Francis Mading Deng and Issameldin Abbas Ahmed

Introduction:

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, the Sudan crisis has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation and overlap of regional and international initiatives aimed at halting the fighting and launching a comprehensive political process. Despite the intensity of these efforts and the diversity of actors involved – from the Jeddah and Manama platforms to the International Quad and the Quintet and the efforts of the French Promediation Organization,  this multiplicity has failed to translate into any meaningful breakthrough in the peace process. On the contrary, it has contributed to increasing the complexity of the landscape by fostering an environment of competition and institutional fragmentation, thereby undermining the prospects for a unified international position.

This reality has given rise to several complicating dynamics, most notably “forum shopping” by the parties to the conflict, the fragmentation among civil and political actors, the dilution of policies, and the repetition of rhetoric shaped by a “lowest common denominator” approach – without producing tangible results. In this context, the core problem is no longer the absence of initiatives, but rather the lack of effective coordination among them, as well as the absence of an inclusive framework capable of ensuring complementarity of roles and directing efforts toward clear, shared objectives. Accordingly, there is a pressing need to rethink how this multiplicity is managed, and to transform it from a source of paralysis into a driver of coherence that can enhance the prospects for a sustainable political settlement.

External mediators have been concentrating on addressing the humanitarian crisis associated with the  war, understandably leaving the political resolution of the conflict to the Sudanese. Sustainable peace will require addressing the root causes that are historically rooted and have engulfed the country into successive wars since independence. These wars have resulted in alternating civilian democracy and military dictatorships that have defied civilian democratic governance. The challenge for the Sudanese is therefore to agree on a framework that ensures peace, security and stability based on inclusivity, equality and dignity for all citizens.

Facilitation Platform Overlap: Three Key Complications

First: Geopolitical Competition and Proxy War Dynamics

The Quad – comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt – was established to exert pressure on both parties to the conflict to accept the roadmap proposed in September 2025. However, internal rivalries have significantly undermined its effectiveness. The Sudanese government has accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Egypt is widely perceived as backing the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). These competing alignments have rendered the Quad an incoherent platform, lacking unified direction. 

The Quintet initiative – which expands the Quad framework by incorporating additional international and regional actors, including the United Nations and key Western partners – was conceived as a broader diplomatic mechanism to overcome the limitations of narrower coalitions. In principle, the Quintet offers several strengths. Its expanded membership enhances international legitimacy and provides a more comprehensive platform for aligning political, humanitarian, and economic tracks. The inclusion of multilateral actors allows for greater technical capacity, access to peacebuilding tools, and a stronger linkage to global norms, particularly in areas such as civilian protection and humanitarian access. Moreover, the Quintet can, at least theoretically, dilute the impact of bilateral rivalries by embedding them within a wider consultative framework.

However, these same features also introduce notable weaknesses. The broader composition often leads to slower decision-making and diluted policy coherence, as consensus becomes harder to achieve among actors with divergent strategic interests. Geopolitical competition can reproduce, rather than resolve, the divisions seen within the Quad. Additionally, the Quintet risks becoming another layer of diplomatic fragmentation if it fails to clearly differentiate its mandate or effectively coordinate with existing initiatives. In the absence of a unified enforcement mechanism or shared strategic vision, it may struggle to translate diplomatic engagement into tangible leverage on the ground, thereby limiting its overall impact on the trajectory of the Sudanese conflict.

Within this fractured landscape, the French Promediation initiative has sought to partially bridge the widening gap between fragmented civil actors and the broader political process. These efforts concentrate on rebuilding horizontal dialogue among divided civilian forces, facilitating discreet channels of communication between civil actors and local power holders, and connecting localized mediation processes in regions such as Darfur and Eastern Sudan with national-level political discussions. While such initiative has generated important micro-level spaces for confidence-building and coordination, their overall impact remains structurally constrained. They operate in a context marked by the absence of unified civilian leadership, inconsistent engagement by external mediation platforms, and the continued dominance of armed actors over decision-making processes, thereby limiting their ability to influence the broader trajectory of the conflict.

Second: Fragmentation and “Forum Shopping”

Internally, the existence of multiple and parallel tracks – military-security versus political has enabled each party to engage selectively with initiatives that align with its tactical interests. The RSF has shown greater receptiveness to the Quad framework, while the SAF continues to promote its own roadmap. This divergence has contributed to genuine diplomatic paralysis and a fragmented vision of a viable political solution.

Such fragmentation is not limited to the warring parties; it extends to regional organizations as well. Notably, differences between the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are evident in both tone and approach. While the AU adheres to strict legal norms regarding unconstitutional changes of government, IGAD has adopted a more flexible posture in an effort to facilitate a pragmatic, ground-level agreement. These divergent approaches further complicate efforts to build a coherent mediation framework.

Third: The Lowest Common Denominator and the Erosion of Effective Influence

Repeated calls by international and regional mediators have produced little tangible change on the ground, revealing a persistent pattern of policy dilution and rhetoric without results. The proliferation of platforms and the divergence of their priorities have reduced collective positions to the “lowest common denominator,” stripping initiatives of meaningful operational content and reducing them to repetitive political statements lacking enforcement mechanisms and follow-up.

This dynamic is clearly reflected in the outcomes of major diplomatic engagements. Instead of agreeing on concrete and actionable measures – such as ceasefire monitoring mechanisms, binding timelines, or credible leverage – these initiatives tend to produce generalized appeals for cessation of hostilities, dialogue, and humanitarian access. These formulations essentially represent the minimal positions all actors can accept without incurring real political costs. This, in turn, allows the parties to signal formal compliance without altering their conduct on the ground.

Despite the high-level attention surrounding the Paris (April 2024) and London (April 2025) conferences, their outcomes amounted to little more than repeated calls for a humanitarian truce, absent clear enforcement mechanisms or guarantees of compliance. The Berlin Conference (April 2026) followed a similar pattern: notwithstanding substantial financial pledges, it largely reproduced the same rhetoric and policy approach, without delivering measurable improvements in the humanitarian situation or meaningful progress toward a ceasefire.

In this context, the core challenge is no longer the absence of initiatives, but their structural inability to move from rhetoric to action – an outcome that has contributed to prolonging the conflict and deepening the trust deficit among stakeholders.

Maximizing the Impact of International Efforts

For external initiatives to achieve meaningful results in Sudan, they must be grounded in a coordinated approach that aligns bilateral, regional, multilateral, and international efforts in support of ceasefire negotiations and a comprehensive political process. Initiatives such as the Quad, Quintet, Promediation, and other multilateral platforms can operate effectively in parallel – but only if there is a clearly defined and genuine complementarity of roles. A breakthrough will depend on organizing these efforts within a shared strategic framework, including a common understanding of whether – and how – to engage the Sudanese parties to the conflict. Effective coordination can also help build trust among mediators, which in turn strengthens their credibility with the conflict actors.

First: Establishing an Effective UN-Mandated Political Mission

In light of the ongoing escalation and the increasing complexity of the crisis, there is an urgent need to establish an effective political mission under a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. Such a mission would be better positioned to overcome the limitations of fragmented initiatives and provide a unified and effective international framework.

A ceasefire should be treated as the essential entry point to a broader political process that addresses the root causes of the conflict and lays the foundation for a credible transition to durable  peace. Accordingly, the mission’s mandate should extend beyond political mediation to include oversight and coordination of the overall humanitarian response—ensuring unimpeded and non-politicized access, as well as strengthening civilian protection. 

In addition, the mission could play a central role in harmonizing regional and international efforts and reducing duplication by establishing a coordination mechanism that brings together key actors under a shared vision toward a comprehensive, just, and durable peace. This would help align interventions around agreed priorities and enhance the likelihood of achieving a genuine breakthrough in the peace process.

Second: Coordinating Efforts and Integrating Roles

Given the proliferation of initiatives, coordination and role complementarity have become essential conditions for achieving tangible impact. In this regard, the AU and the IGAD are well positioned to facilitate an inclusive Sudanese civil dialogue aimed at rebuilding trust among civil and political actors and reducing the fragmentation that has weakened their collective influence. This requires a shift from merely managing divisions to actively building effective coordination platforms that prioritize shared national interests.

At the regional level, the League of Arab States LAS has a critical role to play in revitalizing diplomatic engagement with regional actors – particularly those directly or indirectly involved in supporting the warring parties. Such engagement can help mitigate negative external interventions and curb the flow of arms. This role should evolve beyond traditional diplomacy toward closer strategic coordination with African and international initiatives, especially in the humanitarian domain, to ensure that aid delivery remains effective and free from politicization.

At the international level, the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom possess significant leverage, particularly through diplomatic engagement within the United Nations specifically the Security Council, as well as through logistical, technical, and financial support. However, the effectiveness of these efforts depends largely on the extent to which they are aligned within a coherent multilateral framework that minimizes duplication and directs resources toward clearly defined priorities – especially those related to civilian protection and the restoration of a civilian-led transition.

Ultimately, the central challenge is no longer the multiplicity of actors, but rather how to transform this multiplicity into a strategic advantage through coordinated action and integrated roles. Moving from competitive initiatives to a unified coordination framework is essential to reducing fragmentation and “forum shopping,” and to enhancing the prospects for a sustainable political settlement in Sudan.

As earlier noted, external mediators, bilateral and multilateral, correctly focus on the humanitarian aspects of the war and the urgency of assistance and protection of civilians, assigning the political dimension of ending the war and agreeing on sustainable peace to the Sudanese, albeit with the support of external partners. This requires an agreement on a framework for peace that is generally acceptable to the Sudanese people. Such a framework must, to a significant extent, prioritize ensuring the unity of the country on the basis of inclusivity, equality, and dignity for all without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, culture or gender. It must be recalled that the secession of South Sudan was the result of the failure of the national leadership to create conditions for consensual unity within a normative framework of full equality of citizenship. That was the core of the New Sudan Vision.

The leadership of the Islamist National Congress Party wrongly assumed that the secession of South Sudan would leave the rest of the country at peace with itself and united on the bases of the Arab-Islamic framework. But the ginny was already out of the bottle. the vision of New Sudan had inspired large portions of the Sudanese in the marginalized areas and among the liberally minded Sudanese throughout the country, many of whom had joined the South in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army, SPLM/A, and had sacrificed their lives in the struggle. Although the current war has been complicated by multiple internal and external factors that must be given due consideration, it is in significant part a continuation of the quest for the New Sudan Vision. The details of a framework that would gain consensus and the principles for transitional justice and accountability for those bearing the primary responsibility for the catastrophic conflicts that have devastated the country since independence can also be negotiated within the framework of national consensus.

The two wars in South Sudan consecutively lasted for seventeen years and twenty-two years. This was in significant part due to the denial of the root causes of the conflict by the national governments, which no longer holds. Besides, considering the intensity of the current conflict in the Sudan and the magnitude of the devastation the war has inflicted and continues to inflict on the country, it is unfathomable that the war in the Sudan can last anywhere that long. A mutually hurting stalemate and the ripening of the conflict, two conditions necessary for agreeing on an end to conflict, can expectedly be reached within a much shorter period of time. But in the interest of face-saving, a third-party mediator with requisite credibility and leverage is needed. While multiple mediators can contribute constructively, there is a need for a principal mediator or a more limited team of mediators to drive the process with the tools and resources needed for persuasive incentives.   

For the peace process to be credible,  comprehensive, and effective, it must syncretize humanitarian action with the stipulation of a vision for the outcome that ensures unity, inclusivity, equality and dignity for all the citizens.  Considering that internal conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan spill over their borders, thereby continuing to bind  tge two countries negatively by conflict, sustainable peace should also lay a foundation for cultivating closer ties of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the two countries. 

Conclusion

The Sudanese experience clearly demonstrates that the proliferation of initiatives, in the absence of effective coordination, does not necessarily accelerate conflict resolution; rather, it can produce the opposite effect by deepening divisions, thereby prolonging the war. The central challenge is no longer the creation of additional platforms or conferences, but the restructuring of existing efforts within a unified coordination framework that curbs competition and fosters genuine complementarity.

Achieving a meaningful breakthrough in the peace process requires a shift from the logic of parallel and competing initiatives to one of coordinated collective action, where the roles of regional and international actors are aligned and mutually reinforcing, and where political and humanitarian tracks are integrated within a coherent strategic vision. Strengthening effective international mechanisms – particularly an expanded political mission mandated by the UN Security Council – could provide a critical anchor for reordering this fragmented landscape.

Ultimately, the prospects for peace in Sudan will be determined not by the number of actors engaged, but by their capacity to operate within a shared framework that transcends narrow interests and places the priorities of the Sudanese at the center of all efforts. This will require strategic collaboration between the Sudanese and external actors and synchronizing humanitarian action with mediating sustainable inclusive peace, security, and stability.