The Reverse Veto: How Egypt and the UAE derailed the Washington conference on Sudan
By: Mekki El Shibly
The cancellation of the long-anticipated Washington Conference on Sudan is not merely a diplomatic setback, it is the most explicit confirmation yet of a troubling new pattern in global diplomacy: the ability of regional powers like Egypt and the UAE to wield a “reverse veto” that thwarts the decisions of global powers like the United States and the United Kingdom. When it comes to Sudan, Washington and London no longer set the rules of engagement; Cairo and Abu Dhabi now draw the red lines.
This development marks a pivotal moment in the evolution of international diplomacy toward Sudan. With the emergence of two rival state-building projects—Amal (the Port Sudan Alliance, aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces) and Tasis (the Nairobi Alliance, led by the RSF and its civilian allies)—the traditional model of negotiation between two warring factions has become obsolete. Instead of adjusting to this new political reality, the U.S. and its partners have opted to retreat. The conference’s failure is not a tactical delay; it is a strategic retreat.
Washington’s Dilemma: Between the Proxies of War
The original goal of the Washington Conference was to reboot international diplomacy through a unified track capable of ending the war and launching a political transition. But developments on the ground have far outpaced that vision. Amal and Tasis have each consolidated rival sovereignties—with territorial control, constitutional claims, and powerful regional backers.
Washington attempted to navigate this landscape without prematurely legitimizing any side. In fact, the conference had already been postponed once before due to internal objections to inviting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), whose close ties to Sudan’s old Islamist establishment raised concerns about granting undeserved legitimacy. Instead, Washington tried to engineer a more civilian-led track.
Egypt rejected this unequivocally, insisting that the SAF is the only legitimate representative of the Sudanese state and warning that any effort to elevate Taasees or marginalize the army would be seen as hostile. Meanwhile, the UAE warned against excluding Hemedti and his allies. Quiet but sustained pressure from both Cairo and Abu Dhabi compelled Washington and London to abandon any inclusive framework that might undermine their proxies. As London backed off, so did Washington.
The Reverse Veto, Confirmed
The collapse of the Washington Conference (July 2025), like that of the London Conference (April 2025), confirms what many observers have long suspected: real influence over Sudan’s diplomatic track no longer lies with the West, but with the regional actors funding the war. Though Egypt and the UAE rank low on most global power indices, they have gained outsized leverage by controlling the tools of influence on the ground. This is the essence of the reverse veto: when smaller regional powers constrain the policy options of global powers.
In Sudan, this means that Washington and London can no longer impose a peace framework—or even convene an effective diplomatic forum—without prior approval from Cairo and Abu Dhabi. The image is stark: the United States is no longer leading but reacting. It is no longer setting the agenda but managing its fallout. For Sudanese civilians and regional actors seeking principled leadership, the message is clear: even superpowers can be sidelined by empowered proxies.
Amal and Taasees: More Than Factions
The rise of the Amal and Taasees alliances has redrawn Sudan’s political map in seemingly irreversible ways. Amal, operating from Port Sudan, provides political cover for the SAF and enjoys strong backing from Egypt and certain Arab League members. Its project is one of continuity—preserving the old state bureaucracy, asserting legal legitimacy, and denying the validity of rival tracks.
Taasees, on the other hand, seeks to refound the Sudanese state. It unites the RSF, the SPLM-N (al-Hilu), and other forces to form emerging political institutions with a secular and decentralized constitutional vision. Though young and facing questions of legitimacy, it offers a clear alternative to both the army and the Islamist old guard. These are not mere negotiating teams; they are embryonic states. And the lesson from both the London and Washington conferences is clear: any international process that ignores their institutional demands is doomed to fail. Tragically, it is not the warring Sudanese factions that delivered this blow—but their regional patrons: Egypt and the UAE.
The Biggest Loser: Sudanese Civilians
The primary victims of the conference’s collapse are the Sudanese people—the main casualties of both war and diplomatic paralysis. Civilian coalitions had hoped Washington might offer them an independent role. Over the past year, groups such as Taqadum/Somoud and the Sudanese Women’s Charter have sought recognition as independent political actors, distinct from the two military blocs. But the reassertion of the regional veto has sidelined them once again.
What Comes Next? Three Scenarios
- Cairo Ascendant: Egypt may now attempt to redesign the entire diplomatic process by hosting the SAF and its non-Islamist allies in a Cairo-led forum, excluding Taasees and independent civilian platforms. If Washington and London remain absent, this track could become the de facto peace process—provided it succeeds in isolating the Islamists.
- Multipolar Mediation: The current vacuum could trigger parallel initiatives, such as an Emirati-led dialogue in Nairobi, an AU-IGAD forum in Addis Ababa, or even a civilian dialogue hosted by Qatar. However, without a unified framework, these tracks will likely echo one another without making an impact.
- Civilian Reset: The only viable long-term path may be to build a purely civilian political process that sidelines both military projects from leading the constitutional conversation. This would require unprecedented coordination between the West and Gulf actors—still unlikely under the current “reverse veto” dynamic.
What Should Washington and London Do Differently?
- Impose a Unified Framework: Instead of yielding to regional vetoes, Washington and London must design a multi-track process separating short-term security negotiations (involving Amal and Taasees) from a long-term political transition (led by civilians).
- Make Recognition Conditional: Legitimacy must not be granted automatically. It should be tied to humanitarian conduct, ceasefire compliance, financial transparency, and respect for civilian leadership.
- Pressure Cairo and Abu Dhabi: Quiet diplomacy is no longer sufficient. Washington and London must make it clear that obstruction via reverse veto will carry consequences—sanctions, suspension of economic or military aid, and reputational costs.
- Empower Civilians: Civilian actors must be treated as primary interlocutors, not appendices. Any track that marginalizes them should be considered illegitimate.
From Paralysis to Action
The cancellations of the London and Washington conferences are blaring alarms. They have exposed a fundamental flaw in Western diplomacy toward Sudan: not an excess of voices, but the silencing of all others by the loudest few. Egypt and the UAE have shown they can obstruct international action. Washington has finally followed London’s lead and backed down. But the real test lies ahead: Will the U.S. and the U.K. continue down the path of reactive diplomacy, or will they reclaim the initiative by imposing a civilian-led process? If they fail, the war will not just persist—it will become entrenched. And neither Sudan nor the regional and global order can afford that.
* melshibly@hotmail.com