Sudan’s narrowing window to prevent a deeper food crisis
By Dr Mohamed Elmunir Ahmed Safieldin
Public Policy Analysis and Administration Specialist
Sudan is approaching 2027 with a dangerous convergence of war, poverty, disrupted markets and declining agricultural production. Millions of Sudanese already struggle to get enough food, while insecurity, shortages of agricultural inputs, and adverse rainfall threaten to weaken the country’s capacity to feed itself. The danger is no longer simply humanitarian. It is becoming a national food-security and economic challenge requiring immediate planning. The United Nations reports that 19.5 million people face acute food insecurity and cites concerns about below-average rainfall, insecurity, and input shortages affecting the 2026 agricultural season (IPC and FAO Reports).
Using a very conservative planning assumption of 49 million consumers in the country in 2027, my estimate of annual requirements for the three principal grains, sorghum, millet, and wheat, is approximately 7.93 million tonnes. By comparison, reported production of these crops in 2025 was about 5.25 million tonnes.
The outlook becomes considerably more worrying if sorghum and millet production falls during the 2026/27 season. Under a scenario in which their production declines by 20 per cent from 2025 levels, and assuming wheat production reaches the Government-planned levels of approximately one million tonnes, the combined grain deficit would be about 3.08 million tonnes. If sorghum and millet production falls by 30 per cent, the deficit could rise to approximately 3.56 million tonnes. These two scenarios reflect the deterioration in rainfall conditions reported by FAO. On 24 September 2026, FAO reported cumulative rainfall deficits of about 20 per cent in Sennar and 30 per cent in Gedaref, two states that together produce, on average, roughly a quarter of Sudan’s sorghum. Agricultural stress indicators also showed severe drought conditions affecting up to 55 per cent of cropland in Sennar and 70 per cent in Gedaref. The assumed production declines should therefore be understood as analytical risk scenarios informed by these warning signals, rather than as official FAO production forecasts
The financial implications are equally serious. Using the indicative international prices, purchasing enough grain to cover the estimated deficit would cost Sudan approximately $1.17 billion under the 20 per cent production-decline scenario and $1.37 billion under the 30 per cent scenario. If we add a 15 per cent allowance for freight, insurance and handling, which are not included in the indicative prices, the total financial requirement could rise to approximately $1.35 billion to $1.58 billion. That represents an estimated increase of roughly 22 to 43 per cent over the calculated 2025 baseline import requirement.
This is why Sudan should not wait for the final harvest figures before acting. The country faces not only a potential grain shortage, but also the challenge of mobilising sufficient foreign exchange, securing supplies, and transporting food from ports and production areas to communities that need it. Domestic availability alone will not guarantee food security if households cannot afford food or if conflict and market disruption prevent it from reaching deficit areas.
Three actions deserve immediate priority.
First, Sudan should maximise the coming wheat harvest by prioritising irrigation, seed, fertiliser, fuel and agricultural finance. The current analysis assumes that successfully cultivating the targeted wheat area could raise domestic wheat production to around one million tonnes, substantially reducing dependence on imports.
Second, the government should establish an early and phased grain-procurement strategy rather than waiting for shortages to materialise. Procurement planning should be built around the estimated deficit range of approximately 3.08 to 3.56 million tonnes, while being continuously revised as actual harvest data, humanitarian food commitments and market conditions become clearer. Where feasible, alternative financing arrangements, including commodity-exchange or barter mechanisms, could also be examined to reduce additional pressure on scarce foreign exchange.
Third, Sudan must protect domestic production and food-distribution systems. Support for sorghum and millet producers should begin early, with timely access to quality seed, other inputs and agricultural finance. At the same time, maintaining the movement of grain from production areas and ports to consumption centres should be treated as both a humanitarian and an economic priority. Food-security planning should therefore assess deficits geographically, not merely as a single national balance.
Sudan still has an opportunity to reduce the severity of the coming food crisis, but the cost of delay is rising. Emergency interventions alone cannot address a potential grain deficit exceeding three million tonnes and a financing requirement that could approach $1.6 billion. It requires advance procurement, protection of domestic production and coordinated management of national grain supplies.
The figures presented here are scenarios, not predictions. They should be updated as soon as reliable estimates of the 2026 harvest become available. But their warning is already clear: Sudan cannot wait for a food-security emergency to fully materialise before preparing its response.