Sudan must move from reactive relief to proactive flood risk management
Moving from reactive response to proactive flood risk management: reforming policy in Sudan
Mohamed Elbashir
Mohamed.m456 [at] outlook [dot] com
In just one year, the cost of Sudan’s floods reached nearly nine billion dollars in 2026 U.S. dollars—losses that reflect the scale of the burden borne by a country facing a predictable phenomenon that is still managed as if it were a sudden event. Despite decades of recurring floods and the widespread human and economic losses they cause, the response often begins after the disaster, with relief and emergency aid, rather than investing in prevention and building resilience.
The problem is not Sudan’s rivers or its topography, but rather the way flood risks are managed. Floods are part of Sudan’s natural system, but their recurring transformation into humanitarian and developmental crises reveals gaps in policies, planning, and governance. The question that should be asked today is not: When will the next flood come? But: Will Sudan be ready when it does?
Almost every rainy season, the Sudanese people experience the same scene: rivers overflow, communities submerged, people lose their homes, schools, hospitals, and roads are disrupted, and then local and international relief campaigns begin to rescue those affected. As soon as the waters recede, the issue fades from public attention, only to re-emerge with the next flood. Thus, the cycle continues year after year, as though the floods were an unavoidable fate.
But the reality is different. Floods in Sudan are not an exceptional event or an unexpected disaster; rather, they are a well-known and largely predictable seasonal phenomenon. Therefore, the real question is not why the rivers overflow, but why floods continue to inflict such massive humanitarian and economic catastrophes while hindering the country’s development. The answer lies in the fact that the fundamental problem is not the river itself, but the policies and institutions responsible for managing flood risk.
Over the past four decades, eight million people have been affected by floods, with thousands losing their lives or livelihoods, while the national economy has suffered losses amounting to billions of dollars. The 2020 floods were a stark example of this crisis: more than 176,000 homes were destroyed or damaged; dozens of hospitals and healthcare facilities were affected; 123 schools were destroyed, and more than one thousand were damaged, in addition to roads, bridges, and water and electricity networks. Sudan’s archaeological sites were not spared either. For instance, floodwaters reached the royal city of Meroe for the first time in history, threatening one of the most important sites of human heritage.
These losses were not solely due to the force of nature, but also to inadequate preparedness and flood risk management (FRM). Floods may be inevitable, but the devastation they cause is not.
The fundamental problem is that Sudan continues to manage floods through a reactive emergency response approach, rather than a proactive FRM strategy. When a disaster strikes, state agencies and humanitarian organizations mobilize to provide aid, shelter, and relief. However, after the crisis subsides, meaningful steps are rarely taken to address the underlying causes that allow similar disasters to recur on the same scale year after year.
This does not mean that Sudan lacks laws or institutions. Laws exist regulating water resources, civil defence, and humanitarian work, and various institutions have responsibilities related to flood management. However, these responsibilities are distributed among multiple entities, creating overlap and fragmentation, without a unified national framework that clearly designates the lead authority for the FRM system, defines its operational structure, or establishes how coordination between different institutions is to be carried out.
This institutional fragmentation has a direct impact on the ground. The absence of a comprehensive national strategy means that efforts remain fragmented, and resources are often directed toward response after disasters occur rather than toward prevention and risk reduction. Consequently, reliance on foreign humanitarian aid has become part of the flood management cycle, when such assistance should be the exception rather than the rule.
Perhaps the most important lesson revealed by international experiences is that countries that have succeeded in reducing flood losses did not achieve this by attempting to eliminate floods, but rather by changing their approach to FRM and their understanding of floods themselves.
In the Netherlands, 60% of the country is prone to flooding; the solution was not limited to building dams and erecting barriers. Instead, the country adopted a philosophy based on “giving rivers more space,” expanding floodplains, and enhancing nature’s capacity to absorb water. The goal was not to resist the river, but to coexist with it in a more sustainable way that reduces flood risks, protects communities, and minimizes damage.
As for Japan, its approach focuses on building an integrated FRM system that combines advanced infrastructure, early warning systems, clearly defined institutional responsibilities, and public participation in FRM decision making and disaster preparedness. As opposed to solely on government response after disasters occur, Japan emphasizes continuous public preparedness through education and awareness programs, training, the distribution of hazard maps identifying at-risk areas, regular evacuation drills, and the periodic review of disaster management plans.
In China, flood management is treated as a shared national responsibility involving governments at all levels, institutions, and society. This approach is embedded in law and supported by sustained investment in infrastructure, planning, and scientific research, demonstrating how long-term commitment and coordinated action can strengthen flood resilience.
Despite the differences between these experiences, they all share one principle: investing in prevention and preparedness is far less costly than paying the price of repeated disasters, and it reflects a commitment to protecting human dignity and the well-being of citizens.
This is the lesson Sudan needs to learn. FRM should not be treated as a seasonal humanitarian issue that can be addressed later, but rather as a pressing development issue and a necessary investment in the country’s future. The recurring losses each year drain the national economy, disrupt essential services, threaten food security, increase poverty and displacement, and hinder long-term development efforts.
Therefore, reform should begin with the establishment of a comprehensive national FRM strategy that clearly defines institutional responsibilities, creates effective coordination mechanisms, and commits the state to long-term planning based on scientific research, data collection, continuous monitoring, infrastructure investment, early warning systems, and community awareness.
Furthermore, floodplain management should be integrated into urban planning, with land-use practices in flood-prone areas reviewed and regulated where necessary, alongside the promotion of nature-based solutions that help mitigate flood risks.
Sudan cannot prevent floods from occurring, but it can choose whether they continue to become recurring national crises. By adopting a proactive approach to flood risk management, Sudan can protect lives, preserve livelihoods, strengthen resilience, and transform seasonal flooding from a source of devastation into an opportunity for sustainable development.
This article is a summary of a forthcoming policy paper titled Flood Risk Management and Sustainable Development in Sudan: Proposed Public Policy Reforms.