War, political paralysis and plunder in Sudan
Where do the changes in SAF command lead?
Tasis government—no word, no action, what’s happening?
Are they really going to sell downtown Khartoum and the Sunt Forest?
Yasir Arman
“The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born; now is the time of monsters.”
This is one of the most famous sayings of the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci, as found in his Prison Notebooks (1929–1935), where he wrote about the ruling class losing its leadership role and relying instead on authoritarianism.
Taking Gramsci’s words, Sudan’s old order is dying, and the new is struggling to be born. Now is the time of the war monsters.
Two weeks after the controversial changes carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the fog has cleared, and the picture has become sharper. The army leader now holds the reins of power inside the military more firmly than before. It is also clear that the removal of Islamists from the army is impossible without ending the war and building a civilian democratic political system. This is the main reason why Islamists and their allies are fighting against democracy and civilian government, because such a transition would end their hijacking of the state. This remains the central issue—without resolving it, our people cannot build a professional state that channels resources toward sustainable development.
Indeed, some Islamists have been removed from the army’s command, while other Islamists have risen to the top.
The most crucial figure removed was General Nasr al-Din, commander of the armoured corps, whom the Islamists had recently polished up to have him “eat for lunch” the Chief of Staff and “for dinner” the Commander-in-Chief. Yet before lunch, he was already devoured at breakfast. Had he managed to challenge the Chief of Staff, he would have been like a buffalo in the forest sharpening its horns on the trees, without stopping there!
It is clear that the changes within the army point to escalating the war, with a more cohesive leadership. The war will intensify at the expense of civilians, especially in Kordofan and Darfur. On the other side, the Rapid Support Forces are also escalating the war, now focusing on Kordofan and al-Fashir, which has taken them away from attacking the Northern and River Nile states or returning to their previous areas of control. These battles, too, are paid for by civilians—the tragedy in al-Fashir is living proof. For civilian forces, stopping the war remains the first priority.
Meanwhile, the Tasis government has not addressed the people, has failed to improve humanitarian conditions, and remains incomplete. At the same time, Kamil Idris, who works piecemeal without vision or strategy, has only made matters worse. Clearly, Tasis is facing real internal difficulties. It would have been better if it had simply formed a civilian administration—like what Dr. John Garang did for over twenty years despite the difference between the two experiences. Forming a government now will harm the Tasis alliance before it harms Sudan unity and risks its division. Both warring sides would be better off pursuing peace rather than clinging to two unrecognized governments that cannot unite the Sudanese people. The longer these governments persist, the more resentment, destruction, and hatred will grow.
Talk has resurfaced about ministries not returning to downtown Khartoum, about creating a new administrative capital, and the old-new project of the Sunt Forest, which we resisted back in 2006. This project would block Khartoum’s riverfront, replace it with a concrete jungle that dumps its waste into the Nile, pollute the environment, and obscure the confluence of the two Niles at al-Mogran—a site registered as world heritage and a natural landmark. It would also flood fishing villages by preventing the White Nile from extending beyond its banks, and seize wide swathes of the Sunt Forest—the only organic forest in Khartoum, legally protected since 1925. All of this is being looted for the benefit of parasitic capital, led by Islamists and their partners.
Now there are attempts to seize downtown Khartoum, including the ministries, Council of Ministers, government institutions, and the University of Khartoum. The British built this area in the form of their Union Jack flag, and over time its historical and commercial value has only increased. Islamist corruption networks have long fought to sell it off, just as they sold off many state assets and projects. Not only that, but they have encroached on citizens’ land whose value has skyrocketed, as in Jireif, Halfaya, Burry, Mayo, and Soba. Today, groups are planning to loot land under the cover of war, weak public resistance, and pretexts of “planning” and “a new administrative capital.” This would be the largest land grab Sudan has seen since the British left and the Inqaz regime came to power—an utterly corrupt system that has learned nothing and forgotten nothing.