and maintains close ties with former members of the Islamist movement.
Available information from well-informed sources indicates that Jibril Ibrahim is attempting to incite the Joint Forces to maintain his hold on the Ministry of Finance. He argues that his removal would lead to the removal of others and claims that the ministry is part of the Juba Agreement and the December Revolution, which he himself helped overturn. This point will be addressed further. His dilemma is that his contributions in terms of militia involvement in the so-called “War of Dignity” have been limited and negligible; the forces that fought are known, and he did not command a significant military presence.
Recently, Kamil Idris attempted to remove Jibril Ibrahim from the ministry but failed – failure being a recurring trait in his actions. He also faced a request to advance the Darfur Regional Governance Law. After consultations, Idris stated that the (now-defunct) constitutional document stipulates the holding of a governance and administration conference and the establishment of a legislative body to pass such a law. Meanwhile, Jibril is trying to drag other components of the Joint Forces into a conflict over the Ministry of Finance. His position is weak and isolated, as several leaders within the Joint Forces disagree with him. Additionally, military intelligence has influence within the coalition, and a new alliance appears to be forming between the army and certain leaders, including Dar’a, Al-Nour Qubba, and Musa Hilal.
A key Gulf country is reportedly unwilling to engage with Jibril Ibrahim due to his close ties with the Islamist movement. Furthermore, sanctions imposed on him prevent him from participating in international institutional meetings. In recent times, he has worked to purge independent national cadres from the Ministry of Finance, including senior-level individuals. His specific dilemma is that, unlike others, he cannot manoeuvre by threatening to join the Rapid Support Forces – an option available to others but not to him.
The current state does not accommodate everyone and is on the brink of collapse. It urgently needs an end to the war and a shift toward what benefits the people, not what benefits those with guns.
The Ministry of Finance has no direct link to the Juba Agreement. The agreement did not stipulate that the ministry would belong to the Justice and Equality Movement or to Jibril himself – something he knows well. Ministerial assignments were the result of political understandings not included in the agreement. The agreement itself has expired, and its signatories have fragmented. Its constitutional framework was dismantled, with Jibril himself participating in the October 25 coup alongside the army leadership and the Rapid Support Forces.
Jibril Ibrahim’s battle resembles that of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli (“Ghneiwa”) in Libya, who distributed the state’s revenues, central bank resources, and unified currency among factions that divided Libya and spilled its blood among militias. We are now heading down the same path. Jibril’s struggle is an extension of the Islamist movement’s role in destroying and hijacking the state for the benefit of its organization, relying on militia power.
The battle over the Ministry of Finance – and the claim that it is a personal fiefdom of Jibril – signals the dawn of militia ideology as the new definition of the state and the division of power and wealth outside any framework of social justice or national reconstruction. It is one of the clearest signs that Sudan is transitioning toward a project of dividing the state and its institutions. Without confronting this issue, among many others, our aspirations for equal citizenship, a democratic civil state, stability, development, and sustainable peace will vanish.
Without building a unified security sector centred on a professional, national army that reflects Sudan’s diversity, avoids rural wars, and addresses the structural imbalances within the security apparatus, the country will be lost to chaos.
The issue of armed struggle, rooted in marginalization, requires deep reassessment and renewal. Its slogans have, in many cases, become tools for reproducing marginalization under deceptive narratives.
Finally, without a precise and serious approach to addressing the proliferation of militia weapons across Sudan – replacing them with a single national force that monopolizes arms under a professional army protecting sovereignty within a democratic civil state – our country and people are heading toward enduring further fragmentation instead of lasting peace.
Let us reject the spread of militia ideology and work toward building a new nation, with armed forces that belong to the people, not a people that belong to the armed forces.