Fractured Triangle: How the Sudan war is dividing Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia
Professor Mekki El Shibly
Executive Director, Cognisance Centre for Strategic Studies
- Arab Triangle: Conversion–diversion dynamic
The ongoing war in Sudan is revealing deep and potentially lasting fractures within a once-cohesive regional triangle: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Longstanding allies, these three powers had, for nearly a decade, acted in concert to shape the post-Arab Spring regional order, often coordinated by a shared ideological commitment to countering political Islam and stabilising neighbouring regimes. Yet Sudan’s descent into full-scale war in April 2023 has exposed growing contradictions in their strategic objectives, threatening to upend not only Sudan’s prospects for peace but also the regional alliance system that once promised order.
This divergence has become so pronounced that the three states have found themselves backing different belligerents or pushing conflicting diplomatic tracks. The UAE has emerged as the principal external backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Egypt has thrown its weight, albeit inconsistently, behind the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, appears caught in between: convening peace talks in Jeddah, hosting refugees, and signalling a desire to reclaim its traditional role as mediator in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
At the heart of this fragmentation lies a complex interplay of geopolitics, political economy, ideological realignment, and refugee politics. Understanding how these dynamics interact is key to assessing both the trajectory of the Sudan conflict and the durability of the Egypt–UAE–Saudi axis.
- The geopolitical chessboard: security, sovereignty, and strategic depth
Sudan sits at the intersection of multiple strategic theatres. For Egypt, Sudan is an extension of its southern frontier, vital for border security, Nile water negotiations, and projecting influence in the Sahel. Cairo views the SAF as the legitimate military partner to protect these interests. The RSF, by contrast, is seen as an unpredictable paramilitary force with tribal roots, cross-border economic networks, and suspected links to illicit arms and human trafficking.
For the UAE, Sudan represents both a commercial frontier and a strategic gateway. Abu Dhabi’s stake in Sudan includes access to gold, agricultural land, and a possible foothold on the Red Sea. It sees the RSF, particularly under Hemeti’s entrepreneurial leadership, as a more pliable and transactional partner, capable of securing Emirati economic interests and countering Egyptian, Turkish and Qatari influence.
Saudi Arabia’s position is more ambivalent. While historically aligned with both Cairo and Abu Dhabi, Riyadh has adopted a more measured approach. It co-hosted the Jeddah peace talks and fears that further destabilisation could threaten Red Sea security and its Vision 2030 projects along the western coast. The Kingdom’s deeper concern is that unchecked militarisation of Sudan could export insecurity to Yemen, Somalia, and Eritrea, jeopardising the fragile regional equilibrium.
- The political economy of proxy warfare
The triangular rivalry is not just about power, it is also about economic interest and influence. Sudan is resource-rich and governance-poor. Its gold exports have become a lifeline for the RSF, allegedly facilitated through UAE-linked supply chains. This has allowed the RSF to operate as a self-financed militia, impervious to traditional sanctions or pressure.
Egypt, struggling with its own economic crisis, has far fewer levers. It relies on Gulf support to stabilise its economy, yet remains sidelined in Sudan’s commercial spoils. Egyptian frustration is mounting, not only at the RSF’s battlefield gains but also at Abu Dhabi’s growing control over Red Sea trade routes and borderlands, including the strategic triangle linking Libya, Sudan, and Egypt.
This divergence raises a critical question: Can Egypt, dependent on UAE financial support, still assert an independent Sudan policy? Cairo’s failure to stop UAE-backed General Haftar from aiding the RSF suggests its leverage is limited.
- From anti-Islamist to transactional: The waning ideological consensus
Perhaps the most ironic and consequential shift in this triangular rivalry is the decline in the role of ideology. For much of the past decade, the Egypt–UAE–Saudi triangle was unified by a powerful ideological driver: the containment of political Islam. Sudan, under Omar al-Bashir, was seen as a troubling node in the Islamist network, and all three countries quietly welcomed his ouster in 2019. Their early post-revolution engagement with Sudan’s transition was framed mainly through this lens: support for military figures, suspicion of civilian groups with Islamist sympathies, and active marginalisation of groups like the Popular Congress Party and Islamic Movement remnants.
However, the war that broke out in 2023 changed the calculus. The ideological coherence has since fractured under the weight of realpolitik. The UAE’s support for the RSF, despite its links to ex-Bashir loyalists and Islamist-leaning tribal networks, has revealed a shift from ideology to instrumentalism. If paramilitary actors can deliver strategic depth, gold exports, and territorial leverage, their ideological baggage is overlooked. Similarly, Egypt’s alignment with SAF has less to do with anti-Islamist priorities and more with military institutionalism and border stability. Even Saudi Arabia, historically hostile to Islamist actors, has taken a more pragmatic approach in its attempts to broker peace, engaging with a wide range of actors across the spectrum.
In this light, ideology is no longer the primary organising principle of regional policy toward Sudan. It has been superseded by geopolitical rivalry, economic penetration, and maritime strategy. This shift not only reflects changing national interests but also raises the possibility that Islamist actors, marginalised but not extinguished, may find new spaces to re-emerge amid fragmentation and foreign-backed militarisation.
- Refugees and the hidden cost of proxy warfare
As Sudan’s war drags on, it has created the world’s largest displacement crisis, with over 10 million people displaced, over 2 million refugees in neighbouring countries, and more arriving every day. This exodus is no longer simply a humanitarian concern; it is becoming a core national security issue for the three regional powers backing Sudan’s belligerents.
- Egypt: Demographic pressure and political anxiety
Egypt has received more than half a million Sudanese refugees since the war began, adding to an already sizable Sudanese population. While Egypt has historically had more open policies toward Sudanese nationals, the current economic crisis, coupled with rising xenophobia and securitisation, has turned refugees into a politically sensitive issue. Cairo fears that continued RSF gains will trigger new refugee flows toward its southern border, potentially overwhelming public services and exacerbating urban unemployment and housing shortages. Worse still, there is anxiety that Islamist or RSF-affiliated networks could infiltrate these refugee communities, creating internal security risks. Paradoxically, UAE support for the RSF may be contributing to Egypt’s refugee burden, intensifying tensions between the two states and reinforcing Cairo’s support for SAF as a strategy to halt RSF expansion and future displacement.
- Saudi Arabia: A buffer State with strategic stakes
Saudi Arabia has largely kept its borders closed to Sudanese refugees, but it is deeply concerned about instability spreading across the Red Sea corridor. Port Sudan, where millions have fled, lies directly opposite Jeddah and key Red Sea trade routes. Prolonged conflict risks creating waves of maritime migration, piracy, and security breaches. Moreover, Saudi Red Sea investments, in Neom, maritime logistics, and tourism, depend on a stable western flank. A failed Sudanese state with armed actors operating near the coast could jeopardise Riyadh’s strategic ambitions. Saudi Arabia, therefore, sees an incentive in ending the war not just for humanitarian reasons, but to prevent spillover, protect its strategic corridor, and avoid a repeat of Yemen-style refugee and maritime crises.
- UAE: Beneficiary of chaos or hostage to it?
The UAE, while geographically removed, is deeply implicated in Sudan’s refugee dynamics, albeit indirectly. Its support for the RSF has contributed to the collapse of governance in Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum, driving millions to flee. While the UAE hosts relatively few Sudanese refugees, it funds humanitarian operations in Sudan and across the region to blunt criticism of its role. In the long term, however, the UAE may find itself at the mercy of the consequences of its own policies. A protracted war could drive instability into the Sahel, where Abu Dhabi has made significant investments in energy and security partnerships. Refugees crossing into Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia may destabilise those fragile regimes, undermining Emirati influence. Moreover, the RSF’s dependence on transborder networks, gold, arms, and human trafficking, creates reputational risks. If these flows increasingly intersect with refugee movements, the UAE could be accused of enabling human rights abuses or transnational criminality under the cover of proxy warfare.
- Conclusion: The war that redefines the region
Sudan’s war is not just a local conflict; it is a stress test for a broader regional order. The once-coherent Egypt–UAE–Saudi triangle is being pulled apart by diverging security concerns, economic rivalries, ideological recalibrations, and refugee pressures. If these trends continue, the war may not only redraw Sudan’s political map but also rewrite the rules of alliance politics in the Arab world.
What began as a coordinated push to stabilise the region is now fragmenting into a set of parallel, and often conflicting, agendas. The longer the war continues, the harder it will be to restore strategic consensus, and the more likely it is that non-state actors, transnational networks, and ideologically fluid militias will fill the vacuum.
The “reverse veto” in Sudan is not only a diplomatic deadlock; it is the symptom of a deeper regional reordering. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, each with overlapping but increasingly divergent interests, are navigating a complex landscape in which traditional alliances no longer guarantee policy coherence.
If left unresolved, the Sudan file could trigger a broader recalibration of regional relations. A new alignment may emerge: one where Egypt and Saudi Arabia forge a strategic axis focused on state stability and territorial sovereignty, while the UAE continues to pursue influence through non-state actors and economic leverage.
For Sudan, this divergence means that a unified regional push for peace remains elusive. For the broader region, it signals a shift from strategic unity to strategic competition, one whose consequences will reverberate far beyond Khartoum. In the end, Sudan is not just the battlefield; it is the mirror reflecting the shifting balance and deepening contradictions of Arab geopolitics.