Oppose the Government, Not the State: Sudan’s Sovereignty Must Survive the War

By Dr Mohamed Elmunir Ahmed Safieldin

msafieldin@gmail.com

There are moments in the life of a nation when political disagreement must remain fierce, but one distinction becomes indispensable: opposing a government is not the same as weakening the state. Sudan has reached precisely such a moment.

Governments rise and fall. Leaders come and go. Political systems change. The state, however, is meant to endure. It is the continuing framework that embodies the country’s population, territory, institutions, sovereignty and international personality.

This distinction matters profoundly in today’s Sudan. Sudanese citizens and political forces have every right to challenge those exercising governmental power, criticize their policies, question their legitimacy and seek their peaceful replacement. But political opposition crosses a dangerous threshold when it begins to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity or essential institutions of Sudan itself.

Some Sudanese political actors have supported international measures intended to restrict the Sudanese Armed Forces’ access to weapons, military aviation or state resources. Such proposals may be motivated by a desire to pressure the authorities or end the war. But good intentions do not eliminate unintended consequences. The critical question is whether such measures pressure a government or whether they also diminish the capacity of the Sudanese state to protect its population, territory and continued existence as a sovereign entity.

The distinction between the belligerents also matters. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are the armed forces of the Sudanese state, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are described in contemporary governmental reporting as a paramilitary force fighting the SAF. Whatever one’s political judgment of either side, these institutional positions should not simply be treated as identical. 

Both parties remain bound by international humanitarian law. Civilians must be protected, and violations must not be excused in the name of sovereignty. But equality of humanitarian obligation does not mean equality of sovereign status. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions expressly provides that applying humanitarian protections in a non-international armed conflict does not affect the legal status of the parties. 

There is also a practical reality that policymakers should confront. Measures that appear equal on paper may be profoundly unequal in effect. A state conducts much of its international activity through visible diplomatic, financial and military channels that can be monitored and restricted. Non-state armed actors may operate through less visible networks. Equality of restrictions therefore does not necessarily mean equality of enforcement or consequences.

Sudan’s own recent history offers an important lesson for today’s politicians. When young Sudanese men and women rose against the authoritarian rule of Omar al-Bashir, they showed that determined opposition to a government need not become opposition to the country. The movement that began in December 2018 developed into demands captured in the words “Freedom, Peace, Justice,” while peaceful protest became one of its defining methods. 

That experience should be remembered not merely with nostalgia, but as a political lesson for the present. Young Sudanese confronted an entrenched government through civic mobilisation, courage and peaceful resistance. Today’s politicians should recover that patriotic principle: governments can be challenged and changed without making Sudan itself the casualty of the struggle for power. When political disagreement becomes existential, the country must remain larger than the quarrel.

International engagement can support mediation, humanitarian assistance and the search for peace. But Sudan’s political disputes ultimately require Sudanese political solutions. Durable peace cannot be imposed in place of national political consent. It must emerge from a process capable of addressing legitimate grievances while preserving Sudan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national institutions.

This is not an argument for any government. It is an argument for Sudan.

One can oppose a government while defending the state. One can demand civilian government while defending national sovereignty. One can demand accountability from state institutions while recognizing that reforming them is fundamentally different from weakening the foundations of the country itself.

Sudan belongs neither to a government nor to an army commander, political coalition or armed movement. It belongs to its people, including those who disagree profoundly about how it should be governed.

Governments will change. Leaders will depart. Political alliances will come and go. But when the guns finally fall silent, there must still be a Sudan within which Sudanese can disagree.

Governments are temporary. The state is our common national inheritance. Political opposition may be necessary; sacrificing the integrity of the nation is not.