Tagadum’s split and impact of new parallel government
By Mohamed Al-Badawi
The Sudanese political forces coalition, known as “Tagadum,” experienced a split on February 10, 2025, dividing into two groups. Tagadum was established as a coalition calling for a ceasefire in Sudan, comprising a majority of the civilian forces that participated in the constitutional and executive positions in the transitional government and a wing of the Sudanese Professionals Association. This coalition persisted throughout the transitional period interrupted by the 2021 coup, followed by the April 2023 war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The coalition’s announcement of its agenda to stop the war gave the international community hope that it would be a centre for making decisive decisions to end the conflict in Sudan and restore the civil path before the 2021 coup. However, this optimism clashes with questions about the reasons for the division, the signs of which appeared in the conflicting positions, and the desire of a group within Tagadum to form an executive government in areas controlled by the RSF.
This comes amid the continuation of the war and the decline of support for efforts to stop it. The government expected to be announced in the RSF-controlled areas will necessarily operate under the umbrella of these forces, even if in coordination with them, given some of the stated goals of this step. This is because the concept of any authority, in the context of the ongoing war, means protecting the exercise of its functions, which will naturally be done by the RSF and under its supervision.
This is in addition to being subject to the structures previously announced by the RSF in the areas it controls, such as the “Relief Agency” announced by the RSF commander in August 2023 as a parallel body to the Humanitarian Aid Commission, which is subject to the Ministry of Social Welfare, according to the governing structures in the 2019 Constitutional Declaration.
Among the goals announced by the expected government is facilitating civilians’ access to aid. This goal raises questions about the mechanisms the government will adopt to achieve this, foremost of which is the extent to which the regional and international communities recognize this authority. This recognition, if achieved, necessarily means diplomatic recognition, which entails providing legal status for relief agencies, countries, and global organizations that provide aid. These political and procedural complications may lead to results independent of the Port Sudan government.
The issue of international and regional recognition of the expected government is subject to constitutional frameworks and international norms, as in cases of self-governance or peaceful secession through a constitutionally stipulated referendum, a recognized peace agreement, or the implementation of the provisions of a historical document granting a region the right to self-governance or secession after a specific period.
This situation raises questions about the situation in the Darfur region, especially the attack on El Fasher, the last of the five state capitals of Darfur that remains outside the RSF’s control.
The conflict in Sudan is inherently intertwined with power and resources, as both warring parties seek to achieve goals related to control and influence. This conflict has led to the obstruction of the transitional period, cutting off the path to democratic civil transition and excluding civilians from the power equation.
The split of “Tagadum,” regardless of the agreements or disagreements with it, weakens the peaceful civil entity, the Sudanese parties, and the Sudanese state, as practices may lead to a different reality. This division raises fundamental questions about the nature of the RSF, which represents a military body lacking a party cover under its umbrella and supervision.
Will the RSF’s approval of the formation of an executive government in the areas under its control be in the form of an alliance with the bodies willing to do so? Or will this transform those bodies into a political body under its supervision? This raises another question about the political interest of both parties, whether the RSF or the group that announced the alliance with it. It is worth noting that the RSF has preceded the scene by forming civil administrations in the areas under its control, some of which are still in place, while others, such as the model announced in Wad Madani, have been swept away by the conflict.
Considering the current situation, what is happening represents an extension of issues that were not addressed promptly. The division of Tagadum represents a continuation of the reasons for the earlier division of the Sudanese civilians following the fall of the National Congress regime in 2019. This division reflects the failure of the political and civil forces to coordinate to stop the war and form a national body representing the civilians, who constitute the main missing link in the equation. This situation will reveal an impact on the unions and civil bodies included in the lists of political alliances amid the continuing confusion about the relationship of unions and civil organizations with the executive and political authority.
Finally, the announcement of a government in the RSF-controlled areas raises questions and scenarios about the course of relations outlined above. Answering these questions will lead to meaningful answers about the political and legal responsibility and the human rights record related to the protection of civilians and their conditions. The duty of protection is an inherent condition for any authority that declares its responsibility for managing or supervising specific areas under its control. This is in addition to the responsibility of any military party outside of that to abide by the protection of civilians. In other words, the expected civil authority will be an addition to the bodies entrusted with responsibility under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, which govern the current state of war in Sudan.