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Sudan Tribune

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Sudan’s shadow economy defies Western sanctions as war drags on

Sudanese army officer inspects a discovered weapons storage site belonging to the (RSF in Khartoum on May 3, 2025, AP Photo

Sudanese army officer inspects a discovered weapons storage site belonging to the RSF in Khartoum on May 3, 2025, AP Photo

June 29, 2026 (KHARTOUM) – For more than three years, Western powers have steadily sharpened their economic weaponry against the architects of Sudan’s civil war, cutting off bank accounts, blacklisting front companies, and restricting travel for key commanders.

Yet on the ground, the gears of the conflict keep turning.

The limits of international financial pressure were spotlighted again on Friday when the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) slapped sanctions on eight individuals and entities. Washington accused them of managing sophisticated financial structures and recruitment networks fuelling the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Analysts cast doubt on the effectiveness of these financial resources, stressing that the ultimate success of this strategy remains highly uncertain. Historically, military-linked business networks in Sudan have successfully bypassed sanctions by pivoting to regional trading partners, black markets, and informal financial channels. Furthermore, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue to receive backing from a regional power that U.S. sanctions have noticeably omitted due to its close ties with American companies.

The measures follow a familiar pattern of rolling sanctions by the United States and the European Union. But as Sudan’s war solidifies its status as one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian crises, diplomats and analysts increasingly question whether the strategy is fundamentally flawed.

A parallel financial empire

The resilience of Sudan’s warring factions stems from a structural reality: they are not relying on traditional global banking.

“Western sanctions are colliding with a modern African ‘war economy’ built to withstand external pressure,” said Joseph Otieno, a Kenyan political analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa.

According to Otieno, both the SAF and the RSF spent years before the outbreak of hostilities engineering a highly complex, parallel financial system.

“These networks rely on safe havens outside the traditional Western financial grid,” Otieno said. “They move assets through shell companies located in regional and international hubs that simply choose not to enforce Washington’s decrees.”

While asset freezes and travel bans carry undeniable political weight, they do little to disrupt logistics. The lifeblood of the conflict is cash and commodities, chief among them Sudanese gold. Smuggled across borders and traded directly for weapons or fuel, gold remains entirely insulated from international banking oversight, leaving Western regulations largely toothless on the battlefield.

Adapting to the squeeze

Inside Sudan, the civilian population bears the brunt of economic collapse while the combatants adapt.

Local human rights groups have welcomed the sanctions, viewing them as an important step toward dismantling the culture of impunity. But local analysts say the economic battlefield has shifted.

“After more than 37 months of relentless fighting, the warring parties have fully adapted to these restrictions,” said Mohamed Idris, a Sudanese political analyst. “They have deepened the shadow economy, seized control of whatever domestic resources remain, and turned entirely to informal, alternative channels.”

The core vulnerability of the Western approach is enforcement. Without strict monitoring mechanisms along Sudan’s porous land borders and Red Sea coastline, and without diplomatic leverage with regional neighbours that facilitate the logistics, blacklists remain paper barriers.

“As long as the international community contents itself with managing the crisis and issuing moral condemnations, these sanctions will remain limited measures,” Idris added.

The political deadlock

The economic gridlock is mirrored on the diplomatic front. Observers argue that the military leaderships of both the army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, headed by Mohamed Handan Daglo, remain convinced that they can secure a total victory on the battlefield, making them indifferent to international censure.

Political friction intensified this weekend following allegations by Massad Boulos, a senior advisor to the U.S. president on Arab and African affairs, who told the UN Security Council that Sudan’s Transitional Sovereign Council had rejected a U.S.-brokered humanitarian truce.

Khaled Omer Yousif, deputy head of the Sudanese Congress Party, seized on the reports, stating on Facebook that the military’s failure to accept a ceasefire plan reflected a total absence of political will for peace.

The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs pushed back sharply on Saturday, issuing a statement calling Boulos’s remarks “inaccurate.” The ministry asserted that the government has engaged responsibly in all peace initiatives, citing its own civilian protection blueprint submitted to the Security Council in late 2025, which was rejected by the RSF-aligned “Tasis” coalition.

For civil society activists on the ground, the diplomatic manoeuvring feels increasingly disconnected from reality.

“The weapon of sanctions holds legal importance, but it lacks the teeth to force a ceasefire,” said Ilham Mohamed al-Sir, a local resistance committee member. She argued that halting the war would require an ironclad international consensus capable of resolving deeper regional rifts, including confronting the African Union’s quiet backing of the military establishment.

Until then, Sudan’s parallel financial networks ensure that the business of war remains uninterrupted.