Why Ethiopia Zenawi may ignite war against Eritrea?
By Yohannes Woldemariam*
“Western diplomats are concerned that Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister, may be tempted to be more bellicose to divert attention from his domestic problems. The behaviour of his Government has become a deep embarrassment for Tony Blair. This year he championed Mr Meles, a former Marxist rebel, as one of the “new breed” of African leaders worthy of much greater Western support. Mr Meles was appointed to Mr Blair’s Commission for Africa, which promotes aid to countries that practice good governance.1”
Nov 6, 2005 — I think this assessment of the Western diplomats is correct. Tony Blair has been eager to portray Ethiopia and his African client, Meles Zenawi, as a showpiece for democracy, development and human rights in Africa. However, since the Ethiopian opposition allegedly won a majority in the summer 2005 elections, the Zenawi regime has become increasingly desperate in its response to opposition demonstrations and protests and has been engaged in day light massacre of civilian demonstrators. Yet, the crackdown has largely failed to quell opposition fervor, and the killings of demonstrators have not slowed the momentum of the opposition bandwagon. So things might be falling apart for both Meles and Mr. Blair. Meles is desperate and desperate people are very dangerous!
My guess is that Meles prefers to maintain his power by using force internally. If, however, the domestic use of force will divide the military along ethnic lines, then he might try to protect his power by pursuing a diversionary aggression against Eritrea. Meles’s TPLF junta may choose aggression against Eritrea because its narrowing base of public support, lack of a unifying mission, and intra-regime splits have made both acquiescence and continued domestic repression unpalatable options. Repression at home will more than likely divide the military against itself, giving the TPLF powerful incentives to protect its rule by using force against Eritrea. Again, although there may still be other restraining factors which discourage war with Eritrea, the TPLF’s situation is extreme enough that its preference for aggression against Eritrea maybe overriding.
The CUD opposition and Meles are in a fundamental disagreement even on the rules for governing the political game. The dispute is not over relatively mundane matters and technicalities, but over the most fundamental rules – unconstrained TPLF dictatorship or competitive multiparty democracy. The Opposition groups feel that they have accumulated considerable power, and they want to apply it to change the rules of the political game. The unwillingness to play politics by a common set of rules is what makes the TPLF willing to use force to protect its power. The TPLF cannot resolve these disputes by following any established rules and procedures, because there are no commonly accepted rules and procedures. To achieve its goals, the TPLF must resort to extra-legal means. As the current situation shows, students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the TPLF shoots against these forces.
The CUD has recognized the increased utility of force in this environment, and it is trying to acquire coercive capabilities while preventing the regime from gaining them. Because the TPLF possesses these capabilities in abundance, CUD are forced to encroach upon its interests. CUD is trying to gain the loyalty of groups within the military. If successful, it may weaken military cohesion by appealing to soldiers from their own ethnic groups (e.g. Amhara), class, regional, or other groups.
Most Ethiopian officers in key positions are drawn from the TPLF’s home base in Tigray. But the vast majority of the military have been diversified since the (1998-2000) border war with Eritrea. Under these circumstances, when elections are contested, all groups in the country are relatively freed from the constraints of political rules and procedures. Executive decrees become impotent. Most relevant here, the rank and file military can ignore a purportedly authoritative TPLF command.
How will the TPLF use its coercive capabilities when its power is challenged? It could provoke external threats (read as Eritrea) in order to rally the populace and silence its opponents. Provoking an Eritrean “threat” will conceivably buffer the TPLF from the internal opponents like CUD. The TPLF calculation is that it would be poor politics for CUD to interfere with the military in a time of crisis. Using force against Eritrea does not, however, eliminate opponents. But it hopes that foreign crises would encourage a rally round the flag effect. Dissension gives aid and comfort to the enemy; hence the domestic opponents must mute their attacks on the government or risk discrediting themselves in the eyes of their own constituents. At a minimum, opponents must leave it alone. At a maximum, they must hastily burnish their patriotic credentials, echoing and even outdoing military alarms, in order to avoid being branded traitors.
The Meles regime can exploit an imagined threat from Eritrea. He could use as pretext the recent restrictions imposed by the Eritrean government on the UNMEE movements which limited the UNMEE’s ability for surveillance of the demilitarized zone. He can claim that Eritrea has attacked him first and that he is defending Ethiopian sovereignty. Decoding his statement, “if Eritrea opts for aggression then Ethiopia is prepared to take decisive and irreversible action to smash the attack and protect its sovereignty, ” suggests that he might be entertaining a resort to aggression against Eritrea.
Meles’s efforts to resolve domestic conflict, ideological disputes, ethnic strife, regional separatism, and other differences have reached an impasse. To the extent that the Ethiopian military has become a microcosm of society, this condition will tend to divide it against itself. Using force domestically can exacerbate these disagreements. It entails repressing some groups like the Amharas and privileging the Tigreans. By openly taking sides and calling the Amharas names like Interhamwe (the Rwandan genocidiares), Meles has adopted a clear ethnic line. Some officers are members of the Amhara, Oromo and other ethnic groups and there are indications that they feel repressed, disenfranchised, or otherwise disadvantaged and using force domestically provides them with conflicting incentives. For example, some pilots from the air force have flown their planes to neighboring countries and others have defected while in advanced training in Eastern Europe. As members of the military, they stand to gain by going along with Meles to protect their interests. As members of other class, ethnic, ideological, or other groups, however, they stand to gain by protecting the interests of their groups and opposing repression. If using force at home sufficiently alienates enough officers, then the Ethiopian military risks dividing along ethnic lines.
Prior to the 1998-2000 border war with Eritrea, the Ethiopian military was dominated by the TPLF and was relatively homogeneous. Unlike the larger society, the officer corps was not divided along ethnic, religious, ideological, or other lines. But recruitment needs during the border war changed this. Now, the Ethiopian military is diverse. A split military is rent by many overlapping cleavages. For example, not only will officers come from distinct regions in the country, but they will also be members of different ethnic groups, economic classes, religious faiths, and so forth. Because of the numerous cleavages and the resulting diversity of interests in the military, officers will, like their counterparts in the larger society, disagree about fundamental political issues. In particular, they will disagree about how to use force domestically. Furthermore, because these cleavages overlap, one bloc of officers will consistently disagree with the others. Even in the best of times, relations between these opposing blocs will be strained. In an environment of contested situations, relations could be unmanageable.
Protests against the results of the Ethiopian election turned violent in June, when TPLF Special Forces opened fire on crowds in the capital during demonstrations, killing at least 37 people, which then prompted a massive crackdown on the opposition in which thousands were detained. The same and perhaps an even worse situation have been repeated as I write. Something very serious is simmering in Ethiopia. The Meles regime is therefore bent on using force against Eritrea not to protect its parochial interests and not particularly to acquire disputed territory. Rather, it is seeking to provoke an Eritrean “threat”as a diversionary tactic from its domestic woes. Sadly, Tony Blair, the EU, the U.S. and the U.N, instead of taking measures of firm deterrence, are engaged in reassuring appeasement of Meles and enabling policy.
* Yohannes Woldemariam is an Eritrean living in the United States.
1- THE London TIMES, Border unrest to divert attention from domestic issue say diplomats, November 04, 2005 The Times (November 04, 2005), By Richard Beeston and Jonathan Clayton.