Nhial’s defection, a relaunch of the Garang boys, Kiir fight

by Steve Paterno

Gen. Abraham Deng Nhial has officially joined a long list of prominent Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) members who have defected from the movement. His move is currently dominating discussions among South Sudanese, thus requiring some structured historical context. One commentator, in a post on his Facebook (FB) page, seems to capture one of the central themes shaping the direction of the discussions surrounding Gen. Nhial’s political declaration, and is in line with the historical context contained in this article. The commentator tantalizingly asks, “Why is Abraham Nhial allying SSSM with UPA of Pagan?” The poster answers his own suggestive question in a revealing manner: “Methinks it’s a relaunch of the old fight: Garang boys vs. Salva Kiir.”

It is a known fact that Cdr. John Garang used to favour some individual members within the SPLM/A more than others. This rift became apparent in 2004, at a critical time for the movement, as it was about to sign a final peace deal with the Sudanese government in Khartoum. At that critical time, it was rumoured that Cdr. Garang was planning to restructure the SPLM/A hierarchy by, for example, replacing Deputy Chairman Cdr. Salva Kiir with Cdr. Abraham Deng Nhial. The rumours grew so serious that it was alleged that Cdr. Salva Kiir was about to be arrested as part of that restructuring process and was, in turn, about to launch a preemptive coup against Cdr. John Garang. The incident almost led to armed confrontations within the SPLM/A.

Fortunately, the issue was resolved peacefully in late 2004 in a joint meeting held in Rumbek involving the SPLM/A leadership, members of civil society, and community leaders. The meeting emphasized resolving and respecting the movement’s structures as its leaders entered a new era to preserve its legacy. Cdr. Garang underscored this very point. He pleaded that if the rumour were true, he planned to replace Cdr. Kiir with Cdr. Nhial, “it would have meant that I would have dismissed all those senior to Cdr. Nhial, including Cdr. Riek, Cdr. James, Cdr. Daniel Awet, Cdr. Lual Diing, etc.—which would be bad for the Movement.”

The peace agreement was subsequently signed in early January 2005 without any further obstacles within the movement. Unfortunately, Cdr. Garang died just a few months after the agreement was signed. Following Cdr. Garang’s death, President Kiir oversaw the formation of a government of national unity. Under the power-sharing terms of the peace agreement, the SPLM/A served as a junior partner in the government of Sudan and was responsible for the semi-autonomous government in Southern Sudan.

It was then that substantial evidence of factionalism within the SPLM/A emerged and became a subject of serious public discourse. The term “Garang Boys” quickly gained currency, a label meant to identify the officials Garang favoured and who wielded enough influence to lead a significant faction within the SPLM/A. Those officials were believed to remain loyal to Garang’s vision of a New Sudan. Cdr. Nhial was publicly noted as the de facto leader of this faction. Although SPLM/A officials publicly denied the existence of any wing within the party, prevailing events seemed to suggest otherwise, for example, in the first government formed in 2005 after the agreement, Cdr. Nhial was appointed Minister of Regional Affairs and a member of parliament in the government of Southern Sudan. Surprisingly, he abruptly left both government positions less than six months after occupying them. As a result, he went into exile in the United Kingdom (UK) and ceased all public engagement. No clear reasons for his resignation were forthcoming. His actions fueled public speculation about the role of factionalism and tensions within the SPLM/A, with his supporters praising his departure as principled and his detractors accusing him of self-interest and betrayal.

In the summer of 2006 in Washington, D.C., Cdr. Pagan Amum, the then-SPLM Secretary General, who was also identified as being among the “Garang Boys” faction, tried to address the issue of factions within the party:

1. He admitted it was true that rumours were being fed to President Salva Kiir to sideline some of them who were considered close to Cdr. Garang. He insisted, however, that President Kiir understood the problem well because the country and the president needed them (the ‘Garang Boys’) the most. Amum underscored that the president had ultimately embraced them despite the gossip against them. He further argued that this was the very reason the president brought them closer, even including some of them in the presidential delegation to the USA.
2. On the issue of Cdr. Nhial’s unexplained and abrupt resignations, Amum said that Cdr. Nhial never left the movement or government but instead went on leave. He said that Cdr. Nhial had requested leave even before Cdr. Garang died. It was Cdr. Garang who delayed Cdr. Nhial’s leave. Otherwise, Cdr. Nhial would have gone long ago to join his family in the UK.

However, such assurances from high-level officials never seemed to stop public speculation. Instead, unfolding events seemed to confirm the allegations. For example, damning evidence to that effect came from intelligence reports leaked through the WikiLeaks website, consisting of cables that originated from the U.S. embassy in Khartoum. Apparently, CIA officers stationed in both the American embassy in Khartoum and the consulate in Juba collected and analyzed information about the SPLM and its leaders. In those reports, American intelligence concluded that the SPLM party was divided into three major competing factions based on “ethnicity/regionalism and allegiance to the memory and vision of the late John Garang.”

Accordingly, the first powerful faction was the “Garang Wing,” which was still paying “lip service to Garang’s vision of a unified Sudan, a concept that is unpopular with a majority of Southerners.” Although the reports often identify Rebecca Nyandeng Garang and Pagan Amum as influential leaders of the “Garang Wing,” Cdr. Nhial was considered the most likely leader to emerge from their ranks. Regarding Pagan Amum’s leadership, one report quotes Ghazi Sulieman, a prominent SPLM member from northern Sudan, as telling U.S. embassy officials that Amum would have made a great leader, “except he is too short and too Shilluk.”

The second powerful faction consisted of those who supported President Salva Kiir. The reports insisted that President Kiir seemed to have broader support given his privately favored position on Southern secession, which was popular with most Southerners. He also gained the support of powerful armed militias formerly allied with the Sudanese government, led by Gen. Paulino Matip. At the time, the reports concluded that President Kiir stood as the most powerful leader among all the factions.

The third faction was reportedly led by Dr. Riek Machar, whom one report described as a “Nuer Chameleon as Southern Wild Card.” In other words, he was described as an unpredictable actor between the two factions. The reports further described Machar as someone with a treacherous past “who has cycled in and out of the SPLM.” He was not trusted within the South Sudan government, with many military intelligence reports asserting that he was working to undermine both the government and the SPLM party at the time. The reports concluded that Dr. Machar’s chances were drastically reduced, especially with Amum’s ascension to Secretary-General of the SPLM, which placed Amum second in the party’s hierarchy. Dr. Machar’s influence had also diminished, even among his Nuer constituents, because of the Kiir-Matip alliance. The reports said that Dr. Machar was only pursuing an alliance of convenience.

So, the Facebook commentator’s question—“Why is Abraham Nhial allying SSSM with UPA of Pagan?”—seems to have clear answers in our recent history. For example, in May 2018, Cdr. Nhial revealed to the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Khartoum that he was unwilling to “return to Sudanese politics” and “was not prepared to forgive Kiir for what he considered significant mismanagement within the government of Southern Sudan.” In July of the same year, he again told American Embassy officials that he was returning to the government because “his local constituents were pressing for his return.” Now that he has left the government and the party, the public is wondering how much his “local constituents” factored into his decision to form a political party in exile. Another question is how much support has he cultivated since then beyond his “local constituents”?

*Steve Paterno is an independent research analyst, consultant, and author. He can be reached at paternosteve@gmail.com